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CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF THE LAW GOVERNING
A TARGET'S DIRECTORS
ABSTRACT
This article sets out a proposed federal uniform standard
governing the actions by the board of directors of a publicly
held corporation that is the target of a change of control trans-
action. This proposal would apply in each of the following four
merger and acquisition transactions: (1) the acquisition of a
target in an arm's-length negotiated merger or acquisition; (2)
the acquisition of a target in a management buyout; (3) the
proposed acquisition of a target in a hostile tender offer; and
(4) the acquisition by a target's controlling shareholder of the
minority interests in such target in a freezeout merger.
Under this proposal, an independent and knowledgeable
change of control board would be appointed for the target, and
this board would have complete authority over the acquisition
process. Because of the board's obvious independence, a uni-
form governance standard, the business judgment rule, would
apply in determining if the board acted properly.
This article proposes that federal law preempt state law
rules governing the actions of a publicly held target's board in
each of these transactions. However, this is only a default rule
because a corporation's shareholders could elect not to have
the provision apply or could elect to have it apply only in cer-
tain circumstances, such as in a hostile tender offer. The adop-
tion of this provision would enhance the competition for corpo-
rate governance rules in change of control transactions.
This proposal would replace the four separate governance
rules generally applicable to a target's directors under Dela-
ware and other state law in arm's-length transactions, man-
agement buyouts, tender offers, and freezeouts. This article
[Vol. 70
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also rejects the four sets of rules proposed for these transac-
tions in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendation.
This proposal would also override all state takeover laws,
such as control share statutes, business combination statutes
and disgorgement statutes, which generally have the purpose
or effect of protecting incumbent management.
By placing the control of the change of control process in
the hands of truly disinterested directors and applying the
business judgment rule in all cases in which a change of con-
trol board acts, this proposal should cure the problem of un-
predictability and vagueness, should result in a substantial
decrease in litigation in change of control situations, and
should enhance the efficiency of the change of control market.

CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD: FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF THE LAW GOVERNING
A TARGET'S DIRECTORS
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article sets out a proposed federal uniform standard
governing the actions by the board of directors of a publicly-
. Professor and Director, Center for the Study of Mergers and Acquisitions,
University of Miami School of Law. First, I would like to thank the members of
the University of Miami faculty who participated in the 1995 faculty symposium
at which I first presented this paper. This paper reflects comments made by the
following faculty members: Anthony Alfieri, Tim Canova, Mary Coombs, John
Gaubatz, Steve Halpert, Elliott Manning and Tom Robinson. Second, I would like
to thank Professor Roberta Romano of the Yale Law School for her extensive
comments and for arranging for me to present this paper at the Law, Economics
and Organization Workshop at Yale during the fall semester 1998. Comments
from the following participants in that workshop were particularly helpful: Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Ian Ayres, Josh Brady, Henry Hansmann, Ian Lopez, John
Langbein, Roberta Romano, and Alan Schwartz. Third, I thank the following
merger and acquisition practitioners for their critiques: R. Franklin Balotti of
Richards, Layton & Finger; Dennis S. Hersch, head of the mergers and acquisi-
tions department at Davis Polk and Wardwell; Marshall L. Small of Morrison &
Forester LLP, one of the reporters on the American Law Institute Corporate Gov-
ernance Project; and Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Fourth, I
want to thank the members of the University of Virginia Law School faculty who
participated in a 2001 faculty symposium on this paper. Various sections of this
paper reflect comments by the following Virginia faculty members: Ed Kitch,
Kevin Kordana, Mike Dooley, Paul Stephan, Bob Scott, Paul Mahoney and George
Cohen. Fifth, I thank the faculty of the Washington and Lee University School of
Law for their helpful workshop in 2001 on this paper; comments from the follow-
ing W&L faculty members are reflected here: Lyman Johnson, David Millon, Leo
J. O'Brien, and Mark Grunewald. I must emphasize that very few of the com-
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MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
held corporation that is the target of a change of control board
transaction. This proposal would apply in each of the following
four merger and acquisition transactions:
(1) The acquisition of a target in an arm's-length negoti-
ated merger or acquisition;
(2) The acquisition of a target in a management buyout;
(3) The proposed acquisition of a target in a hostile ten-
der offer; and
(4) The acquisition by a target's controlling shareholder
of the minority interests in such target in a freezeout merger.
Under this proposal, an independent and knowledgeable
change of control board would be appointed for the target,1
and this board would have complete authority over the acqui-
sition process. Because of the board's obvious independence,
one uniform governance standard, the business judgment rule,
would apply in determining if the board acted properly.
This article proposes that federal law preempt state law
rules governing the actions of a publicly-held target's board in
each of these transactions. However, this is only a default rule
because a corporation's shareholders could elect not to have
the provision apply or could elect to have it apply only in cer-
tain circumstances, such as in a hostile tender offer. The adop-
tion of this provision would, therefore, enhance the competi-
tion for corporate governance rules in change of control trans-
actions.
This proposal would replace the four separate governance
rules generally applicable to a target's directors under Dela-
ware and other state law in arm's-length transactions, man-
agement buyouts, tender offers, and freezeouts. This article
This article does not address the issue of the proper treatment of the ac-
quiring corporation, unless the target's shareholders after the acquisition end up
with more than 50% of the acquiror stock. See infra Part III.B. Several proposals
exist for the treatment of the acquiror. See John R. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1269-72 (1984) (suggesting that
acquiror's shareholders have right to vote on acquisitions above certain size);
George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Mergers: Toward a Market Based Legal Re-
sponse, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 777, 794-806 (1986) (proposing that courts enjoin ac-
quisitions where announcement of which causes material decline in price of
acquiror's stock).
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also rejects the four sets of rules proposed for these transac-
tions in the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendation.2 However, the
scope of authority of a change of control board, the duty of
care governing the actions of a change of control board, and
the formulation of the business judgment rule protection for a
change of control board are based on analogous provisions of
the ALI's Corporate Governance Project.
This proposal would also overide state takeover laws, such
as control share statutes, business combination statutes, and
disgorgement statutes, which generally have the purpose or
effect of protecting incumbent management.
In a recent article, Professors Bebchuck and Ferrell of
Harvard Law School stated the following:
Our analysis of Delaware takeover law highlights the fact
that its rules governing defensive tactics seem to be charac-
terized by unnecessary ambiguity and unpredictability, result-
ing in frequent litigation. While this aspect of Delaware law
benefits the interest of the Delaware bar, which might be of
importance to Delaware, it is difficult to see how shareholders
are benefited by the excessive unpredictability and vagueness
of its rules.'
Since the corporate governance rules proposed by the ALI are
similar to those in Delaware, it could be expected that the
adoption of the ALI rules would not solve this problem of un-
predictability and vagueness. On the other hand, by placing the
control of the change of control process in the hands of truly
disinterested and informed directors and applying the business
judgment rule in all cases in which a change of control board
acts, this proposal should cure the problem of unpredictability
2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMENDATION (vols. 1 and 2) (1994) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PROJECT]. The ALI's approach to these four transactions is explored in
detail in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., The Merger and Acquisition Provisions of the
ALI Corporate Governance Project As Applied to the Three Steps in the Time-
Warner Acquisition, 1996 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 145 (1996).
' Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The
Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1172 (1999).
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and vagueness, should result in a substantial decrease in litiga-
tion in change of control situations, and should enhance the
efficiency of the change of control market.
I must emphasize that this article is not an attack on the
Delaware judiciary or bar; as a teacher of corporate law, I be-
lieve that Delaware has the most knowledgeable corporate law
judges and many of the most knowledgeable corporate lawyers
in the country. Adoption of this proposal would only reduce the
role of the Delaware bench and bar in change of control trans-
actions; they would continue to be active in other areas of cor-
porate law.
While most readers of this article will likely have an initial
adverse reaction to the idea of federalizing any aspect of state
corporate law, the purpose and effect of this proposal is to re-
duce regulatory and judicial interference in the market for
corporate control. Thus, both those who believe the current
federal system produces a "race to the bottom" and those who
believe the system produces a "climb to the top" should support
this proposal.
Section II of this article sets out the rationale for the
change of control board concept by illustrating the conflicts of
interest existing under current law and showing how this pro-
posal would remedy these conflicts and provide other benefits.
This section also reviews the proposals in the ALI Corporate
Governance Project for the treatment of change of control
transactions and discusses why these proposals are not an
adequate substitute for the change of control board concept.
Section III discusses in detail the operation of the change
of control board concept and outlines the collateral changes to
the federal securities laws that would be needed if the change
of control concept were adopted. To facilitate analysis of this
proposal, the Appendix contains a suggested amendment (i.e.,
Proposed Section 14A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "1934 Act") detailing the operation of the change of control
board concept.
Section IV illustrates how the change of control board
concept would have applied in several leading cases. Section V
then discusses why the use of the current concept of disinter-
[Vol. 70
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ested directors does not effectively address the fundamental
conflict problem in change of control situations.
Section VI examines whether a federal uniform governance
standard is consistent with the empirical evidence bearing on
the advisability of federalizing corporate law. Section VII sur-
veys various other proposals for addressing change of control
transactions, and Section VIII compares the change of control
board concept with the rules governing takeovers in the United
Kingdom, Germany, and the European Union. Section IX ana-
lyzes the negative comments of several merger and acquisition
practitioners on this proposal, and finally, Section X, the con-
clusion, provides a summary of the arguments in support of the
adoption of the change of control concept.
II. RATIONALE FOR THE CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
A. Introduction
The basic purpose of the change of control board is to elim-
inate the potential conflict of interest facing a target's board in
each of the four acquisition transactions mentioned above.
Potential conflict is apparent and well recognized in manage-
ment buyouts, tender offers, and freezeouts.
The potential conflicts also exist in arm's-length transac-
tions, because the target's board or senior managers may re-
ceive in connection with such a merger or acquisition a collat-
eral payment, such as a golden parachute payment or a post-
acquisition employment agreement. Deutsche Bank AG's ac-
quisition of Bankers Trust Corporation in an arm's-length
transaction provides a good illustration of these potential con-
flicts. The merger agreement provided for substantial annual
payments to several of the top officials of Bankers Trust, in-
cluding a $10.1 million annual bonus to the Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Frank Newman.' Shortly after comple-
tion of the transaction, Mr. Newman resigned "with a contro-
versial $69 million pay package after failing to land a spot on
Deutsche Bank's board and after reports that Bankers Trust
Bankers Trust Corp., PROXY STATEMENT, 38 (Mar. 23, 1999).
20001
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used unclaimed customer funds to pump up its bottom line."5
It is highly likely that Mr. Newman would not have received
payments at these levels if a change of control board had been
in place for Bankers Trust. On the other hand, nothing here
would limit the post merger compensation an acquiror could
pay the target's top management.
The discussion below illustrates the conflicts in several
leading change of control cases and shows how the current
corporate governance rules address these issues. Also, the rules
for change of control transactions proposed in the ALI Corpo-
rate Governance Project are examined. Neither the current
rules nor the rules proposed in the Project adequately address
these transactions.
B. Illustration of Conflicts and Current Law Governance Rules
for Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Introduction
This section examines several seminal cases that illustrate
the potential conflicts in arm's length, management buyout,
tender offer, and freezeout transactions. The section below
dealing with arm's length transactions considers the Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in (1) Smith v. Van Gorkom, (2)
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner),7
and (3) Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.
(QVC).8 Although Time-Warner and QVC resulted in hostile
tender offers, they started as arm's-length negotiated transac-
tions.9
The section which addresses management buyouts looks at
the Second Circuit's 1986 decision in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc.10 and the Delaware Chancery Court's
1996 decision in Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc."
' Karen Lowry Miller et al., Fixing Deutsche Bank, Bus. WK., July 19, 1999,
at 56, 56.
6 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
8 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
9 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1143-46; QVC, 637 A.2d at 39-40.
10 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
" Civ. A. No. 12489, 1996 WL 159628 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996), 21 DEL. J.
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In considering tender offers, the Delaware Supreme Court's
decisions in (1) Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,12 (2) Time-Warner, and (3) QVC are examined. This sec-
tion also examines a Delaware federal district court's decision
under Delaware law in Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Ser-
vices, Inc. 3 and the Pennsylvania federal district court's deci-
sion under Pennsylvania law in Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Con-
rail, Inc. " In addition, this section discusses the Delaware
standard governing the actions of a target's directors in a ten-
der offer as reflected in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.15
and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.1 6
The section focusing on freezeouts examines the Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.7 and
Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. 8
These decisions are briefly summarized below. Although
many other cases could be discussed, these cases illustrate the
conflicts that can arise in the four types of change of control
transactions addressed here. Section IV discusses the manner
in which the change of control board proposal would have ap-
plied in each of these cases.
2. Arm's-length Transactions
Smith v. Van Gorkom 9 was an arm's-length acquisition in
which Trans Union, a publicly-held corporation, was acquired
in a cash merger by Marmon, a corporation controlled by the
Pritzker family.2" The chief executive officer of Trans Union,
Van Gorkom, was the driving force behind the transaction."
He was a major shareholder of Trans Union and was about to
CoRP. L. 1143 (1996).
12 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
" 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995)
14 No. 96-7167, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997).
" 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
16 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
17 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
'8 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), on remand, No. 8749, 1995 WL 301403 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 17, 1995), affd, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995).
19 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
21 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865-70.
21 Id. at 865-66.
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reach retirement age.22 After consulting with Trans Union's
controller concerning an acceptable acquisition price for Trans
Union, but without consulting Trans Union's investment
banker, Van Gorkom suggested to Jay Pritzker that Marmon
acquire Trans Union at a price of $55 per share.' This price
was a substantial premium over the market price of the Trans
Union shares. Jay quickly accepted the offer but demanded a
lock-up option to purchase a substantial number of Trans Un-
ion shares at $.75 above market.25 He also demanded that
Trans Union not shop the deal.2" Van Gorkom accepted both
terms.27 Over the objection of some members of senior man-
agement, Trans Union's Board approved the transaction at a
hastily-called two-hour meeting.'
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that since Van
Gorkom was approaching retirement age, he may have been
particularly motivated to effectuate a quick sale of the company
and of his shares.29 Notwithstanding this potential conflict,
the court did not find that Van Gorkom had a legally cogniza-
ble conflict of interest sufficient to take the transaction out of
the business judgment rule.
The board consisted of a majority of outside directors who
were found by the court to be sophisticated, experienced in
business affairs, and well informed about Trans Union's fi-
nances.3" The court held, however, that the directors "did not
adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forc-
ing the 'sale' of the Company ... [and] were grossly negligent
in approving the 'sale' . . . upon two hours consider-
ation . . . ."" The court, therefore, denied the directors the
2 Id. at 866.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 869 n.9.
25 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
26 Id. at 868.
27 Id. at 867.
28 Id. at 869.
29 Id. at 866.
20 Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2d at 868.
31 Id. at 874.
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protection of the business judgment rule and remanded for a
determination of damages.32
A quick reading of the facts of the Van Gorkom case leads
one to ask why a sophisticated executive like Van Gorkom
would follow such a casual procedure in selling an undervalued
public corporation. One might argue Van Gorkom was moti-
vated by something other than a desire to maximize the long-
term interest of the shareholders. This is so even though Van
Gorkom was a major shareholder himself. It may have been
that he was interested most in maximizing what he perceived
to be his own short term interest by effectuating a quick sale
while he was still in control of the corporation.
In criticizing the court's decision, Professor Fischel argues:
Van Gorkom had strong incentives to negotiate the best deal
possible. The transaction was negotiated at arm's-length;
moreover, Van Gorkom was himself a large shareholder. The
better the deal that Van Gorkom negotiated, the more money
he made himself.... Van Gorkom was one year away from
retirement and thus had no reason to block a merger in the
interest of keeping his job.33
While all of these points are true, they do not contradict the
observation that Van Gorkom presumably had a personal inter-
est in seeing a quick sale of the company and that he may have
let his personal interest lead him to an unwise decision to sell.
The Van Gorkom decision also illustrates that independent
directors are not necessarily reliable as a check on strong insid-
ers like Van Gorkom. The adoption of the change of control
board concept proposed here would eliminate the potential for a
strong chief executive to dominate a target's decision-making
process in a change of control situation. Although the change of
control board would be expected to consult with the
corporation's senior managers and its board, it is highly unlike-
ly that the control board would permit itself to be dominated.
'2 Id. at 893.
" Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and The Trans Union Case,
40 Bus. LAw. 1437, 1445-46 (1985).
2000]
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
In both the Time-Warner and QVC transactions, which are
examined in more detail below in connection with tender offers,
the boards of corporations that ultimately became the targets of
hostile tender offers (i.e., Time and Paramount) negotiated
arm's-length merger agreements with friendly corporations.'
The boards of both these companies had a majority of indepen-
dent directors.35 Both merger agreements contained provisions
designed to discourage third party bids, and, at the time the
merger agreements were entered into, the boards of both Time
and Paramount knew that other firms were interested in ac-
quiring them.36 It is inconceivable that a change of control
board would have entered into either of these "arm's-length"
transactions without first thoroughly exploring other potential
transactions.
3. Management Buyouts
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,'
Hanson made a tender offer for SCM, and in response, several
of SCM's inside directors, together with Merrill Lynch, pro-
posed a leveraged management buyout as an alternative to
Hanson's offer.38 In evaluating the two offers, SCM's board
acted through a committee of disinterested directors who were
advised by the investment banking firm of Goldman Sachs and
the law firm of Wachtell Lipton. 9
On the advice of Goldman and Wachtell, the disinterested
directors granted a crown jewel lock-up option to the manage-
ment group.40 At this point, the offer of the management
group was for cash and stock with an aggregate estimated
value of $72.50 per share, and Hanson's offer was for cash of
$72 per share." Hanson subsequently increased its offer to
"' Time-Warner, 571 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Del. 1989); QVC, 637 A.2d 34, 34 (Del.
1993).
'5 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1143; QVC, 637 A.2d at 34.
's Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1144-46; QVC, 637 A.2d at 39-40.
, 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
3 Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 268-69.
" Id. at 267-68.
40 Id. at 270.
" Id. at 271.
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$75 per share in cash.4 2 In addition to the lock-up option,
SCM also granted the management group a no-shop agreement
and paid Merrill Lynch's fees for entering the bidding ("hello
fees") and agreed to pay Merrill a fee in the event its offer
failed (a "goodbye fee").43
Although Goldman Sachs advised the disinterested direc-
tors that the option prices were within the range of fair value,
the court found that the option prices were substantially under-
valued and that "the disinterested directors never asked
Goldman what the stock would generate at top value.""
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying New York
law, observed that it appeared as if Goldman, Wachtell, and
the disinterested directors wanted the management group to
prevail.45 The court nevertheless found that the disinterested
directors were not interested in the transaction and acted in
good faith and without fraud, which are the normal conditions
for protection under the business judgment rule.48 The court
went on to say, however, that this was not enough and that the
directors were required to meet the "standard of due care" with
"conscientious fairness."47 The court elaborated on this point
as follows:
The law is settled that, particularly where directors make
decisions likely to affect shareholder welfare, the duty of due
care requires that a director's decision be made on the basis
of 'reasonable diligence' in gathering and considering material
information. In short, a director's decision must be an in-
formed one.48
In support of this proposition the court cited a draft of the ALI
Corporate Governance Project.49
42 Id. at 272.
" Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 270.
" Id. at 275.
45 Id. at 272-73.
16 Id. at 274.
47 Id.




The court went on to find that although the actions of the
disinterested directors did not amount to gross negligence as in
Van Gorkom, the disinterested directors did not properly in-
form themselves of the value of the optioned assets.5" Conse-
quently, their actions were not protected by the business judg-
ment rule."1 The burden, therefore, switched to the disinter-
ested directors to prove that the option price was either fair or
in the interest of the shareholders, and the directors failed to
meet this burden.52 The option was, therefore, enjoined. 3
Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.' applies Del-
aware law in a management buyout in which the target was to
be acquired by an entity controlled by the target's controlling
shareholder."5 In such case, the entire fairness test applies.56
Further, under Lynch, which is discussed below in connection
with freezeouts, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
establish that the transaction is entirely fair, unless there is a
"properly functioning committee of independent directors repre-
senting the interest of the minority ... ."" In such a case, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff."6 In Dairy Mart, the court said
that it could not find as a matter of law that the independent
committee functioned properly.59 One of the two members of
the committee was a paid consultant to the target, and the
committee did not attempt to negotiate a higher price than that
offered by the management group because the controlling
shareholder would not permit the target to consider any other
offers.60 Also, the court pointed out that in this situation, "the
selection of professional advisors for the committee doesn't give
50 Id. at 275.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 277-83.
"' Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 283.
14 No. 12489, 1996 WL 159628 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996), 21 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1143 (1996).
"' Dairy Mart, 1996 WL at *1, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1149-50.
56 Id. at *8, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1156.
5, Id. at *6, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1156.
58 Id.
5 Id. at *7-8, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1157.
Dairy Mart, 1996 WL at *7-8, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1157-58.
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comfort, it raises questions."61 Finding that it could not con-
clude as a matter of law that the transaction was entirely fair,
the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.62
Under Delaware law, if it is clear that the independent
directors are the decision-makers for the target, and these
directors are not in any way related to the buyout group, the
business judgment rule may apply.63
Hanson Trust shows that even though disinterested direc-
tors may not have a legally cognizable interest in a transaction,
they may have a bias for management that deters their ability
to act vigorously in promoting the welfare of shareholders. It is
highly unlikely that any change of control board would conduct
itself like the boards in Hanson Trust or in Dairy Mart. Also,
the legal and other advisors to the change of control board
would not be beholden to the senior management, as was ap-
parently the case in Hanson Trust.
4. Tender Offer Defensive Tactics
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.' involved
a battle for control of Revlon between Pantry Pride and
Forstmann Little, which acted as a "white knight" in coming to
the rescue of Revlon."5 The board of Revlon granted an auction
ending lock-up to Forstmann, which Revlon favored throughout
the process, even though Forstmann's offer was not clearly
superior to Pantry Pride's offer.' As part of its offer,
Forstmann agreed to support the value of Revlon's outstanding
notes, which had been issued by Revlon as a defensive tactic in
exchange for part of its outstanding stock.67
In setting out the legal standard to be applied in the case,
the Delaware Supreme Court first noted that under the busi-
61 Id. at *8 n.6, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1158 n.6.
62 Id. at *10, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 1161.
6 In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders' Litigation, [1988-1989 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
, Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176, 183.
Id. at 175-79.
6 Id. at 178-79.
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ness judgment rule, the directors get the benefit of a presump-
tion that in making a decision they acted: (1) on an informed
basis, (2) in good faith, and (3) in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interest of the corporation." The
court noted that this rule did not apply here, because in this
situation the enhanced duty adopted by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. applies.69 The
Unocal court noted that when a board adopts takeover defenses
there arises "the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders .. . ."o If directors act in
their own self-interest, the business judgment rule does not
apply, because disinterestedness is one of the conditions for
application of the rule." The Revlon court went on to set out
the Unocal enhanced standard as follows:
This potential for conflict places upon the directors the bur-
den of proving that they had reasonable grounds for believing
there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, a
burden satisfied by a showing of good faith and reasonable
investigation. In addition, the directors must analyze the
nature of the takeover and its effect on the corporation in
order to ensure balance - that the responsive action taken is
reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
Thus, as a result of the potential conflict of interest inher-
ent in the adoption of takeover defenses, the Revlon directors
had the burden of proving first that they acted in good faith
and conducted a reasonable investigation.73 Proof of these ele-
ments would show reasonable grounds for believing there was
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness. 4 The directors
Id. at 180 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (1984)).
Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985)).
70 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
7' Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180.
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then had to show that their defensive measures were reason-
able in relation to the threat posed.7"
In addressing the issue of whether there was a threat to
Revlon's corporate policy and effectiveness, the court reasoned
as follows: at the point in the bidding war that it became ap-
parent that the break-up of Revlon was imminent, the "duty of
the board changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corpo-
rate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a
sale for the stockholders' benefit."76 At this point, "the ques-
tion of defensive measures became moot, [and] [tihe directors'
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auction-
eers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at
a sale of the company."77
In applying this legal standard, the court found that the
"principal object" of the Revlon board in granting the lock-up
option "appears to have been protection of the noteholders over
the shareholders' interest."8 The board was concerned that if
Pantry Pride's offer succeeded, the notes would lose value and
the directors could be held personally liable.79
The court reasoned that although lock-ups and related
agreements are permitted when not tainted by director interest
and other breaches of fiduciary duty, the actions taken by the
Revlon directors did not satisfy this disinterested standard."
Further, citing Unocal, the court said that a "board may have
regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibili-
ties, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders."81
Further, the court stated that the noteholders had accepted
the notes subject to fixed contractual terms and, therefore,
"nothing remained for Revlon to legitimately protect, and no
rationally related benefit thereby accrued to the stockhold-
75 Id.
7' Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 184.
79 Id.
80 Id.
" Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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ers."8 2 Consequently, "the merger agreement with Forstmann
was unreasonable in relation to the threat posed," and, there-
fore, the court enjoined the merger, the no-shop agreement, and
the payment of cancellation fees. 3
Revlon demonstrates that although a target's board may
not have a legally cognizable interest in the acquiring vehicle,
it may have other reasons for favoring one party to a takeover
at the expense of the shareholders. In this regard the court
noted:
Revlon had dealt preferentially, and almost exclusively, with
Forstmann throughout the contest. After the directors autho-
rized management to negotiate with other parties, Forstmann
was given every negotiating advantage that Pantry Pride had
been denied: cooperation from management, access to finan-
cial data, and the exclusive opportunity to present merger
proposals directly to the board of directors .... [Tihe direc-
tors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing
favorites with the contending factions."
In elaborating on the second prong of the Unocal test-that
the defensive measures be balanced-the Delaware Supreme
Court in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.5 held that a
defensive action could not be coercive or preclusive and must
fall within a range of reasonableness.8 At a minimum, the
actions of Revlon's board would appear to be preclusive.
The adoption of the change of control board concept would
avoid the type of favoritism shown by Revlon's board for the
Forstmann offer. It can be expected that a change of control
board would be fiercely loyal and diligent in pursuing the wel-
fare of the target's shareholders.
In Time-Warner, Time and Warner agreed to a stock for
stock merger in which Time would acquire Warner in a reverse
subsidiary merger, with the Warner shareholders owning 62%
82 Id. at 182-83.
8' Id. at 183-204.
Id. at 184.
651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
6 Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-88.
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of the resulting company, Time-Warner. 7 The merger agree-
ment contained certain defensive measures such as a "no-shop,"
and Time had a poison pill in place.8 Delaware law provided
that Warner's shareholders had to approve the merger, and the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules provided that Time's
shareholders had to approve the transaction.89
After Time and Warner mailed their proxy material, Para-
mount made an "all cash, all shares" tender offer for Time at
$175 per share.' Time's board found this offer inadequate and
restructured its acquisition with Warner as a two-step transac-
tion as follows: first, a cash tender offer for 51% of Warner's
shares at $70 per share; second, a freezeout merger for Time-
Warner securities also at $70 per share.91 Paramount in-
creased its tender offer for Time to $200 per share, but Time's
board also rejected this offer as inadequate.92 As pointed out
by Chancellor Allen in the lower court opinion, Time's invest-
ment banker, Wasserstein Perella, rendered an opinion that
Time was worth substantially more than $200 per share. 3 In
commenting on Wasserstein's prediction that the trading range
for Time's shares in 1993 would be between $208 and $402,
Chancellor Allen said that this is a "range that a Texan might
feel at home on."'
Certain shareholder plaintiffs brought action against Time
arguing that under Revlon, Time was required to auction itself
because by entering into the transaction with Warner and
adopting the protective devices, Time had put itself in play.95
Paramount and the shareholder plaintiffs also brought a
Unocal claim against Time's board.96
17 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del.
1989).
'8 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1146.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1147.
" Id. at 1148.
9' Id. at 1149.
' Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Recp. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,272-73 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
id.




The court first held that Time's board acted on an informed
basis in negotiating the original merger, and consequently, this
transaction was protected by the business judgment rule. 7
Second, the court held that even though the Time share-
holders would have become minority shareholders of Time-
Warner, there was no change of control of Time because the
stock of Time-Warner would be in the hands of a "fluid aggre-
gation of unaffiliated shareholders."98 Consequently, Time had
not put itself up for sale, and the Revlon auction requirement
was not applicable.99
Third, the court held that in structuring the tender offer
for Warner, Time initiated a defensive tactic that was governed
by Unocal. °° Under the first part of the Unocal test, Time
correctly concluded that Paramount's offer posed a "cognizable
threat" to Time's "culture."'01 Under the second part of the
Unocal standard, the Court found Time's tender offer for
Warner to be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
10 2
Thus, the court let Time reject Paramount's offer and proceed
with its transaction with Warner. °3
In QVC,' °  after several discussions, Paramount and
Viacom entered into a merger agreement pursuant to which
Viacom, which was controlled by Sumner Redstone, would
acquire Paramount. 05 The consideration originally to be paid
by Viacom was Class A voting stock, Class B non-voting stock
and $9.10 in cash, with an aggregate value of approximately
$70 per share of Paramount."° The merger had (1) a no shop,
(2) a termination fee of $100 million, and (3) a stock option on
19.9% of Paramount's stock.' 07 The stock option could be paid
for by Viacom's subordinated note, and as an alternative to
" Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1150.
00 Id. at 1151.
10 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1151.
101 Id. at 1153.
1- Id. at 1155.
103 Id.
104 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).




CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
exercising of the option, Viacom could "put" the option to Para-
mount for the bargain element inherent in the option.0 8 Also,
Paramount had a poison pill, and Paramount's CEO was to
continue to run Paramount. 10 9
"Paramount wanted at least $70 per share." ° QVC coun-
tered with a proposed merger for cash and stock at $80 per
share."' Paramount's board of directors refused to negotiate
with QVC because of an unsatisfied financing condition."2
QVC later made a tender offer for 51% of Paramount's
stock to be followed by a second step merger for common stock
of QVC."3 At this point, QVC's bid was $10 higher than
Viacom's merger consideration."'
Viacom and Paramount then renegotiated their deal as a
tender offer by Viacom for 51% of Paramount's stock to be
followed by a second step merger for Viacom stock with a price
of $80 per share at both stages."5
QVC's proposed fair bidding process was rejected, and
Viacom and Paramount amended Viacom's tender offer to $85
in cash with $85 in stock in the second step merger."6 QVC
then amended its bid to $90 in cash with $90 in stock on the
back end."7
These offers can be summarized as follows:
(1) Viacom -- $70
(2) QVC -- $80
(3) Viacom -- $80
(4) Viacom -- $85
(5) QVC -- $90
108 Id.
lo9 Id.
10 QVC, 738 A.2d at 39.
111 Id.
12 Id. at 40.
113 Id.
114 Id.
" QVC, 637 A.2d at 40.




Paramount's board of directors determined that QVC's $90
offer was not in the best interests of the corporation.1 '8 Also,
Paramount's board of directors did not negotiate with QVC
because of the unsatisfied financing contingency." 9
The court first noted there are rare cases in which a court
will "take a more direct and active role in overseeing" a board's
decisions. 2' In such cases the court subjects the directors to
"enhanced scrutiny" to ensure reasonableness citing, inter alia,
Unocal and Revlon."' The court said that this case raises two
situations that implicate enhanced scrutiny: (1) a sale of con-
trol and (2) defensive measures.'22
There was a sale of control because Sumner Redstone was
in control of Viacom and would become the controlling share-
holder of Paramount.'23 This is distinguished from Time-
Warner, where the stock of Time after the acquisition would be
held by a "fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders repre-
senting a voting majority."124 Paramount's shareholders were
entitled to a control premium, and, in the absence of such a
premium, the directors had an obligation to get the sharehold-
ers the "best value reasonably available" (BVRA).'25 Thus, in
a sale of control situation, enhanced scrutiny applies.'26
The court reasoned that where directors take action to
cause a change of control or to break-up the target, they have
an obligation to seek the BVRA. 27 Thus, Time-Warner is not
controlling in such a situation." The court went on to state
that "[tihe Paramount Board, albeit unintentionally, had
'initiate[d] an active bidding process seeking to sell itself by
agreeing to sell control of the corporation to Viacom in circum-
stances where another potential acquiror (QVC) was equally
118 Id.
19 Id.
120 QVC, 637 A.2d at 42.
121 Id.
122 Id.
"' Id. at 43.
12 Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1150.
12 QVC, 637 A.2d at 43.
126 Id.
I" ld. at 43-44.
12 Id. at 46-48.
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interested in being a bidder."129 Also, the court found that the
defensive tactics (i.e., the pill, the no shop, the termination fee,
and the stock option) were not reasonable.3 °
In Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc.,3 ' the
acquiring corporation, Moore, made an acquisition proposal to
Wallace, which was rejected.3 2 Moore then made an "any and
all" tender offer at $56 per share with a back end merger at
that price. 3 Moore also started a proxy contest to unseat
Wallace's board of directors and redeem its pill."M The $56
price was a 27% premium over the pre-offer price.'35 Wallace
retained Goldman Sachs, which gave an opinion that the $56
was "inadequate."36 Moore increased its offer to $60, but
Goldman gave another inadequacy opinion.'37 Goldman was
not asked to value Wallace."
The court found that Wallace's actions were defensive and
that the Unocal standard, therefore, applied.3 9 The court
went on to fred that Moore's action posed a threat because the
price offered was, under the circumstances, inadequate and
that Wallace's directors' action in not redeeming the pill was
proportionate, thereby satisfying the Unocal standard. "
Thus, although 73.4% of Wallace's shareholders tendered their
shares to Moore,' Wallace was permitted to "just say no" by
keeping its pill in place.'
In Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail, Inc.," CSX, a rail-
road company and the acquiror, entered into a merger agree-
' Id. at 47.
135 QVC, 637 A.2d at 48-51.
131 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
1 Moore, 907 F. Supp. at 1550.
' Id. at 1551.
"3 Id. at 1550-51.
13 Id. at 1551.
'36 Id. at 1551-52.
131 Moore, 907 F.2d at 1553.
"3 Id. at 1552-53.
9 Id. at 1553-54.
Id. at 1560, 1564.
141 Id. at 1553.
' Moore, 907 F. Supp. at 1563.
Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978, at *10-11
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997).
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ment with Conrail, also a railroad company and the target,
pursuant to which CSX was to acquire Conrail in a multi-step
acquisition for $92.50 per share, which was later raised to $110
per share."' Norfolk Southern, also a railroad company, and
also a shareholder of Conrail, sought vigorously to block the
merger and made a competing bid for Conrail at $100 per
share and then raised its offer to $115 per share. "'
Conrail was a Pennsylvania corporation that was subject to
the provisions of the Pennsylvania business corporation law
governing takeovers. " 6 The court specifically found that the
intent of these Pennsylvania provisions is to reject such Dela-
ware cases as Unocal and Revlon. " 7
In a series of opinions from the bench, the District Court
specifically found that the defensive measures employed by
Conrail, including a poison pill and a no shop (which was effec-
tive for a two-year period) were in accord with Pennsylvania
law. " 8 Consequently, the Conrail board could keep its poison
pill and other defensive measures intact. "9
Notwithstanding this decision, CSX and Norfolk Southern
subsequently reached an agreement with Conrail pursuant to
which CSX acquired Conrail for $115 per share, and CSX and
Norfolk then split up the Conrail assets.
As indicated below, if the change of control provision had
applied in Time-Warner, QVC, Moore, and Norfolk Southern,
either the likely outcomes would have been different or the
outcome would have been similar but without the costs and
expense of litigation.
5. Freezeout Mergers
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc."5 involved a freezeout merger in
which Signal Companies, Inc., a controlling shareholder of UOP
with a 50.5% stock interest, acquired all of UOP's shares in a
' No. 76-7167, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1992).
'4 Id. at *15.
14 Id. at *2.
147 Id. at *5-7.
148 Id. at *4-6.
149 Norfolk S., 1997 U.S. Dist., lexis 879, at *5-6.
"' 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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cash merger transaction. 5' Signal's executives, Arledge and
Chitiea, who were also directors of UOP, decided "that it would
be a good investment for Signal" if it could acquire the minority
held UOP shares for any price up to $24 per share.'52 Signal's
executive committee settled on a price of $20-21 per share, and
Signal's board concluded that the $20-$21 price would be fair to
both Signal's shareholders and UOP's shareholders.' Signal
had previously paid $21 for UOP shares, and the shares were
now trading for almost $14 per share.'54
Signal's executives met with UOP's president, Crawford, to
discuss the deal.'55 Crawford, who had been a prior employee
of Signal, did not object to the $20-$21 price, but he had other
discussions regarding retention of UOP's employees.' 56
Crawford retained the Lehman Brothers investment banking
firm "to render a fairness opinion" on the transaction.'57 One
of Lehman Brothers' partners was a member of UOP's
board.'s
Lehman Brothers rendered an opinion that $21 per share
was fair.'59 The court noted that the opinion was prepared on
a rush basis. 1" UOP's board met to consider the transaction
and, with only the outside directors voting, the transaction was
approved at the price of $21 per share.' The UOP board ap-
parently was not advised that Signal's executives had conclud-
ed that any price up to $24 per share would be a good invest-
ment for Signal.'62
The merger agreement was structured so that a majority of
UOP's minority shareholders and two-thirds of all shareholders
M Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 701.
152 Id. at 705.
153 Id.
11 Id. at 704.
'5 Id. at 705.
' Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705.
1 Id. at 706.
158 Id.
"9 Id. at 707.
im Id. at 708.




were required to approve the transaction, and this approval
was obtained."3
Minority shareholders brought a class action alleging that
the price paid was unfair." In discussing the governing law,
the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that a controlling share-
holder generally has the burden of establishing fairness in a
freezeout merger."5 However, the court held that if the merg-
er has been approved by a majority of the minority sharehold-
ers and the controlling shareholder shows complete disclosure
of all material facts, then "the burden entirely shifts to the
plaintiffs to show that the transaction was unfair to the minori-
ty."'66 Here, the Supreme Court found a failure on the part of
Signal to show complete disclosure. 67 The court held that
Arledge and Chitiea, as officers of both Signal and UOP, failed
in their "duty of good management to both corporations.""
The court's analysis centered around two fundamental
aspects of the entire fairness doctrine: "fair dealing and fair
price." 69 The concept of fair dealing asks courts to determine
the fairness of all stages of negotiation between the parties
involved." ° Fair price considerations involve .an examination
of "the economic and financial considerations of the proposed
merger." 7' Courts weigh these concepts in order to make a
general determination of the fairness of the transaction.7 '
The court concluded Signal breached its duty of fairness
under both tests.' Signal was not engaged in fair dealing
because Arledge and Chitiea failed to disclose to UOP directors
that Signal considered as high as $24 per share to be a fair
purchase price of the remaining minority stock.7 4 By virtue of
I ld. at 707-08.
"' Id. at 703.
165 Id.
'66 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703. 12
167 Id.
168 Id. at 705, 710-11.
'6 Id. at 711.
170 Id.
171 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
172 Id.
171 Id. at 712, 714.
'74 Id. at 712.
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Signal's failure to disclose that fact, the court also found Signal
breached its duty to negotiate a fair purchase of the minority
shareholders' stock in UOP.175
The court also suggested in a footnote that Signal should
have adopted an independent negotiating structure for deter-
mining the price to be paid the minority shareholders:
Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result
here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed
an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors
to deal with Signal at arm's-length. Since fairness in this
context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly in-
dependent, board of directors acting upon the matter before
them, it is unfortunate that this course apparently was nei-
ther considered or pursued. Particularly in a parent-subsid-
iary context, a showing that the action taken was as though
each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargain-
ing power against the other at arm's-length is strong evidence
that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
176
The Weinberger court also decided that the Delaware block
valuation formula was no longer the exclusive valuation meth-
odology in Delaware and that any generally acceptable valua-
tion technique could be utilized in determining fair value.
177
Further, the court said that for future cases, appraisal would
be the exclusive remedy in the absence of "fraud, misrepresen-
tation, self dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or
gross and palpable overreaching .... ots
Although Signal did not employ the type of independent
negotiating structure suggested by the Delaware Supreme
Court, the independent directors of UOP and a majority of the
minority shareholders approved the transaction.' 9 As the
court noted, however, neither the UOP independent directors
'75 Id. at 714.
,76 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709, n.7 (citations omitted).
177 Id. at 712-13.
171 Id. at 714.
179 Id. at 707-08.
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nor the public shareholders were fully informed.' ° Further,
as the court indicated, the only negotiation engaged in by
Lehman Brothers was over the fee it would charge for essen-
tially a weekend's worth of work.' Lehman Brothers did not
appear to be very vigorous in its attempt to value UOP.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Systems, Inc. amplifies the application of the
Weinberger principle."l 2 In Lynch Communication Systems,
the court explained "[olnce again, this court holds that the ex-
clusive standard of judicial review in examining the propriety
of an interested cash-out merger transaction by a controlling or
dominating shareholder is entire fairness.""3
The court further stated that although the controlling
shareholder initially has the burden of establishing entire fair-
ness, if the transaction is approved by an "independent commit-
tee of directors or an informed majority of minority sharehold-
ers," the burden of proof on the fairness issue shifts to the
shareholder-plaintiff.' In this case, the court found that the
"Court of Chancery's determination that the Independent Com-
mittee 'appropriately simulated a third-party transaction,
where negotiations are conducted at arm's-length and there is
no compulsion to reach an agreement,' [was] not supported by
the record."'85 Consequently, the controlling shareholder had
the burden of proof on the entire fairness question. 8 '
On remand, the Chancery Court applied the entire fairness
test with the burden on the controlling parent and found that
the defendant proved the merger's fairness.8 7 Surprisingly,
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed despite evidence that
80 Id. at 703.
... Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 706.
1 Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
18 Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d at 1117 (citing Weinberger, 452 A.2d
at 710-11).
184 Id.
... Id. at 1121.
188 Id.
... Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., No. 8748, 1995 WL 301403, at
*2-3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995).
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the controlling parent forced the transaction on an independent
negotiating committee. 8 '
This series of decisions in Lynch Communication shows
that, when courts apply Delaware's "entire fairness" test, it is
first necessary to determine whether a special committee is in-
deed independent so that the burden of proof can be allocated.
Then, it is necessary to apply close scrutiny on the entire fair-
ness issue without regard to who has the burden of proof. This
is at best a cumbersome process that, as shown in Lynch Com-
munication, can produce strange results.
The defects in Weinberger and Lynch Communication
would be cured by the adoption of a change of control board,
which would in essence implement the suggestion in footnote 7
of the Weinberger decision, which proposes a "wholly indepen-




6. Summary of Current Delaware Corporate Governance Rules
for Mergers and Acquisitions
The following table summarizes the current Delaware
corporate law governance rules for mergers and acquisitions:
" Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 80-81 (Del. 1995).
... Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709-10 n.7 (Del. 1983).
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Summary of Current Law Governance Rules
For Mergers and Acquisitions
TC = Target Corporation
BD = Board of Directors
BJR = Business Judgment Rule
I = Plaintiff
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7. Economic Effects in the Above Conflicts and in the Merger
and Acquisition Market Place Generally
In several of the above cases, if the courts had not inter-
vened, the targets' shareholders would have received substan-
tially less than fair value for the shares they owned. This is
true even though in each case the acquiror proposed to pay a
price that was substantially more than the pre-acquisition
trading price of the target's stock in regular market conditions.
The adoption of the change of control board concept should
ensure that in all cases the target's shareholders receive fair
value for their shares.
Many economic studies have examined the price effects of
merger and acquisition activity on both targets and acquirors.
In general, the studies have found that target shareholders
receive substantial premiums and that acquiror shareholders
experience near zero returns. Professor Roberta Romano sum-
marizes the evidence on targets as follows:
[Aicquisitions generate substantial gains to target company
shareholders. All studies find that target firms experience
statistically significant positive stock price responses to the
announcement of takeover attempts or merger agreements.
On average, there is a 20% increase over the pre-an-
nouncement market price for mergers and a 30% increase for
tender offers in the period around the takeover announce-
ment. Abnormal returns in going-private transactions (lever-
aged buyouts) are of a similar magnitude, ranging across
studies between 20% and 37%. Without question the an-
nouncement of a bid is good news for target shareholders.1"
Professor Romano summarizes the evidence on acquirors as
follows: "[tihe data are more ambiguous, however, concerning
acquiring firms' returns. Depending on the sample and time
190 Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 119, 122 (1992).
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period, acquirors experience positive, negative, or zero abnor-
mal returns on a bid's announcement and completion." 9'
One might deduce from the economic evidence that target
shareholders are generally receiving fair treatment in mergers
and acquisitions and, therefore, a change of control board con-
cept is not needed. This is the wrong conclusion for several
reasons. First, even though target shareholders may on average
benefit from mergers and acquisitions, the illustrative cases
indicate that there is a real possibility that such shareholders
may not benefit as much as they should. Second, the economic
studies do not focus on those mergers and acquisitions that
never occur because of the intransigence of the target's board
and the unwillingness of bidders to push the point. Adoption of
the change of control board concept will ensure that acquirors
get a fair hearing without unnecessary roadblocks. Thus, the
change of control board concept should increase the economic
efficiency of the market for corporate control.
One aspect of the drag on economic efficiency caused by the
current system is illustrated by the factual background facing
the Delaware Chancery court in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore.'92
In this case, Shorewood, a publicly traded Delaware corpora-
tion, made an offer for Chesapeake, a publicly traded Virginia
corporation.'93 The offer was at a premium of 41% over the
pre-bid trading price of Chesapeake's shares."9 Chesapeake
had a continuing director or "dead-hand" poison pill, which is
redeemable only by the directors of the target at the time of an
offer or by the director's designees. 9' This type of pill is per-
missible in Virginia and other states, such as Georgia"9 that
have pill validation statutes, but is not permissible in Dela-
ware."'97 As the court explained, Chesapeake's dead-hand pill
191 Id. at 123.
' No. 17626, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20 (Feb. 7, 2000).
19 Chesapeake, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *1-2.
194 Id.
'- Id. at *20-21.
196 See, e.g., Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Tech., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1580
(N.D. Ga. 1997).
" See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
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and staggered board provided "iron-clad defenses." 198
Chesapeake's board rejected Shorewood's offer and then made a
counter offer for Shorewood at a 40% premium.1 99
Shorewood's board took various defensive measures, which the
court held, inter alia, did not satisfy the Unocal test. Thus, the
court's decision made Shorewood more susceptible to
Chesapeake's offer. This case illustrates that under our current
federal system, companies incorporated in states with pill vali-
dation statutes like those in Virginia and Georgia can be made
takeover proof if the boards so decide, whereas companies in
Delaware and in other states that follow Delaware law cannot
be made takeover proof. Economic efficiency is obviously de-
terred by this system that permits, for example, a Virginia
corporation to takeover a Delaware corporation in a hostile
offer, but prevents a Delaware corporation from taking over a
Virginia corporation in a hostile transaction.
Third, the adoption of a change of control board concept
should increase the number of transactions in which targets
are disposed of in fair auctions and, therefore, should increase
the consideration paid to the shareholders of such targets. This
conclusion follows from the observation of Professor Romano
that premiums are higher in tender offers than in negotiated
mergers."
Finally, each of the above cases illustrates that in the
change of control context there is often no effective separation
of what Professors Fama and Jensen call "decision manage-
ment" and "decision control."01 Decision management in-
volves "initiation," that is, the "generation of proposals for
resource utilization and structuring of contracts," and "imple-
mentation," that is, the "execution of ratified decisions."0 2 De-
cision control involves "ratification," that is, the "choice of the
decision initiatives to be implemented," and "monitoring," that
19 Chesapeake, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *20-21.
" Id. at *21-22.
20 Romano, supra note 190, at 122.
201 Eugene Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 303-04 (1983); Michael C. Jensen, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANI-
ZATIONAL STRATEGY 1998).
202 Id. at 303.
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is, "measurement of the performance of decision agents and
implementation of rewards." °3 Because of the collective action
problem facing shareholders in publicly held corporations, the
boards of such companies, even if the boards have a majority of
disinterested directors, effectively perform the functions of both
decision management and decision control. Professors Fama
and Jensen explain: "Without separation of decision manage-
ment and decision control, residual claimants [e.g., public
shareholders] have little protection against opportunistic ac-
tions of decision agents, and this lowers the value of unrestrict-
ed residual claims." 4 They further explain that the "agency
problems of diffuse decision management can... be reduced by
separating the management (initiation and implementation)
and control (ratification and monitoring) of decisions."0 5 The
proposal here for a change of control board is consistent with
the observation of Professors Fama and Jensen that "[elffective
separation of top-level decision management and control means
that outside directors have incentives to carry out their tasks
and do not collude with managers to expropriate residual
claimants ... [Outside directors have incentives to develop
reputations as experts in decision control."2"6 Adoption of this
proposal would insure that the change of control process is
presided over by real outside directors.
C. The ALI's Governance Rules for Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Introduction
The Corporate Governance Project sets forth governance
rules for, inter alia, the four transactions addressed here:
arm's-length mergers and acquisitions; management buyouts;
defensive tactics in tender offers; and freezeouts. °7 The ALI's
treatment of each of these transactions is discussed in the
following sections.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 305-06.
206 Id. at 308.
204 Id. at 325.
201 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
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2. Arm's-length Mergers and Acquisitions
Section 6.01 of the Corporate Governance Project governs
the actions of a target's board in all forms of arm's-length
mergers and acquisitions. 8  This provision authorizes a
target's board "in the exercise of its business judgment... [to]
'approve, reject or decline to consider a proposal'" to engage in
a merger or acquisition (i.e., a transaction in control).2" Spe-
cific rules regarding the board's duty of care and the protection
afforded by the business judgment rule are set forth in section
4.01.210 The rules in section 4.01 apply generally and to arm's-
length mergers and acquisitions under section 6.01. Thus, sec-
tion 6.01 gives a target's board wide latitude in responding to
an arm's-length merger or acquisition proposal, and the board's
decisions will be protected by the business judgment rule in
section 4.01(c) as long as (1) the director's business judgment is
made in good faith, and (2) the director (a) is not interested in
the transaction, (b) "is informed with respect to the subject of
the business judgment," and (c) "rationally believes that the
business judgment is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion."211 The business judgment rule also protects the direc-
tors of an acquiring corporation.212
Under section 7.24, appraisal by the court that hears the
dispute is the exclusive remedy a shareholder has for challeng-
ing an arm's-length transaction.21 ' As a practical matter, how-
ever, appraisal proceedings will be rare, because under section
7.22(b), in an arm's-length transaction, the price accepted by
the target's board is presumed to be fair value "unless the
plaintiff can prove otherwise by clear and convincing evi-
dence."214 Thus, the appraisal rules for arm's-length transac-
tions are structured to discourage the use of appraisal proceed-
ings.
20. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.01(a).
2"9 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 169. (quoting CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRO-
JECT, § 6.01(a)).
210 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 157.
¢' See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 4.01(c).
212 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 165.
21 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.24.




Section 5.15 of the Goverate Governance Project governs
management buyout transactions, which are mergers and ac-
quisitions in which the directors or principal executive officers
of the target have an interest in the acquiring vehicle.215 In
these transactions, the general rule is that "interested direc-
tors/executives have the burden of proving the transaction is
fair to the target's shareholders."21 However, if the following
four conditions are satisfied, the challenging party has the
burden of proving waste of corporate assets.217 The conditions
are: (1) public disclosure of the proposed transaction must be
made, (2) responsible potential bidders must be provided with
the relevant information and must be "given a reasonable op-
portunity to submit a competing proposal" (that is, the transac-
tion must be market tested), (3) the transaction must be ap-
proved by disinterested directors, and (4) the transaction must
be approved, or the tender offer accepted, by disinterested
shareholders.218
Although appraisal is not the exclusive remedy for dissent-
ing shareholders in a management buyout, if the transaction is
market-tested and approved by disinterested directors and
shareholders as specified in section 5.15(b), it is likely that the
accepted price would constitute fair value.2"9 Consequently, if
such a mechanism is utilized, it is unlikely that there would be
a challenge either on the grounds of waste of corporate assets
or in an appraisal proceeding. Thus, appraisal can effectively
be avoided in management buyouts by using market test proce-
dures and securing the approval of disinterested directors and
shareholders.
If these market test and disinterested director/shareholder
procedures are followed, the practical result is the same as that
reached in arm's-length transactions governed by section 6.01
and the business judgment rule of section 4.01(c). However, if
215 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 206.
26 Thompson, supra note 2, at 207.
217 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 207-08.
218 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.15(b).
219 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.15(c).
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this approach were adopted, there would likely be substantial
litigation over whether the directors were truly disinterested,
the transaction was adequately market tested, and the share-
holders were adequately informed. These questions would not
likely arise with a change of control board.
4. Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers
Section 6.02 of the Corporate Governance Project governs
actions of a target's board that have the "foreseeable effect of
blocking an unsolicited tender offer." 20 The directors may
take such defensive action as long as the action is a "reason-
able response to the offer."
221
"In [determining] whether [an] action is a reasonable re-
sponse to [an] offer," the target's board may take into account
all relevant factors including "questions of legality" and wheth-
er the offer, if successful, would "threaten the corporation's
essential economic prospects."222 Further, the target's board
may "have regard for interests or groups (other than sharehold-
ers) with respect to which the corporation has a legitimate con-
cern if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term
interests of the shareholders."223
Under Section 6.02(c), the challenging party has the bur-
den of proving "that the board's action is an unreasonable re-
sponse to the offer."224 Thus, although the Corporate Gover-
nance Project explains that the standards in section 6.02 are
"intended to be consistent" with the enhanced or intermediate
standard of review set forth in the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Unocal,225 the burden under section 6.02 is on the
challenging party.226 This should be contrasted with the
Unocal decision, which places the burden on the target's direc-
22 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02(a).
221 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2; see generally Thomp-
son, supra note 2, at 224-26.
22 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02(b)(1).
221 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02(b)(2).
224 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02(c).
m See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02 cmt. a; see also
supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
226 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02, cmt. a.
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tors to prove that their action in blocking a tender offer was a
reasonable response.2 27
Thus, section 6.02 sets out a standard of reasonableness
that is higher than the "rationally believes" standard of the
business judgment rule in section 4.01(c) that applies in arm's-
length mergers and acquisitions under section 6.01.2" Under
the business judgment rule, the decision of the target's direc-
tors need not be a reasonable response.229 As long as the di-
rectors act in good faith, are not interested, and are informed,
the business judgment rule applies if they "rationally believe"
that their business judgment is in the best interest of the cor-
poration.23 The Corporate Governance Project explains that
the "rationally believes" test is "intended to afford directors and
officers wide latitude when making business decisions" and
that "[sound public policy dictates that directors and officers
be given greater protection than ... a 'reasonableness' test
would afford."231 Even though section 6.02 adopts a reason-
ableness standard, the Corporate Governance Project makes
clear that a target's directors are given wide latitude in re-
sponding to a hostile tender offer. 2
The Corporate Governance Project provides, however, that
"there will be [some] sets of facts where the board will not be
able to block the tender offer and satisfy the requirements of
§ 6.02."23 Unfortunately, the Corporate Governance Project
does not give an illustration of such a set of facts. Also, the
Corporate Governance Project says that under the Section 6.02
standard, a court faced with the facts in the Paramount case
would likely reach the result the Supreme Court of Delaware
reached in that case.234 This would likely not be the result
with a change of control board. Because the burden is on the
challenging party rather than on the target's board, as under
227 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
228 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
229 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 4.01 cmt. c.
220 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
2. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 4.01 cmts. e. & f.
22 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02 cmt. c(8).
221 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
224 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02, rptr. n.3.
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the Delaware Unocal test, adoption of the section 6.02 standard
would likely make it more difficult to challenge the actions of
an entrenched board.
5. Freezeouts
The Corporate Governance Project divides freezeout trans-
actions into those in which the controlling shareholder does not
have sufficient voting control to unilaterally effectuate the
transaction (i.e., non-majority control freezeouts) and those in
which such unilateral voting power exists, as is the case with
short form-mergers (i.e., majority control freezeouts). 25
Non-majority control freezeouts are governed by section
5.10."6 Section 5.10(a) provides that a controlling shareholder
satisfies its duty of fair dealing if either "(1) the transaction is
fair to [the target] when entered into;" or (2) after disclosure,
the transaction is approved by disinterested shareholders and
does not constitute a waste of corporate assets."
Under section 5.10(b), if disclosure is made and the trans-
action is approved by disinterested directors or disinterested
shareholders, the challenging party has the burden of proving a
waste of corporate assetsY8 If this procedure is not followed,
the controlling shareholder has the burden of proving the
transaction is fair. 9
Although appraisal is not the exclusive remedy in non-
majority control freezeouts, if the disclosure and disinterested
director/shareholder procedures are followed as a practical
matter, the consideration paid in the transaction should consti-
tute fair value and the transaction should not constitute a
waste of corporate assets.
Majority control freezeouts are subject to section 5.10 un-
less the following four conditions of section 7.25 are satis-
fied.24° First, the directors who approve the transaction must
21 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, §§ 5.10, 7.25.
23 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.10.
23 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.01(a).
238 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.01(b).
'39 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
240 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25 cmt. c.
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have an "adequate basis, grounded on substantial objective
evidence, for believing that the consideration offered to the
minority shareholders ... constitutes fair value for their
shares."241 Second, full disclosure must be made to minority
shareholders.242 Third, the transaction must be approved pur-
suant to state law and the "corporation's charter docu-
ments."243 Finally, dissenting shareholders must have an ap-
praisal right.244 If these four conditions are met, appraisal is
the exclusive remedy.245
Under Section 7.25(b), the controlling shareholder has the
burden of proving compliance with these four conditions, unless
the transaction was approved by disinterested directors and
disinterested shareholders.246 In such a case, the burden is on
the challenging party.247
In summary, if disinterested directors negotiate with the
controlling shareholder concerning the price of the transaction
and the parties agree on a price that is approved or ratified by
disinterested shareholders, then the burden is on the challeng-
ing party to establish that one of the four conditions is not
satisfied. If the challenging party meets this burden, appraisal
is not the exclusive remedy.
As a practical matter, if an independent negotiating struc-
ture is utilized, the controlling shareholder will have an "ade-
quate basis" for believing that the price constitutes fair value,
and assuming the other conditions are satisfied (which will
normally be the case), appraisal will be the exclusive remedy.
Furthermore, the price set by the independent negotiating
structure would normally be found to constitute fair value in
an appraisal proceeding. However, under this approach dis-
putes will undoubtedly arise concerning whether the negotiat-
ing structure is indeed independent; this would not be an issue
with a change of control board.
241 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25(a)(1).
242 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25(a)(2).
213 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25(a)(3).
24 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25(a)(4).
245 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
24 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25(b).
247 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
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6. Summary of ALI's Governance Rules for Mergers and
Acquisitions
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7. Comment on the ALI's Approach
The ALI's rules are quite complex; however, the bottom
line is that if disinterested directors act in each of the transac-
tions, courts will find the amount paid to be fair. This is, in
essence, a disinterested director approach, which, for the rea-
sons outlined below, is fundamentally flawed. Also, the ALI's
approach to defensive tactics in tender offers is even more
protective of the target's directors than is Delaware law with
its Unocal standard, because the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff, instead of the director, as would be the case under
the Unocal standard.24 s
For these reasons, the change of control concept is superior
to the ALI's approach. However, the ALI's formulation of the
business judgment rule in section 4.01 and its basic formula-
tion of the standard governing tender offers in section 6.02 is
adopted here under the proposed change of control board stan-
dard.
249
III. OPERATION OF CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
A. Introduction
This section discusses the operational rules governing the
change of control board. The specific statutory language is set
forth in Proposed Section 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which is set out in the Appendix.2 ° Also, this section
discusses the effects on certain collateral provisions of the 1934
Act and the Internal Revenue Code.
B. Corporations Subject to the Rules
Unless public shareholders vote to elect-out of Proposed
Section 14A (an option available under the proposed law), Pro-
posed Section 14A applies to domestic public corporations with
211respect to which a trigger event occurs. Such public corpo-rations are referred to in Proposed Section 14A(a) as "affected
24 See supra notes 72, 226 and accompanying text.
249 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, §§ 4.01, 6.02.
20 See infra app. § 14A.
25, See infra app. § 14A(a).
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issuers."22 A public corporation is any corporate issuer that
satisfies the asset and shareholder test of § 12(g) of the 1934
Act.2"3 Under § 12(g)(1), every issuer engaged in interstate
commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce or
whose securities are traded in interstate commerce, is required
to register such securities with the SEC, provided the issuer
has total assets exceeding $10 million and equity securities
held of record by five hundred or more persons. 2s' Although
under § 12(g), issuers that are not corporations may be re-
quired to register, the control board concept applies to only
domestic corporate issuers that have more than $10 million in
assets and at least 500 shareholders.2 5
Five types of trigger events are specified in Proposed Sec-
tion 14A(b).256 Section 14A(b)(1) encompasses all forms of
arm's-length consensual mergers and acquisitions proposed to a
target's board, including arm's-length mergers, management
buyouts, and freezeouts.5 7 This concept, therefore, includes
proposed direct or subsidiary mergers that include target acqui-
sitions and proposals to acquire substantially all of the target's
assets.2 8
Proposed Section 14A(b)(2) encompasses proposed mergers
or acquisitions that are initiated by the target's manage-
ment-such as occurred in Van Gorkom.25 9
Proposed Section 14A(b)(3) encompasses hostile tender
offers for public corporations.6 0 Proposed Section 14A(b)(4)
involves transactions in which a Schedule 13D, indicating an
acquisition of more than 5% of the issuer's stock, is filed with
respect to a public corporation, provided the purpose of the
252 See infra app. § 14A(a).
252 See infra app. § 14A(a).
2'4 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (1994); see 17 C.F.R. 240.12(g)(1).
2" See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B).
25 See infra app. § 14A(b).
See infra app. § 14A(b)(1).
54 See infra app. § 14A(b)(1). A subsidiary merger involves a merger between
a wholly-owned subsidiary (Sub) of the acquiring corporation and the target. In a
reverse subsidiary merger, the Sub merges into the target with the target's share-
holders receiving the merger consideration and the target becoming a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. In a forward subsidiary merger,
the target merges into the Sub.
259 See infra app. § 14A(b)(2); see also supra notes 19-34 and accompanying
text [citation to provisions discussion of Van Gorkom].
2"4 See infra app. § 14A(b)(3).
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acquisition is, or may be, to effectuate an acquisition of the
issuer.261 Thus, if the Schedule 13D indicates that the
acquiror has a bona fide potential change of control purpose,
then a trigger event has occurred.
Proposed Section 14A(b)(5) encompasses situations in
which a public acquiring corporation acquires the stock or as-
sets of another corporation in exchange for stock of the acquir-
ing corporation that exceeds 50% of the acquiring corporation's
outstanding stock after the acquisition.2 2 Thus, this type of
trigger event involves a so-called "upside-down" acquisition in
which a small corporation acquires, in exchange for its stock,
the stock or assets of a large corporation. In such cases, the
acquiring corporation is deemed to have experienced a trigger
event. Thus, Proposed Section 14A(b)(5), in essence, would
codify one aspect of the de facto merger doctrine.2 3
In addition to the trigger event under Proposed Section
14A(b)(5) for the public acquiring corporation, a trigger event
will also occur under Proposed Section 14A(b)(1) with respect to
the target if it is a public corporation.2' Thus, in such cases
both the public acquiror and the public target are affected issu-
ers. This would be the case, for example, in a situation such as
the proposed original merger between Time Inc. and Warner
Communications, Inc.265 In that transaction, it was proposed
that Time acquire Warner in a reverse subsidiary merger in
which the shareholders of Warner would have owned approxi-
mately 62% of Time after the merger, and Warner would have
become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time.266 Under Proposed
Section 14A(b)(1), a trigger event would have occurred with
respect to Warner since Time proposed a merger between the
two companies.2 67 Also, under Proposed Section 14A(b)(5), a
trigger event would have occurred with respect to Time since it
was proposed that Time issue in the acquisition its stock
amounting to in excess of 50% of Time's outstanding shares
261 See infra app. § 14A(b)(4).
2 See infra app. § 14A(b)(5).
26 See infra app. § 14A(b)(5) cmt. 1.
264 See infra app. §§ 14A(b)(1), (b)(5).
266 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 (Del.
1989).
' Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1141-49.
267 See infra app. § 14A(b)(1); Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1146.
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after the transaction.268 Consequently, both Time and Warner
would have been affected issuers under Proposed Section
14A(a), and, under Proposed Section 14A(c), which is discussed
below, a change of control board would have been appointed
with respect to each such corporation.269
C. Change of Control Official
Upon the happening of a trigger event with respect to a
public corporation, Proposed Section 14A(c)(1) imposes a duty
on the target's board to petition the Change of Control Official
for the appointment of a change of control board.27° Under
Proposed Section 14A(c)(2), if the target's board does not
promptly file such a petition either the SEC or a shareholder or
shareholders owning at least 5% of the target's shares may file
the petition instead.27 '
Under Proposed Section 14A(d), the Change of Control
Official is a non-political appointee of the SEC, and the ap-
pointee is not to "be identified with any particular change of
control theory or ideology."272 A majority of the members of
the Federal Reserve Board must concur in the appoint-
ment.273 This concurrence procedure should help ensure that
the Change of Control Official is indeed non-political and does
not have a particular philosophy regarding change of control
transactions. The SEC may, if it deems appropriate, appoint
Change of Control Officials for various sections of the coun-
try.
27 4
The Change of Control Official or Officials perform func-
tions similar to those of a United States Trustee in a bankrupt-
cy proceeding.275 The primary functions of the Change of Con-
trol Official are: (1) the identification of qualified persons will-
ing to serve on a change of control board, and of qualified attor-
neys, investment bankers, and other merger and acquisition
'u See infra app. § 14A(b)(5); Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148.
26 See infra app. § 14A(c).
270 See infra app. § 14A(c)(1).
271 See infra app. § 14A(c)(2).
272 See infra app. § 14A(d)(1).
27 See infra app. § 14A(d)(1).
274 See infra app. § 14A(d)(1).




specialists willing to provide advice to change of control boards,
(2) the appointment of change of control boards, and (3)
consulting with change of control boards regarding the hiring
by such boards of professional advisors.276 All other duties
would be governed by SEC rules and regulations.
Proposed Section 14A(e) sets forth the rules regarding the
appointment of the members of a change of control board. 7
The Change of Control Official must make such appointments
promptly after the receipt of a petition.27 The change of con-
trol board is to consist of three members unless the Change of
Control Official decides that, under the circumstances, it is ap-
propriate to appoint more than three."9 No more than five
members may be appointed.8 °
In making the appointments, the Change of Control Offi-
cial must first insure that each member is not interested in the
proposed transaction.2 1  The determination of whether a
member is interested is to be made pursuant to rules to be
promulgated by the SEC.282 It is contemplated that such rules
will be broader than the rules under current law and the provi-
sions of the Corporate Governance Project for determining
whether a party is interested in the transaction.
In making the selections, the Change of Control Official
should also give consideration to the proposed member's experi-
ence in dealing with change of control transactions, and, in
appropriate cases, should give consideration to the prospective
member's knowledge of the particular industry."3 This selec-
tion process should maximize the possibility that the members
of a change of control board will be free of any possible conflict
and will have the experience needed to do an effective job.
Further, the Change of Control Official should be satisfied that
each member will: (1) act in good faith, (2) make a proper in-
27 See infra app. § 14A(d)(2). This identification process should be an ongoing
process, so that once a change of control takes place, appointment of the change
of control board and its advisors could be made from a list of individuals who
have already been identified.
277 See infra app. § 14A(e).
278 See infra app. § 14A(e).
279 See infra app. § 14A(e).
280 See infra app. § 14A(e).
281 See infra app. § 14A(e).
28 See infra app. § 14A(e).
2 See infra app. § 14A(e).
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quiry, and (3) rationally believe that any decision made is in
the best interest of the corporation.2" Thus, the Change of
Control Official will be required to make an ex ante judgment
that each member of the change of control board will satisfy
the duty of care standard and will be protected by the business
judgment rule set forth in Proposed Section 14A(i)."5
The Change of Control Official may, in appropriate circum-
stances, appoint to the change of control board one member
(and no more than one) of the target's regular board who is
otherwise qualified to serve. 6 The Change of Control Official
should make every effort to make such an appointment because
such a member could provide continuity and helpful in-
sights. 7 However, a member of the regular board should not
be appointed unless the Change of Control Official is convinced
that the person clearly is disinterested.28
It should be anticipated that in most cases the members of
a change of control board would reside in the geographic area
in which the affected issuer has its headquarters, thereby facil-
itating meetings of the change of control board and minimizing
travel delay and costs.
Once appointed, the members of the change of control
board will continue to serve until resignation by the member or
dissolution of the board.289
D. Responsibilities and Authority of Change of Control Board
1. In General
Proposed Section 14A(f) sets out the responsibilities and
authority of the members of a change of control board.29 ° In
essence, such boards, acting by a majority vote, have full power
over all matters relating to a proposed change of control trans-
action involving the affected issuer.291
First, the change of control board has the power to decide
whether to consider, accept, or reject a proposal to enter into a
2, See infra app. § 14A(e).
2M See infra app. § 14A(i)(3)-(4).
2S See infra app. § 14A(e).
2,1 See infra app. § 14A(e).
2,, See infra app. § 14a(e).
", See infra app. § 14A(e).
290 See infra app. § 14A(f).
291 See infra app. § 14A(f)(1) cmt. 1.
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merger or acquisition.292 This power is similar to that speci-
fied in section 6.01 of the Corporate Governance Project for
arm's-length mergers and acquisitions.293
Second, such boards have the power to implement defen-
sive tactics that may have the foreseeable effect of blocking the
offer.2' This power is similar to the principle set out in sec-
tion 6.02 of the Corporate Governance Project relating to hos-
tile tender offers.295 Such tactics include the issuance of a poi-
son pill, provided that state law or the corporation's charter
authorizes any such action.2' Thus, the change of control
board may not take any action that the corporation's regular
board would be prohibited from taking by state law or the char-
ter documents.297
The current state of the empirical evidence bearing on the
efficacy of the poison pill would support granting the change of
control board the power to use a pill as it deems appropriate.
For example, the recent works of Professor Coates challenge
the conclusions reached by many academics on the basis of
event studies that poison pills harm a target's sharehold-
ers.' 9 On the other hand, he also criticizes premium studies
that many have relied on as support for the view that pills are
beneficial to a target's shareholders.299 His analysis led to the
following principal conclusions: (1) "Institutional shareholders
should be aware of the fact that half the traditional academic
case (at least) against defenses stands on shaky ground ... "
(2) "Boards ... should not be permitted to rely without caveat
on pill premium studies to support a decision to adopt a pill at
a given point in time,""1 and (3) "Delaware courts ... should
' See infra app. § 14A(f)(1)(i).
293 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.01.
' See infra app. § 14A(f)(1v), (f)(3).
See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02.
See infra app. § 14A(f)(3).
See infra app. § 14A(f)(3).
29 John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEx. L. REV. 271, 277 (2000) [hereinafter Coates,
Takeover Defenses]; John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover
Defenses: Where Do We Stand?, 54 MIAMI L. REV. 783 (2000) [hereinafter Coates,
Empirical Evidence].
Coates, Empirical Evidence, supra note 298, at 785.
Coates, Empirical Evidence, supra note 298, at 797; see also Coates, Take-
over Defenses, supra note 298, at 338.
201 Coates, Empirical Evidence, supra note 298, at 797; see also Coates, Take-
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take some comfort from the fact that they resisted strong aca-
demic arguments ... to push them to dramatically repudiate
pills and other structural defenses"" 2
While a change of control board would have the power to
issue a traditional pill, it would have no reason to issue a con-
tinuing director or deadhand pill like the ones found invalid
under Delaware law in Carmody v. Toll Brothers°3 but valid
under Georgia law in the Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Tech-
nologies, Inc.3" Also, a change of control board would have no
reason to issue a delayed redemption pill like the one found
invalid under Delaware law in Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.
v. Shapiro. 5 In this type of pill, the replacement board ap-
pointed after a successful proxy contest is prohibited from re-
deeming the target's pill for a specified period. Thus, these
issues concerning the validity of attempts by boards to deter
proxy contests by restricting the ability of a new board to re-
deem a pill would not be of concern under the change of control
provisions.
Third, the change of control board has complete responsi-
bility and authority over the preparation of proxy statements,
information statements and other disclosure documents relat-
ing to the change of control transaction.3" The change of con-
trol board can in appropriate circumstances delegate these and
other matters to the target's officers. The change of control
board has the authority to negotiate with antitrust and other
regulatory authorities and to make divestiture decisions that
may be required by such authorities. The change of control
board would, however, consult closely with the regular board
before making any divestiture.
Fourth, such board has control over the preparation of the
target's response to a tender offer on Schedule 14D-9 under the
1934 Act.30 7
over Defenses, supra note 298, at 338.
3M Coates, Empirical Evidence, supra note 298, at 797; see also Coates, Takeover
Defenses, supra note 298, at 338.
303 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
31 968 F. Supp. 1578. (N.D. Ga. 1997).
'0 761 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
" See infra app. § 14A(f)(1)(ii).
"o See infra app. § 14A(fM1)(iii).
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Fifth, such boards have the authority to cause the corpora-
tion to make "golden parachute" and similar severance pay-
ments to key employees of the target.3"8 The regular board
would have no power over such payments. The change of con-
trol board could thus take appropriate steps to ensure the con-
tinued services of key employees.
Sixth, such boards may cause the corporation to redeem its
stock at a premium in a "greenmail" transaction.3 9 The
corporation's regular board would have control over redemption
programs that are not connected with a potential change of
control transaction.
Seventh, change of control boards have the authority to
cause the corporation to enter into various types of lock-up
agreements, such as stock options and no shops, to protect a
negotiated merger or acquisition transaction.310 Stock options
give the acquiror the right to buy stock in the target at
premerger (bargain) prices if a third party acquires the target,
and no shops prevent the target's board from seeking a better
deal from a third party, subject to certain fiduciary obligations
to the target's shareholders.
Eighth, the change of control board may cause the corpora-
tion to pay various types of fees to induce a potential acquiror
to enter the bidding, such as "hello fees" and "goodbye (i.e.,
termination) fees."
The law in Delaware governing deal protection devices like
stock options, termination fees, and no shops is not yet set-
tled.312 For example, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax
Minerals Co.,"' Chancellor Chandler expressed the view that
"no talk" provisions are "troubling" and may amount to "willful
blindness."31 " He further observed that the termination fee in
that case "probably stretches the definition [of range of reason-
ableness] beyond its breaking point."1 5 Along the same lines,
Vice Chancellor Strine in ACE Limited v. Capital Re Corpora-
so See infra app. § 14A(f)(1)(iv).
"o See infra app. § 14A(f)()((v).
"' See infra app. § 14A(f)(1)(vii).
... See infra app. § 14A(f)(1)(viii).
32 See, e.g., Gregory V. Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for
Analyzing Deal Protection Measures, 55 Bus. LAW. 1609 (2000).
", No. 17383, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999).
314 Phelps Dodge, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *4.
15 Id. at *5.
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tion316 found that the no talk there was likely invalid. He rea-
soned that "[wihen corporate boards assent to provisions in
merger agreements that have the primary purpose of acting as
a defensive barrier to other transactions not sought out by the
board, some of the concerns that animated the Unocal standard
of review might be implicated."317 On the other hand, in In re
IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation v. Cincin-
nati Bell, Inc.31 Vice Chancellor Steele applied the business
judgment rule in validating a termination fee, a stock option
and a no shop that were not "defensive mechanisms instituted
to respond to a perceived threat to a potential acquiror."319
The standard of review for a change of control board that em-
ployed any of these deal protection devices would be the busi-
ness judgment rule set out in Proposed Section 14A(i)(4), which
is discussed in Section III.E. below.
The change of control board may, with the approval of the
Change of Control Official, hire its own independent attorney,
investment banker, or any other professionals necessary for it
to carry out its business.320 Since such professionals will be
hired directly by the change of control board, they should be
free of the conflicts that have infected professionals in the ac-
quisitions detailed by Chancellor Allen.32
Proposed Section 14A(f)(4) requires the corporation's regu-
lar board to cooperate fully with the change of control
board. 22 It is anticipated that the change of control board
will, in appropriate cases, consult extensively with the target's
regular board concerning the merits of the proposed merger or
acquisition. Also, the change of control board may consult with
certain influential shareholders of the target company.
If the regular board does not cooperate, the change of con-
trol board may petition a court to suspend the regular board
and transfer all of its responsibilities to the change of control
board.3" The members of a change of control board are not to
'16 747 A.2d (Del. Ch. 1999).
117 ACE Ltd., 747 A.2d at 108.
... No. 17324, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
"' Cincinnati Bell, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 210 at *29.
.20 See infra app. § 14A(f)(2).
321 See infra Part V.
" See infra app. § 14A(f)(4).
"' See infra app. § 14A(b)-(4).
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be considered as governmental employees for any purpose, such
as the Administrative Procedure Act or the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act.
The regular board would continue to make decisions for the
target that are in the ordinary course of the target's business,
and the regular board should seek the approval from the
change of control board for any major decision, such as the sale
or acquisition of a major line of business. The SEC should pro-
mulgate rules delineating the division of responsibilities be-
tween the two boards. Such rules will likely be similar to stan-
dard provisions found in acquisition agreements in which the
target agrees that "[d]uring the period from the date of the
agreement and continuing until the [closing of the acquisition]"
it will "carry on [its] business in the usual, regular, and ordi-
nary course. . . ."
This dual board structure is similar to but by no means the
same as the dual board structure that applies to publicly held
German corporations,32 which are required to have a man-
agement board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board
appoints the management board and "plays a monitoring role
somewhat similar to that played by outside directors on a uni-
tary board."32 The supervisory board also has a role in "help-
ing to develop the long-term corporate strategy and finance
,327 and "the articles of the supervisory board may deter-
mine that specific types of transactions may be entered into
only with the approval of the supervisory board."
3
1
2. Compensation, Oversight, and Incentives For the Change of
Control Board and Its Advisors
Pursuant to Proposed Section 14A(g), the members of a
change of control board are to be compensated by the target on
114 SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR. BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISI-
TIONS 777 (2d ed. 2001).
" See, e.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate
Governance: A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819
(1996). I tnderstand from Professor Leo J. O'Brien that some religious organiza-
tions have a dual board structure.
326 Id. at 1824.
327 Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany-System and Current
Developments 7 (2000) (unpublished paper).
Peter Behrens, Background Information on German Company Law 6 (Part
II, OECD Project Revised Version, Jan. 1997).
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a fee for services basis.32s The SEC is to promulgate rules
concerning such compensation, including a periodically updated
fee schedule.3 ° In developing these rules, the SEC is to take
into consideration "such factors as the size of the parties, the
complexity of the transaction and the level of fees that would
be payable in the open market for comparable work for compa-
rable companies.""' It is crucial that in both perception and
reality members of a change of control board be compensated
fairly for their services. The Change of Control Official will be
charged with monitoring each change of control board to ensure
that the board does not unreasonably extend its term.332 Fur-
ther, the Change of Control Official is to develop methods and
procedures for evaluating the performance of change of control
boards for the purpose of determining whether members should
be appointed to future change of control boards.333
The combination of the interesting-if not fascinat-
ing-work performed by a change of control board, the fair
compensation afforded their members, and the potential for
appointment to change of control boards in the future, should
be powerful incentives for members of a change of control board
to perform their services diligently. It could be expected that a
vigorous market for membership on change of control boards
would develop, and it could also be expected that the most
challenging assignments would go to those who have been most
effective in discharging their responsibilities.
The costs of operating a change of control board may in-
deed be less than the costs of having a regular board supervise
an acquisition. This is true for two reasons. First, a change of
control board will generally consist of just three members;
therefore, the affected issuer will not incur the substantial
meeting fees that would normally be paid to its much larger
regular board for multiple meetings during the course of a
change of control transaction. Second, the members of the
change of control board normally will reside in the same geo-
graphic area in which the affected issuer has its headquarters,
thereby minimizing travel costs.
, 9 See infra app. § 14A(g).
"~ See infra app. § 14A(g).
s" See infra app. § 14A(g).
3 See infra app. § 14A(d)(2).
... See infra app. § 14A(d)(2).
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Proposed Section 14A(h)(1) sets forth a fee for service com-
pensation arrangement for the advisers to the change of control
board.114 However, under Proposed Section 14A(h)(2), in ap-
propriate circumstances and with the approval of the Change of
Control Official, investment bankers who add significant value
to the transaction may be compensated on a contingent fee ba-
sis. 35 The SEC is to promulgate rules setting out general
guidelines concerning contingent fees.336
E. Scope of Authority, Duty of Care,
and Business Judgment Rule
Proposed Section 14A(i) sets out the rules regarding: (1)
the scope of authority a change of control board has in a merg-
er and acquisition transaction, (2) the duty of care governing
actions taken by a change of control board, and (3) the business
judgment rule protecting the change of control board. 3 ' These
provisions are based on the analogous provisions of the Corpo-
rate Governance Project." 8 One standard applies to all types
of mergers and acquisitions. The multiple rules set out in the
Corporate Governance Project for different types of mergers
and acquisitions are not needed because of the experience and
disinterestedness of members of a change of control board.
Proposed Section 14A(i)(1), which sets out the general
scope of authority specified in sections 6.01 (arm's-length
transactions) and 6.02(a) (tender offers) of the Corporate Gover-
nance Project, provides that a change of control board may, in
the exercise of its business judgment, approve, reject, or decline
to consider a proposal to the target to engage in a merger or
acquisition transaction and may take an action, such as the is-
suance of a poison pill, "that has the foreseeable effect of block-
ing an unsolicited tender offer."3 9
Proposed Section 14A(i)(2) authorizes the change of control
board to consider the interests of constituencies other than
shareholders with respect to which the target has a legitimate
concern, if to do so would not significantly injure the long-term
" See infra app. § 14A(h)(1).
"' See infra app. § 14A(h)(2).
" See infra app. § 14A(h)(2).
... See infra app. § 14A(i).
.. See infra app. § 14A(i), cmts. 1-5.
"" See infra app. § 14A(i)(1).
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interest of shareholders.34 ° The same standard is set forth in
section 6.02(b)(1) of the Corporate Governance Project. 4'
The duty of care responsibility of the change of control
board, which is based on Section 4.01(a) of the Corporate Gov-
ernance Project is set out in Proposed Section 14A(i)(3). 2 Un-
der this standard, each member of a change of control board
has a duty to perform his or her duties (1) in good faith, (2) in
a manner he or she reasonably believes is in the best interest
of the corporation, and (3) with the care that a reasonably
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstanc-
es.343 The director is required to make an inquiry when the
circumstances would alert a reasonable director to the need for
such an inquiry, and the extent of the inquiry is to be consis-
tent with what "the director reasonably believes to be neces-
sary."34 In discharging his or her functions, the director may
rely on other persons in accordance with principles set forth in
sections 4.02 and 4.03 of the Corporate Governance Project."
The business judgment rule, which is set forth in Proposed
Section 14A(i)(4), codifies the business judgment rule set forth
in section 4.01(c) of the Corporate Governance Project. 6 Un-
der this standard, a member of a change of control board ful-
,4' See infra app. § 14A(i)(2).
"' See infra app. § 14A)(i)(2) cmt. 1; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 6.02(b)(1). This standard might be viewed as basically consistent with
the team production model of corporate law developed in Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporation Law, 85 U. VA. L. REV.
247 (1999). In describing this model, the authors say:
the primary job of the board of directors of a public corporation is not to
act as agents who ruthlessly pursue shareholders' interests at the expense
of employees, creditors, or other team members. Rather, the directors are
trustees for the corporation itself-mediating hierachs whose job is to
balance team members' competing interests in a fashion that keeps every-
one happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.
Id. at 280-81; see also David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Cri-
tique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 U. VA. L. REV. 1001
(2000).
34 See infra app. § 14A(i)(3) cmt. 1; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 4.01(a).
... See infra app. § 14A(i)(3).
'" See infra app. § 14A(i)(3).
',' See infra app. § 14A(i)(3).
" See infra app. § 14A(i)(4) cmt. 1; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 4.01(c).
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fills his or her duty under Proposed Section 14A(i)(4) as long as
the following four conditions are satisfied:
(1) the member must act in good faith.
(2) the member must not be interested in the subject of the
business judgment. Since the Change of Control Official is
required to make an ex ante judgment that the member is not
interested, it would be a truly rare case in which a court
could find that the director is interested. Further, even if a
court were to find that one of the directors of a change of
control board was interested, as long as the other two direc-
tors voted in favor of the transaction and were not materially
influenced by the disqualified director, the action of the board
would be protected by the business judgment rule.
(3) the member must be informed on the issue to the extent
he or she reasonably believes to be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. Since the Change of Control Official is required
to make an ex ante determination that the member has suffi-
cient experience in the merger and acquisition process, it
would be a rare case in which this duty to make a proper
inquiry would not be satisfied.
(4) the member must rationally believe that his or her busi-
ness judgment is in the best interest of the corporation. The
only conceivable situations in which this condition would not
be satisfied would involve fraud, mental incapacity, or some
other similar reason, and in any event, a board's action would
be protected by the business judgment rule as long as a ma-
jority of the directors approving the action is protected.347
Proposed Section 14A(i)(5) mirrors section 4.01(d) of the
Corporate Governance Project by placing the burden of proof on
the person challenging the transaction to establish a breach of
the duty of care and the inapplicability of the business judg-
ment rule. 3" The challenging party must also establish that
the breach was the legal cause of the damages suffered. 49
Unlike section 4.01(d) of the Corporate Governance Project,
which has a normal standard of proof, Proposed Section
14A(i)(5) adopts a clear and convincing standard of proof for
... See infra app. § 14A(i)(4).
' See infra app. § 14A(i)(5) cmt. 1; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 4.01(d).
"' See infra app. § 14A(i)(5).
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establishing the business judgment rule is inapplicable. 0
Adoption of this more difficult burden is appropriate given the
small chance that a change of control board would lose the
benefit of the business judgment rule. This approach should
substantially reduce litigation in the merger and acquisition
process.
The duty of care and the business judgment rule apply to
all types of mergers and acquisition transactions: arm's-length
transactions, management buyouts, tender offers, and
freezeouts.35' Because of the experienced and conflict-free
change of control board, there is no need for: (1) the enhanced
business judgment standard set out in section 6.02 of the Cor-
porate Governance Project for defensive tactics in tender offers;
(2) the special market test rules of section 5.15 for management
buyouts; or (3) the special rules of sections 5.10 and 7.25 for
freezeouts.
F. No Personal Liability, Insurance, and Indemnification
Proposed Section 14A(j)(1) provides that, except in the case
of a showing by clear and convincing evidence of fraud, a mem-
ber of a change of control board has no personal liability. 52
This is consistent with director exculpation statutes such as
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Business Corporation
Law."5 Thus, any litigation involving the applicability of the
business judgment rule will generally concern only the injunc-
tive remedy.
Insurance and indemnification are provided for the mem-
bers of a change of control board pursuant to Proposed Section
14A(j)(2).3 5 The SEC is to promulgate rules regarding insur-
ance and indemnification, 55 the cost of which will be borne by
the target.
See infra app. § 14A(i)(5) cmt. 1; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra
note 2, § 4.01(d).
See infra app. § 14A(b).
52 See infra app. § 14AQj)(1).
... See Delaware Business Corp. Law, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991
& Supp. 2000).
.. See infra app. § 14A(j)(2).
... See infra app. § 14A(j)(2).
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G. Arbitration of Deadlocks in Majority Control Freezeouts
If a parent corporation proposes a freezeout transaction for
a controlled subsidiary that is a public corporation, the subsid-
iary is an affected target. Consequently, a change of control
board must be appointed for the subsidiary. Thus, in all such
freezeout transactions, including short form mergers, a change
of control board will first have to be appointed for the target-
subsidiary, unless the shareholders have elected out.
If a controlling parent has sufficient voting control of a
controlled subsidiary to be able to unilaterally effectuate a
freezeout transaction, the change of control board for the sub-
sidiary should not be able to block the transaction indefinitely.
For example, the change of control board should not be able to
completely ignore the short form merger provisions of a state's
corporation law. On the other hand, the change of control board
should protect the subsidiary's minority shareholders from
being forced by the controlling parent to sell their shares for
inadequate consideration.
Initially, the change of control board may block the control-
ling parent from unilaterally completing a freezeout transac-
tion. However, to break a deadlock between the subsidiary's
change of control board and the controlling parent, Proposed
Section 14A(k) provides that if these two parties cannot reach a
decision on the price and other terms of such a freezeout, then
the price and other terms are to be determined in a binding
arbitration proceeding.356 The SEC is to promulgate rules gov-
erning both the point at which an arbitration proceeding is to
begin and the procedures for such proceedings." 7
H. Dissolution of the Change of Control Board
Under Proposed Section 14A(l), the change of control board
is dissolved when the Change of Control Official grants a peti-
tion for dissolution.3"8 The petition is to be filed by the change
of control board after the proposed merger or acquisition is
either completed or abandoned.3 9 If the change of control
... See infra app. § 14A(k).
... See infra app. § 14A(k).
... See infra app. § 14A(1).
... See infra app. § 14A(1).
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board does not timely file the petition, either the SEC or a 5%
shareholder or shareholders may file the petition."'
I. Federal Jurisdiction and Preemption of State Law
Proposed Section 14A(m)(1) clarifies that any suits under
the change of control provisions of Proposed Section 14A shall
be brought in the appropriate federal district court, which gen-
erally will be the district court of the district in which the tar-
get has its headquarters.36'
Proposed Section 14A(m)(2) provides that the change of
control provisions of Section 14A preempt all state statutes
bearing on change of control transactions, such as control share
statutes, business combination statutes, and disgorgement
statutes.362 In analyzing these laws, Professors Johnson and
Millon have concluded, "[allthough often shrouded in the rheto-
ric of shareholder welfare, the primary goal of these laws is to
protect various non-shareholder interests thought to be ad-
versely affected by hostile takeover activity."
36 3
Even though these laws are preempted here, the target's
change of control board can, pursuant to Proposed Section
14A(i)(2), give consideration to the interest of groups other
than shareholders, provided such consideration does not signifi-
cantly disfavor the long-term interests of the target's share-
holders.3
The preemption does not, however, extend to the normal
provisions of corporate law governing shareholder voting on
mergers and acquisitions. 365 The SEC is to promulgate regula-
tions specifying those state statutes that are preempted.36
Also, for the reasons outlined below, this provision preempts
state appraisal statutes.
The preemption of state takeover statutes and of state
appraisal statutes will greatly simplify the law governing merg-
ers and acquisitions. Proposed Section 14A(m)(3) preempts all
's See infra app. § 14A(1).
362 See infra app. § 14A(m)(1).
'o See infra app. § 14A(m)(2).
' Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1862, 1863 (1989).
s See infra app. § 14A(i)(2).
' See infra app. § 14A(m)(3) cmt. 3.
' See infra app. § 14A(m)(2).
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corporate charter, by-law, or other contract provisions entered
into by the target's regular board and bearing on mergers and
acquisitions, including "golden parachute" arrangements, "poi-
son pills," and lockups.67 This provision does not preempt
normal charter and by-laws provisions governing shareholder
voting on mergers and acquisitions."' The SEC is to issue
rules specifying those types of corporate provisions that are
preempted." 9
J. Elimination of Appraisal Remedy
Adoption of the change of control concept would eliminate
the need for appraisal proceedings in transactions in which a
change of control board has acted. Since the change of control
board would, through arm's-length negotiations, determine the
price to be paid in a merger and acquisition, one may presume
that the price would be fair, thereby eliminating the need for
an appraisal proceeding to determine a fair price. Consequent-
ly, the appraisal remedy should be eliminated for all transac-
tions in which a change of control board is appointed, thus
substantially simplifying the law governing mergers and acqui-
sitions.70
Although this proposal may seem radical, it is consistent
with the spirit of the Corporate Governance Project. In essence,
the Corporate Governance Project provides that in each of the
forms of acquisition in which appraisal rights are provided (i.e.,
arm's-length mergers and acquisitions under section 6.01, man-
agement buyouts under section 5.15, and freezeouts under
sections 5.10 and 7.25), a price negotiated on an arm's-length
basis by disinterested directors is presumed to be a fair price
under Section 7.22.371
Further, there is a fundamental flaw with the structure of
the appraisal remedy. If under current law or the Corporate
Governance Project, appraisal is the exclusive remedy and the
court in an appraisal proceeding determines that the fair price
is higher than the transaction price, then by definition the
' See infra app. § 14A(m)(3).
' See infra app. § 14A(m)(3) cmt. 1.
' See infra app. § 14A(m)(3).
370 See infra app. § 14A(m)(2) cmt. 1.
371 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.22 cmt. c.
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acquisition price is less than fair. The only shareholders who
receive the benefit of the fair price, however, are those share-
holders who dissent and pursue their appraisal rights. The
shareholders who do not dissent, generally most of the share-
holders, are stuck with an unfair price.
Thus, there is a structural bias in the system for an ac-
quiring corporation, particularly in management buyouts or
freezeouts, to choose a less than fair price. As long as appraisal
is the exclusive remedy, the only costs are: (1) the payment to
the dissenters of the difference between the fair price and the
transaction price, and (2) the litigation costs of the appraisal
proceeding. The acquiring entity would have an economic in-
centive to pay less than fair value if the present value of the
litigation costs is less than the difference between: (1) the ag-
gregate fair price the non-dissenting shareholders would have
received if they were all paid the fair price, and (2) the aggre-
gate price they actually received. On the other hand, under the
change of control concept, all of a target's shareholders will
benefit from the "fair price" negotiated by the change of control
board.
The structure of shareholder voting rights under both cur-
rent law and the Corporate Governance Project may seem intu-
itively fair. Those shareholders that vote in favor of the merger
get the benefit of the board's judgment. Those who dissent have
the right to have their shares appraised. The appearance of
fairness vanishes, however, when the practical aspects of
shareholder voting are considered. Shareholders tend to vote
with management even if the proposal is not in the best inter-
est of the shareholders.372 Professors Bradley and Schipani
theorize that the reason for this is that "decrease in value of
the stock [from voting with management] is less than the costs
investors would have had to incur to prevent it." 373 They go
on to conclude:
[UIndividuals will "produce" information up to the point where
marginal costs equal marginal (expected) benefits. Under
reasonable assumptions, individuals will "produce" a finite
amount of information, which is to say they will decide to
'" See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 70-72 (1989).
113 Id. at 71.
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remain rationally ignorant about some things. If voting with
management increases shareholder wealth, "on average," then
investors will find it uneconomical to investigate and weigh
the merits of each proxy proposal. They will simply follow
management's recommendation. 74
As additional support for this proposition, the authors point out
that, under modern portfolio theory, shareholders should own a
diversified portfolio, and consequently, such shareholders "care
little about the fortunes of any one firm."
3 75
In a merger or acquisition where appraisal is the exclusive
remedy, the acquiring firm can exploit the rational ignorance of
shareholders at a price by paying fair value to only those few
shareholders who incur the costs to acquire the information
that leads them to dissent. The adoption of the change of con-
trol concept would protect rationally ignorant shareholders
from exploitation and thereby enhance shareholder welfare.
K Effective Date
Proposed Section 14A(n) provides that Proposed Section
14A is to become effective three months after the date of enact-
ment. 76 This should allow time for (1) the SEC to appoint a
Change of Control Official or Officials and to promulgate rules
under Proposed Section 14A, and (2) the Change of Control
Official or Officials to prepare to perform their functions.
Upon the effective date of Proposed Section 14A, all execu-
tory contracts of the corporation bearing on change of control
transactions, such as "golden parachutes" and "poison pills,"
will become null and void. 7 Consideration should be given,
however, to grandfathering provisions with respect to which
there has been significant detrimental reliance.378
L. Effect on the Williams Act
The rules governing tender offers and open market pur-
chases contained in the Williams Act, that is, sections 13(d),
374 Id.
375 Id.
311 See infra app. § 14A(n)(1).
37 See infra app. § 14A(n)(2).
"' See infra app. § 14A(n)(2) cmt. 1.
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(e), and (f), and 14(d) and (e) of the 1934 Act,379 will remain in
place with the following modifications.
Rule 13e-3 0 and Schedule 13E-33sl under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 set forth rules governing going pri-
vate transactions. These are transactions in which a controlling
shareholder of a publicly-held corporation squeezes out the
minority shareholders. Thus, the going private rules encompass
all types of freezeout transactions. The rules are designed to
promote fairness in such transactions by requiring, among
other things, the controlling shareholder to explicitly state in
its disclosure documents whether, in its view, the transaction is
fair to the minority shareholders and to set forth in detail the
basis for such a conclusion.382 These rules can be burdensome,
and compliance can be time consuming.
If the change of control board concept is adopted, a change
of control board would be appointed for every going private
transaction, unless the corporation has elected out of the
change of control provision. If the going private transaction was
the second step in a two-step acquisition, the change of control
board for the target would have already been appointed for the
first step, and that board would remain in place for the second
step. If the freezeout were divorced in time from the acquisition
of the initial controlling interest, as in Weinberger, a change of
control board would be appointed specifically for the
freezeout 3"
A special rule would apply if the controlling shareholder
has sufficient votes to effectuate the freezeout without the
consent of the minority shareholders, and the change of control
board and the controlling shareholder could not reach agree-
ment on price within a reasonable period of time.3" In such
case, the price and other significant terms would be determined
by binding arbitration pursuant to rules promulgated by the
SEC.385 Therefore, deadlocks would be prevented.
... 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d),(e) (1994).
3- 17 C.F.R. § 240 13e-3 (2000).
311 17 C.F.R. § 240 13e-100 (2000).
' 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2000).
, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704-06 (Del. 1983).
31 See infra app. § 14A(k) cmt. 1.
31 See infra app. § 14A(k).
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Under the change of control board concept, there is no need
for rules such as Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13E-3, because it can
be presumed that the price negotiated by the change of control
board or the price determined pursuant to arbitration would be
fair to all of the minority shareholders. Consequently, it is
proposed to exempt corporations that are subject to the change
of control provision from the SEC's going private rules.
Rule 14e-1 requires that a tender offer remain open for 20
business days. 386 To give the change of control board suffi-
cient time to analyze the situation, Rule 14e-1 should be
amended to provide that a tender offer is to remain open for 25
business days after the Change of Control Official certifies that
a change of control board has been appointed.
Rule 14e-2 requires the target's board to take a public
position on a tender offer within 10 business days of the com-
mencement of the tender offer." 7 As indicated above, this du-
ty falls on the change of control board. To give the board ade-
quate time to analyze the situation, Rule 14e-2 should be
amended to extend the deadline to 15 business days after the
Change of Control Official certifies that a change of control
board has been appointed.
M. Inapplicability of Golden Parachute and Greenmail Provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code
The Internal Revenue Code limits the deduction of certain
golden parachute payments made by a target corporation to its
management.3 8 Also, the Code imposes an excise tax on cer-
tain greenmail payments made by a target on the repurchase of
target stock held by an unwanted shareholder.8 9 The purpose
of these provisions is to curtail actions of a target's board that
would likely result in members feathering their own nests or
entrenching themselves.
Since the change of control board would be in control of the
decision to make "golden parachute" and "greenmail payments,"
any such payments made by a target would not be for such
3- 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (2000).
387 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (2000).
3" I.R.C. § 280G (1994). Also, an excise tax applies to the recipient of the
golden parachute payment. See I.R.C. § 4999 (1986).
'89 I.R.C. § 5881 (1994).
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entrenchment purposes. Consequently, the "golden parachute"
and "greenmail" provisions of the Code should not apply to cor-
porations subject to the change of control provision.
N. Election-Out
Pursuant to Proposed Section 14A(o), the public sharehold-
ers of a corporation may elect not to have the change of control
provisions or selected subsections of these provisions apply to
the corporation.39 ° Thus, for example, the public shareholders
of a corporation might elect to have the change of control provi-
sion apply in only the situation in which the corporation be-
comes a target of a hostile tender offer. I believe that few cor-
porations will elect out, and therefore, the "election-out" rather
than an "election-in" should be consistent with the "convention-
al approach to statutory defaults [which] is to choose what a
majority of firms would adopt."
3 91
The procedures governing the operation of this election-out
provision are to be specified by the SEC.3 92 Such procedures
are to be designed to ensure that the proposal for an election-
out comes from public shareholders who have not been influ-
enced by management or by a controlling shareholder and that
the management and controlling shareholders in no way influ-
ence the vote on such a proposal.3 9
Thus, if independent public shareholders decide on their
own initiative that it is in the best interest for the corporation
to be free of this provision, they can vote to elect-out. In such a
case, the current state and federal rules regarding mergers,
acquisitions, and tender offers would apply to the elected-out
corporation. The change of control concept is, therefore, a de-
fault provision. For the reasons discussed below, the only way
to effectuate the change of control concept is to have federal
preemption, with the possibility of an election out.
This election-out provision is very broad. Thus, even after a
change of control board is appointed, a target's shareholders
may, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the SEC, elect to
remove the change of control board and thereby make the tar-
"g See infra app. § 14A(o).
391 ROBERTA A. ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 84 (1992).
'" See infra app. § 14A(o).
'" See infra app. § 14A(o) cmt. 1.
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get subject to normal state and federal rules. As a consequence,
if an acquiror has, for example, made an offer for the target at
a substantial premium and the change of control board is "just
saying no," the target's shareholders could elect to replace the
change of control board with a normal board.
The presence of the election-out rule should prevent a
domestic corporation from reincorporating as a foreign corpora-
tion to avoid Proposed Section 14A.
One commenter suggested that this change of control pro-
vision might be made mandatory with a sunset provision, such
as automatic repeal after ten years, unless the provision is
extended by Congress. It is suggested that this would permit a
more accurate comparison of the empirical results of the
change of control concept with such results under current law.
I believe that it is preferable to allow shareholders to elect out
of the provision if they choose; however, I would not object to
having this concept subject to a sunset, unless extended.
0. Regulatory Exemption
Proposed Section 14A(p) gives the SEC the authority to ex-
empt certain publicly-held corporations from this provision."
The exemption may apply if, for example, a single individual or
family owns a controlling block of shares or if the corporation
has recently become public and the managers or organizers
own a significant stock interest.395 This exemption should
minimize the possibility that closely-held corporations will
refuse to become public to avoid the application of Proposed
Section 14A.39
P. Non-Bona Fide Offers
Proposed Section 14A(q) makes it illegal for a person to
make a non-bona fide tender offer or a non-bona fide proposal
to a target for the purpose of causing a trigger event to occur,
thereby triggering the appointment of a change of control
board.39 ' A non-bona fide offer or proposal is one in which the
purported acquiror has no intent of completing the transaction.
" See infra app. § 14A(p).
" See infra app. § 14A(p) cmt. 1.
See infra app. § 14A(p) cmt. 1.
, See infra app. § 14A(q).
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This provision should deter parties from employing Proposed
Section 14A for strategic purposes. 98
Q. Number of Change of Control Boards That Would Have
Been Appointed in 1995 and 1996 and Projection of Future
Number of Change of Control Boards
An analysis of the SEC's report on its full disclosure re-
views contained in its 1996 Annual Report399 provides a basis
for estimating the approximate number of change of control
boards that would likely be appointed each year. As indicated
below, in view of the increase in the number of change of con-
trol transactions in recent years, the estimate based on the
1996 Report is adjusted upward.
In 1995, 140 tender offer statements were filed on Sched-
ule 14D-1, 225 proxy statements were filed for mergers and
"going private" transactions, 77 "going private" schedules were
filed, and 59 contested proxy solicitations occurred. Likewise, in
1996, 165 tender offer statements were filed, 261 proxy state-
ments for mergers and "going private" transactions were filed,
100 "going private" schedules were filed, and 62 proxy solicita-
tions occurred. In each of these transactions, a change of con-
trol board would be appointed. In both 1995 and 1996, these
schedules apparently did not involve a proxy statement but
rather involved freezeout mergers in which the target's share-
holders did not have the right to vote, but did receive a disclo-
sure statement (i.e. an information statement) under section
14(c) of the 1934 Act.4°
Change of control boards would also be appointed upon the
filing of a Schedule 13D (which is required for acquisitions of
more than 5% of the stock of a public issuer),4°' provided that
the purpose of the acquisition is to effectuate a change of con-
trol of the issuer.4 2 The SEC's Annual Report does not list
the number of such filings, but it can be assumed that many
are ultimately followed by the filing of a tender offer statement
or a merger proxy statement, and thus would be automatically
" See infra app. § 14A(q)(1).
1996 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 79.
400 Id.
401 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2000).
41 See infra app. § 14A(b)(4).
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counted with these documents. There certainly would be other
transactions in which a Schedule 13D is filed, indicating a
change of control purpose, but the Schedule 13D is not followed
by the filing of either a tender offer statement or a merger
proxy statement. It is difficult to estimate the number of such
cases, but it would seem that an estimate of no more than 50
each year would be reasonable.
Thus, the estimated number of change of control boards
that would likely have been required if this concept had applied
in 1995 and 1996 would be as follows:
1995 1996
[11 Tender Offers 140 165
[21 Mergers and Going Private
Proxy Statements 225 261
[3] Going Private Schedules 77 100
[41 Contested Proxy Solicitation 59 62
[51 Schedule 13Ds for Change of
Control Purpose, without a
subsequent tender offer or
merger (Estimated) 50 50
Estimated Number of
Change of Control Boards 551 638
There has been an increase in the number of change of
control transactions taking place since 1996, and it would not
be unrealistic to assume that in some years 1000 change of
control boards might be appointed. This assumes that none or
very few corporations elected out of the provision.
Although this may seem like a large number of change of
control boards, the above statistics demonstrate that there are
a large number of change of control transactions taking place
in our economy each year where the potential conflict between
the directors and the shareholders may be preventing the maxi-
mization of shareholder value. The adoption of the change of
control concept would eliminate these conflicts, maximize
shareholder value, and significantly reduce the substantial
litigation that arises in these transactions. Further, the SEC
could appoint Change of Control Officials for various geograph-
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ic areas, because the change of control boards would be spread
throughout the country.
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF APPLICATION OF THE
CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD PROPOSAL IN SEVERAL SEMINAL
TAKEOVER CASES
A. Introduction
This section discusses how the change of control board
concept would likely have applied in the several seminal cases
discussed above. In connection with arm's-length transactions,
this section examines the potential impact of the change of
control provision on the facts presented in (1) Smith v. Van
Gorkom,4 °3 (2) Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.
(Time-Warner)," and (3) Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc.4"'
For management buyouts, this section analyzes the impact
of the change of control provision on the facts in Hanson Trust
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.4" and Kahn v. Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc.4"7
In considering tender offers, this section examines the
impact of this provision on the facts in (1) Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,"8 (2) Time-Warner,°9 (3)
QVC,410 (4) Moore Corp. Inc. v. Wallace Computer Services,
Inc.," and (5) Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail, Inc.
412
For freezeouts, this section examines the impact of the
change of control provision on the facts in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.41 3 and Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.
4 14
403 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
4 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
45 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
4w 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
Civ. A. No. 12489, 1996 WL 159628 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996), 21 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1143 (1996).
4w 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
4w 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
410 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
411 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995)
412 No. 96-7167, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1987).
413 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
4 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
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B. Application of Change of Control Concept
Assuming the shareholders have not elected out under
Section 14A(o), each of the target corporations in these ten
cases (i.e., Trans Union in Van Gorkom, SCM in Hanson Trust,
Dairy Mart in Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Revlon in
Revlon, Time in Time-Warner, Paramount in QVC, Wallace in
Moore, Conrail in Norfolk Southern, UOP in Weinberger, and
Lynch in Lynch Communications) is a public corporation with
respect to which a trigger event has occurred. Therefore, each
of these targets is an "affected issuer" under Proposed Section
14A(a).
415
Consequently, under Proposed Section 14A(c)(1), the board
of each of these targets is required to petition the Change of
Control Official for the appointment of a change of control
board.418 Under Proposed Section 14A(e), the Change of Con-
trol Official must promptly appoint a change of control board,
which normally will consist of three members, each of whom
will have to be both qualified to serve on such a board and
completely disinterested in the transaction.417 Normally, one
of the members will be appointed from the regular board, pro-
vided such person is otherwise qualified to serve.
Pursuant to Proposed Section 14A(f)(1), each of the change
of control boards has complete authority over all matters relat-
ing to the proposed transaction.418 Pursuant to Proposed Sec-
tion 14(A)(f)(2), each change of control board would likely hire
its own completely independent and conflict-free attorney and
investment banker.419 Pursuant to Proposed Section 14A(f)(4),
each of the change of control boards would likely have exten-
sive consultations with the regular boards concerning their
views on the proposed transaction.420
Each of the change of control boards would be subject to
the duty of care in Proposed Section 14A(i)(3) and the business
judgment rule in Proposed Section 14A(i)(4). 421 This is the
case without respect to the form of the transaction, that is,
415 See infra app. § 14A(a)-(b).
416 See infra app. § 14A(c)(1).
417 See infra app. § 14A(e).
418 See infra app. § 14A(f)(1).
419 See infra app. § 14A(f)(2).
... See infra app. § 14A(f)(4).
421 See infra app. § 14A(i)(3)-(4).
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negotiated merger, management buyout, tender offer, or
freezeout merger. In each of the situations it can be expected
that the change of control board would clearly satisfy its duty
of care obligation and would clearly receive the benefit of the
business judgment rule. Pursuant to Proposed Section
14A(j)(1), absent fraud, no member of the change of control
board would face liability.422
Pursuant to Proposed Section 14A(m), any suits dealing
with the change of control board must be brought in the appro-
priate federal district court.4' Also, under this section, the
change of control provisions preempt state law statutes bearing
on change of control transactions,424 such as Pennsylvania's
takeover law, which is very protective of a target's manage-
ment and was at issue in Norfolk Southern,42' and Delaware's
business combination statute, which in certain circumstances
prevents a hostile acquiror from effectuating a second step
freezeout transactions.426 However, because of the protection
afforded by the business judgment rule, it is highly unlikely
that there would be litigation involving the change of control
boards in any of these cases.
Turning to the facts of the cases illustrating arm's-length
transactions, the change of control board for Trans Union
would have decided what steps should be taken in attempting
to sell Trans Union, and there certainly would not have been a
quick deal with Jay Pritzker. Also, the change of control boards
for Time and Paramount would likely have not entered into the
original merger agreements with Warner and Viacom, without
first undertaking a careful market test. The impact of the
change of control provisions on Time and Paramount in connec-
tion with the tender offer aspect of these cases is examined
further below.
Turning to management buyouts, the change of control
board for SCM clearly would not have granted Merrill Lynch
and the management group the option on SCM's crown jewels
without getting an opinion from the investment banker on the
"' See infra app. § 14A(j)(1).
42 See infra app. § 14A(m)(1).
424 See infra app. § 14A(m)(2).
421 15 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2544 (1995).




value of the optioned assets. Also, the change of control board
for Dairy Mart would not have been under the control of the
controlling shareholder, and, therefore, would have actively
sought alternative offers.
In connection with the tender offer transactions, the
change of control board for Revlon would not have extended the
auction-ending lockup to Forstmann, but would have ensured
that Revlon went to the highest bidder.
Even if the change of control board for Time had entered
into a merger agreement with Warner, the board likely would
have given the Time shareholders the opportunity to choose
whether to tender to Paramount, particularly after Paramount
raised its price to $200 per share. Time's board was likely mis-
led by an overly optimistic valuation of Time provided by the
board's investment banker, Wasserstein Perella. Wasserstein
may have had a strong incentive to see the Time-Warner trans-
action proceed. This would not have been the case with an in-
vestment banker for Time's change of control board.
Thus, the result with a change of control board in Time-
Warner likely would have been significantly different from the
result flowing from the court's decision. After taking account of
a stock split that Time-Warner effectuated, Paramount's $200
offer in 1989 translates into an offer of $50 per share in 1999.
The price of Time-Warner's shares did not reach the level of
Paramount's 1989 offer until 1997. Wasserstein's prediction
was that these shares, taking account of the split, would be
trading in 1993 in a range of $92 to $100.50.427 There can be
no doubt that Time's shareholders would have been much bet-
ter off if they could have accepted the Paramount offer.
The change of control board for Paramount in QVC likely
would not have entered into the merger agreement with
Viacom without exploring thoroughly and openly a transaction
with QVC, which was very interested in making a competing
bid. The likely effect of such an exploration would have been an
auction of Paramount to the highest bidder, which was the
effect of the court's decision.
The only reason that Paramount was ultimately sold to
Viacom pursuant to the auction for $110 per share, when the
" See Reed Abelson, When Boards Say 'No Deal' to Holders, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
6, 1996, at C1.
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original merger price was only $70 per share, was the presence
of QVC, which was willing to become a hostile bidder. If QVC
had not been willing to make a bid, it is likely that there would
not have been an auction, and Paramount's shareholders would
have received the $70 per share set out in the original merger
agreement. Under the circumstances in QVC, even if QVC had
not been interested, it is highly unlikely that Paramount's
change of control board would have entered the merger agree-
ment with Viacom without first canvassing the market for
other potential purchasers. Thus, even if QVC were not already
interested in making an offer for Paramount, the change of
control board might have induced QVC to make such an offer.
The change of control board for Wallace may or may not
have made a decision to keep the pill in place and reject
Moore's offer. The decision would have depended upon the
assessment by the change of control board of the expected val-
ue of Wallace after consulting with the independent investment
bankers for the change of control board. It is likely that the
investment bankers for the change of control board would be
more direct than Goldman Sachs seems to have been in dealing
with Wallace's board.
In the Conrail transaction, Proposed Section 14A(m)(2)
would have preempted Pennsylvania's takeover laws, and,
therefore, the Conrail change of control board would have been
subject to the standard duty of care and the business judgment
rule.4" It is highly unlikely that Conrail's change of control
board would have rejected the Norfolk offer in favor of CSX's
lower offer. The end result of a division of Conrail between
CSX and Norfolk Southern may have also occurred with a
change of control board, but this result could have been
reached without lengthy and costly litigation.
Turning to freezeouts, the change of control board for UOP
would have had meaningful negotiations with Signal concern-
ing an appropriate price to be paid in the freezeout merger. If
the parties could not have reached an agreement, then under
Proposed Section 14A(k), the price and other terms of the
transaction would have been determined by arbitration. 429 A
428 See infra app. §§ 14A(m)(2), (i)(3)-(4).
429 See infra app. § 14A(k).
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similar result would have been reached under the facts in
Lynch Communications.
The change of control board in each of these cases would
have addressed the inherent conflicts of interest faced by the
targets' directors.
In summary, the actions taken by a change of control
board would likely have produced the same results as those
reached by the courts in Van Gorkom, Hanson Trust, Dairy
Mart, Revlon, QVC, Weinberger, and Lynch. On the other hand,
in Time-Warner, Moore, and Norfolk Southern, a change of
control board likely would have reached a different result than
that reached by the courts. In all these cases, the change of
control boards would have been much more protective of the
interest of the targets' shareholders than were the targets'
boards, and in each case it is unlikely that there would have
been litigation concerning actions taken by the change of con-
trol board.
V. WHY NOT USE DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS UNDER
EXISTING LAw?
An obvious question is presented by the proposal for a
change of control board: Why not simply rely on disinterested
directors under current law to perform the functions of the
change of control board? The Corporate Governance Project
adopts the disinterested director concept in dealing with man-
agement buyouts under section 5.15,430 non-majority control
freezeouts under section 5.10,431 and majority control
freezeouts under section 7.25.432 Also, the Corporate
Governance Project indicates that in the context of defensive
tactics governed by section 6.02, interested directors who par-
ticipate in a decision should not be held financially liable if the
"number of disinterested directors who approve [the defensive
action] is legally sufficient to authorize action of the corpora-
tion . . . ."
4.. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.15.
.31 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 5.10.
2 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 7.25.
... CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 6.02 cmt. a (emphasis
added).
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In addition, section 3A.01 of the Corporate Governance
Project recommends that every large publicly-held corporation
have a majority of independent directors. 34 Similarly, the
Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association
suggests in its Corporate Director's Guidebook that "at least a
majority of members of the boards of publicly-held corporations
should be independent of management." 35 Further, the Busi-
ness Roundtable, in its Statement on Corporate Governance,
suggests that a "substantial majority of the directors of [a large
publicly owned] corporation should be outside (non-manage-
ment) directors."43 Also, Martin Lipton and Jay Lorsch have
suggested that public corporations should have a "ratio of at
least two independent directors to any director who has a con-
nection with the company, either as management or substan-
tial customer or supplier of goods or services. " '
There is also empirical evidence that the presence of inde-
pendent directors on a board can benefit the shareholders of a
target company. One study has found that the shareholders of
a corporation that issues a poison pill are likely to experience
positive abnormal stock returns upon the announcement of the
adoption of the pill if the board of the corporation consists of a
majority of outside directors.438 On the other hand, the abnor-
mal returns were negative if less than a majority of the board
consisted of outside directors. Abnormal returns are those fall-
ing either above (i.e. positive) or below (i.e., negative) what
would be predicted by normal market moves. The computation
of abnormal returns, which is performed through what is re-
ferred to as an event study, is a statistical measure of the effect
a particular event has on a corporation's share price.
"4 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 3A.01.
"I COMMrrrEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CORPORATE
DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S
GUIDEBOOK].
"" THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 10
(Sept. 1997).
137 Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 59, 67 (1992).
131 James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills,
35 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 387-89 (1994) (discussing this article and similar articles);
see also Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Gover-
nance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 930-937 (1996).
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Furthermore, it has been found that in management
buyouts of publicly-held firms the cumulative abnormal returns
of the target's shareholders are substantially higher when the
target's board consists of a majority of independent direc-
tors.439 There is also evidence that the wealth effects on the
shareholders of acquiring firms are likely to be more favorable
when independent directors comprise at least half of the
acquiror's board."'
In a recent study of the impact of disinterested directors on
corporate performance, Professors Bhagat and Black conclude
that "[t] aken as a whole, the studies of the role of the target
company's board in an acquisition provide evidence that majori-
ty-independent boards extract higher prices from bidders."'
However, with regard to takeover defenses, they conclude that
"there is little evidence that relatively independent boards
behave in a significantly more (or less) shareholder-friendlier
fashion than other boards when they adopt and employ take-
over defenses."" 2
In addressing the relationship between board composition
and general firm performance, Professors Bhagat and Black
have found that "there is no convincing evidence that increas-
ing board independence, relative to the norms that currently
prevail among large American firms, will improve firm perfor-
mance.' 43 Similarly, Professor Lin has found that the empiri-
cal evidence is "mixed regarding whether the proportion of
outside directors has a positive effect on overall firm perfor-
mance.""4 However, Ira Millstein, a leading corporate practi-
... Chun I. Lee et al., Board Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of
Management Buyouts, 21 FIN. MGMT. 58, 58 (1992); see also Lin, supra note 438,
at 930-3 1.
440 John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers?
Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 207 (1992). See also Lin,
supra note 438, at 930-31.
41 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAw. 921, 928 (1999).
42 Id. at 930.
Id. at 950.
Lin, supra note 438, at 962. For a proposal that public companies be re-
quired to disclose "(1) whether or not there is a separate independent chair, and
if there is not, (2) whether or not its board of directors has designated a senior
independent director who functions as a leader of its independent directors," see
Constance E. Bagley & Richard H. Koppes, Leader of the Pack: A Proposal for
Disclosure of Board Leadership Structure, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149, 152 (1997).
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tioner, and Professor Paul W. MacAvoy in a 1998 study found
"a statistically significant relationship between an active, inde-
pendent board and superior corporate performance as mea-
sured by earnings in excess of costs of capital over the industry
average." 5 They go on to conclude that "[Clorporations that
received an 'A+' CalPERS corporate governance grade and cor-
porations that graded as having active governance 'present'
both performed significantly better in generating earnings in
the 1990s than did the other corporations in the sample of
large domestic corporations."" 6
Notwithstanding these divergent findings on general per-
formance, there seems to be strong empirical evidence to the
effect that independent directors benefit shareholders in vari-
ous acquisition contexts. Thus, it seems clear that action by
disinterested directors in the merger and acquisition context is
preferable to action taken by interested directors. However, in
the words of former Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of
Chancery, "the jury is still out on the question whether the
special committee device [that is, disinterested directors] works
well enough, often enough, for the law to continue to accord it
weight."" The proposal here for a change of control board is
designed to ensure that the directors acting for the target in a
change of control situation are truly disinterested and knowl-
edgeable.
Chancellor Allen's skeptical view of the true independence
of disinterested directors also has been expressed by two promi-
nent judges on the Seventh Circuit: Judge Richard Posner, a
vigorous supporter of an economic approach to the law, and
Judge Cudahy, who apparently is not a disciple of the law and
economics movement.
The authors say that the findings of the Bhagat and Black study suggest that
"American corporations need to do more than just place independent directors on
their boards to increase shareholder wealth via their corporate governance activi-
ties." Id. at 161.
Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1283,
1318 (1998).
44 Id.
"' William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are They
Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAW. 2055, 2062-63 (1990). For a discussion of some of
the practical aspects of using independent directors for special transactions, see A.
Gilchrist Sparks, III & Mark Hurd, Special Negotiating Committees, 30 REV. SEC.
& COMMODITIES REG. 97 (Apr. 23, 1997).
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In his dissenting opinion in Panter v. Marshall Field &
Co.," 8 which was decided before Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., " ' Judge Cudahy criticizes the majority for applying
Delaware's normal business judgment rule in examining a
board's defensive tactics.45 ° He points out that the "theoretical
justification for the 'hands off' precept of the business judgment
rule is that courts should be reluctant to review the acts of
directors in situations where the expertise of the directors is
likely to be greater than that of the courts."45' He adds, how-
ever, that if the directors are afflicted with a conflict of inter-
est, relative expertise is no longer crucial, and, in such Lases,
"courts have no rational choice but to subject challenged con-
duct of directors... to their own disinterested scrutiny. "452
Judge Cudahy then says that the Panter majority relies
heavily on the business judgment rule in presuming good faith
on the part of the directors and "attaches special significance to
the 'independence' of Field's [i.e., the target's] Board."4"3 He
then challenges the assumption that Field's Board is indepen-
dent:
The fact that Field's may have had a majority of non-manage-
ment (independent) directors is hardly dispositive. The inter-
action between management and board may be very strong
even where, as here, a relationship of symbiosis seems to
prevail over the normal condition of "management domina-
tion." Whether the relationship is symbiotic or management
"dominates," I do not think it necessary to rely primarily
on... [direct] pecuniary relationships ... to establish a con-
flict of interests here.... [T]he very idea that, if we cannot
- . trace with precision a mighty flow of dollars into the pockets
of each of the outside directors, these directors are necessarily
disinterested arbiters of the stockholders' destiny, is appall-
ingly naive. "
646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
"' 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
450 Panter, 646 F.2d at 299-312 (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
" Id. at 300 (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Judge Cudahy then goes on to catalogue how independent
directors are in his view interested:
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are,
at the very least, "interested" in their own positions of power,
prestige and prominence (and in their not inconsequential
perquisites). They are "interested" in defending against out-
side attack the management which they have, in fact, in-
stalled or maintained in power, "their" management (to
which, in many cases, they owe their directorships). And they
are "interested" in maintaining the public reputation of their
own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raid-
ers" .... 455
The types of "interests" identified by Judge Cudahy are not
cognizable interests under current law or under the Corporate
Governance Project. Section 1.23 of the Corporate Governance
Project provides that a director is interested in the transaction
if the director: (1) is a party to the transaction; (2) has a busi-
ness, financial or [family] relationship with a party and the
relationship could reasonably be expected to adversely affect
the director's judgment; (3) has a direct or indirect material
pecuniary interest in the transaction (other than normal
director's fees and benefits) and the interest could reasonably
be expected to adversely affect the director's judgment; or (4) is
under the control of a party to the transaction or one who has a
material pecuniary interest in the transaction and such control
could reasonably be expected to adversely affect the director's
judgment.456
Judge Posner's assessment of the independence of outside
directors seems to be in complete agreement with that of Judge
Cudahy. In Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp.,4 Judge Posner, in
finding that the target's board had violated its fiduciary duty in
issuing a poison pill, stated:
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over
of the corporation by an investor who is likely to fire them if
the takeover attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict of
-" Id. at 300-01.
46 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2, § 1.23.
4 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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interest, and it is not cured by vesting the power of decision
in a board of directors in which insiders are a minority ....
No one likes to be fired, whether he is just a director or also
an officer. The so-called outsiders moreover are often friends
of the insiders. And since they spend only part of their time
on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of those
affairs is much less than that of insiders, to whom they are
likely therefore to defer.458
These observations by Judges Cudahy and Posner in the
context of an examination of a board's defensive action are
consistent with Chancellor Allen's examination of the role of
independent directors in management buyouts. The Chancellor
points out that there are some cases, like Hanson Trust PLC v.
ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,49 that support the cynical view
that independent boards do not properly function; and there
are other cases, such as In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Liti-
gation,4" in which the independent directors appeared to be
"energetically exercising informed and independent judgment
in the sale of the enterprise.'"61 The Chancellor goes on to
summarize the Delaware cases as follows: "[Iun the sale con-
text, the Delaware cases suggested that it is possible for
'outside' directors to function independently .... But those
cases demonstrate as well that not every decision by an appar-
ently disinterested special committee deserves or will be ac-
corded that respect."462 Notwithstanding the bright spots, he
"confess[es] a painful awareness of the ways in which the de-
vice may be subverted and rendered less than useful."6
The Chancellor also observes that outside directors who
serve on a special committee to preside over the sale of a com-
pany have a "fairly unappetizing assignment" because "no mat-
ter what the director does he will probably be sued for it."4
He further points out that outside directors have a tendency to
" Dynamics, 794 F.2d at 256.
49 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
41 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 94, 194 (Del. Ch.
1989).
4" Allen, supra note 447, at 2060.
462 Id.
46 Id. at 2056.
4 Id at 2061.
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rely on their advisers because "[flrequently, the outside direc-
tors who find themselves in control of a corporate sale process
have little or no experience in the sale of a public company.
They are in terra cognito."'65 Thus, there is not only the prob-
lem with the potential conflict of interest, but also with inexpe-
rienced outside directors. This problem can lead to passivity of
the type manifested by the independent board members in
Smith v. Van Gorkom,466 which involved an arm's-length
transaction, and in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,467 which involved
a freezeout.
Thus, there are cases dealing with each of the types of
mergers and acquisitions addressed here (that is, arm's-length
mergers and acquisitions, management buyouts, tender offers,
and freezeouts) in which independent board members have
failed to act in the best interest of the shareholders. Further,
even if their actions appear on their face to be proper, there is
always the reality that independent directors will conduct
themselves with a view toward litigation and in ways which
may "obscure their true motives."46
The change of control board concept addresses directly both
the conflict problem and the inexperience problem identified by
Chancellor Allen and also the passivity problems illustrated in
Van Gorkom and Weinberger. The Change of Control Official
must make an ex ante judgment that each appointee to a
change of control board has both (1) no conflict of interest of
the type outlined above by Judge Cudahy or set forth in section
1.23 of the Corporate Governance Project, and (2) the requisite
experience to address the issues presented by the proposed
change of control transaction. It can, therefore, be expected
that change of control boards would aggressively pursue the
best interest of the corporation and the shareholders without
respect to the type of transaction or the identity of the parties.
Most of the boards of the target companies in the seminal
cases examined above had a majority of disinterested directors,
and in each of those cases the boards appear not to have acted
in the best interest of the target's shareholders. While this does
465 Id.
466 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
46 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
4 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 251, 281 (1977).
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not show that disinterested directors never work properly in
the merger and acquisition context, it does show that there are
many situations in which the performance of disinterested
directors is not optimal.
Finally, while it can be expected that a change of control
board would act in the interest of the target's shareholders and
thereby ensure that they are treated fairly, Professors Bhagat
and Black, among others, have argued that the "[hligher pre-
mia [resulting from the use of disinterested directors] are not
unequivocally good .... ." 9 They elaborate as follows:
If both bidder and target are publicly traded, a higher take-
over price is simply a wealth transfer from the bidder's share-
holders to the target's shareholders. Moreover, if shareholders
are diversified, then over a number of transactions, the
bidder's shareholders and the target's shareholders are the
same people. The key to economic efficiency in the takeover
market is not the price paid by the acquirer, but instead: (i)
whether there is a good strategic fit between the acquirer and
the target (for which a good measure is combined bidder and
target returns, not target returns alone); and (ii) whether
there is an optimal frequency of takeovers, taking into ac-
count both their efficiency benefits and transaction costs.
4 70
This line of reasoning suggests that a diversified investor
should prefer takeover governance rules that promote the "opti-
mal frequency of takeovers." But, it is impossible to know the
"optimal frequency of takeovers." Further, not all investors are
diversified, and it can be expected that virtually all investors in
a target will want very much to be paid a fair price for their
shares. Moreover, if for whatever reason, investors feel that the
change of control concept is not in their interest, they can elect
out of the provision.
One final point on the "optimal frequency of takeovers" is
that the current rules in Delaware and in many other states
give a target's directors wide latitude in defending against
unwanted takeovers. These rules may, therefore, have the
effect of deterring takeovers because acquirors may not want to
incur the expense and time needed to overcome a recalcitrant
" Bhagat & Black, supra note 441, at 926.
470 Id.
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management. This should not be the case with a change of
control board because such a board will not erect artificial
barriers to the completion of an acquisition, and even if a
change of control board were to erect artificial barriers, the
target's shareholders could, pursuant to SEC rules, vote to
eliminate the change of control board. Thus, as compared with
present law, the adoption of the change of control concept may
move the merger and acquisition market place in the direction
of the "optimal frequency of takeovers."
Finally, one commenter suggested that if the change of
control board concept were more efficient than current law, it
could be expected that companies issuing shares in initial pub-
lic offerings would include similar provisions requiring action
by disinterested directors in their charters, assuming it would
be legal for them to do so. It appears, however, that IPO com-
panies are moving in the opposite direction by including mea-
sures in their charters that can help deter takeovers, such as
staggered boards.471
VI. WHY A FEDERALLY MANDATED CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
A. Introduction
There is nothing to prevent a state legislature from enact-
ing a provision that mandates a change of control board. How-
ever, the "[tiwo interest groups [that] have dominated the de-
velopment of American corporate law-[the] corporate lawyers
and corporate managers .... "472 would likely be able to block
the enactment of any such legislation. And, in any event, state
legislative action in adopting such a requirement could be
avoided by merely reincorporating the corporation in a state
that did not have such a provision. Also, it is unrealistic to
think that many corporations would voluntarily include such a
... Coates, Takeover Defenses, supra note 298, at 277.
" William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate
Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 306 (1997) [hereinafter Carney, Competition for
Corporate Charters]. See generally William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate
Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998) (explaining role of interest groups in corpo-
rate law production); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward An Inter-
est-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1987) (explain-
ing evolution of Delaware's corporate law from "race to the bottom" and "corpo-
rate federal" theories to "interest group" theory).
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provision in their articles (assuming it would be permissible to
do so), because the current board has control over the proxy
process and shareholder proposals do not tend to succeed. As
explained by Professors Bradley and Schipani, shareholders
tend to vote with management because they "find it uneconomi-
cal to investigate and weigh the merits of each proxy
proposal.""3
Thus, the only practical avenue for making the change of
control board effective for publicly-held corporations is to have
a federally mandated provision that applies uniformly to all
registered corporations. Further, this approach is basically
consistent with the approach Congress took with the enactment
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
which makes federal court the exclusive venue for most securi-
ties fraud class action [litigation] involving nationally traded
securities. 74 In fact, the change of control concept is arguably
not as dramatic a change as that enacted by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 because corporations
can opt-out of the change of control provision.
It can be anticipated that many will object to the need for
this type of federal rule. For example, Professor Fischel has ar-
gued that there is no "convincing theoretical case" and no em-
pirical evidence supporting the view that a majority of indepen-
dent directors will increase shareholder welfare. 75 Although
the empirical evidence on the issue of whether independent
directors have an effect on overall firm performance is
"mixed," 76 there is evidence that the presence of independent
directors in various merger and acquisition contexts can have a
positive effect on shareholder welfare. 77 This proposal goes
one step further by insuring that in a change of control trans-
'" Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372, at 71.
... See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 144
CONG. REC. H10774, H10774 (Oct. 13, 1998). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 28(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 781 (1994). See generally Robert B. Thompson, Preemp-
tion and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to
Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999) (discussing expansion
of federal regulation of corporations with enactment of Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act of 1998).
'" Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1283 (1982).
... Lin, supra note 438, at 962.
... Id. at 930-37.
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action, the target has a change of control board that is unques-
tionably independent and also knowledgeable in addressing
change of control issues.
In arguing against the change of control board, some might
endorse the argument of Professor Fischel that it is preferable
to "allow private parties to organize in whatever manner they
wish,"478 because if the change of control board concept "really
will increase shareholders' welfare, it will be undertaken volun-
tarily .... "' But for reasons noted above, it is highly unlike-
ly that a state would enact a change of control provision be-
cause companies would likely reincorporate to avoid the provi-
sion. Thus, as a practical matter the federal route is the only
viable option. Furthermore, since there is an elect-out provi-
sion, the change of control concept is merely a default rule, and
if it is inefficient companies could be expected to elect-out. My
guess, however, is that there would be few elections out. If I
am completely wrong and all corporations elect out, then there
is merely a return to the status quo, and it would thereby be
demonstrated, by a fairly costless election out procedure, that
the status quo maximizes shareholder welfare. On the other
hand, if I am right, the enactment of this provision could sub-
stantially enhance shareholder welfare.
Professor Fischel has criticized Professor Cary's proposal
for federally mandated minimum corporate standards as being
"contradicted by all available theoretical and empirical evi-
dence,"48 ' and it can be expected that this proposal will be
criticized on similar grounds. Also, criticism along similar lines
can be expected from the Delaware corporate bar. For these
reasons, this section examines the empirical case for a federally
mandated change of control board.
B. Comparison of This Proposal With Federalization Proposals
of Professor Cary and Others
Professor Cary has argued that Delaware's legislature and
courts in an effort to attract corporations to that state have
478 Fischel, supra note 475, at 1284.
479 Id.
4' Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 921 (1982)
[hereinafter Fischel, Race to the Bottom].
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engaged in a "race to the bottom" by not providing adequate
protection of shareholders' rights. 8' He, therefore, argues
that federal standards of corporate responsibility should be
enacted. Specifically, he has proposed "minimum corporation
law provisions which shall be applicable to companies doing
business in interstate commerce and construed by federal judi-
cial standards."48 His proposal is for a Federal Corporate
Uniformity Act that would apply to all corporations having
more than $1 million in assets and 300 shareholders.483 Al-
though these companies would still incorporate in the jurisdic-
tions of their choice, they would be subject to federal rules gov-
erning such items as: (1) fiduciary standards, (2) interested
directors, (3) issuance of nonvoting shares, and (4) indemni-
fication of directors.4
Others have made similar proposals, including Professor
Schwartz, who argues that Professor Cary's minimum stan-
dards approach does not go far enough and that a federal char-
tering law should be adopted "applying federal standards con-
sistently to all facets of corporation law.""85
Bills were introduced in 1980 that would have significantly
increased the federal regulation of corporations.486 These bills
were not enacted, however.
Also, in a 1992 article Professor Bebchuk argues that
"state competition may well produce socially undesirable re-
sults whenever a corporate law issue involves significant
externalities. 87 He suggests that "it may well be desirable to
adopt federal law rules-or at least federal minimum stan-
dards-with respect to [issues involving]" significant
externalities such as the regulation of takeovers and proxy
"' William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 700-01 (1974).
- Id. at 701.
483 Id.
4- Id. at 702
4" Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 BUS.
LAW. 1125, 1139 (1976). See also RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING
OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976) (stating that it is constitutional for federal gov-
ernment to charter business).
" See Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980, S. 2567, 96th Cong.
(1980); Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong. (1980).
487 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1494 (1992).
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contests, the protection of creditors, disclosure regulation, and
the protection of constituencies other than providers of capi-
tal.
488
The proposal here for a federal rule mandating a change of
control board does not go nearly as far as these prior federal
proposals. The proposal here is focused on transactions in
which there is compelling evidence that boards, even if acting
through independent directors, are not performing in a manner
that maximizes shareholder welfare. Further, the proposal here
is only a default rule; shareholders can elect not to have the
provision apply or can elect to have the provision only apply in
certain circumstances, such as hostile tender offers. Thus, the
approach increases the competition for corporate governance
rules.
C. Criticisms of the Cary Approach
1. The Basic Criticism
In 1985, Professor Fischel in a criticism of the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in the Smith v. Van Gorkom489 case
wrote:
Delaware corporate law has had its critics, most significantly
Professor William Cary, who wrote a famous article attacking
Delaware a decade ago [referring to Cary, Federalism]. But
today, Cary's position has been discredited; indeed, in recent
years it has been discussed only as an illustration of how it is
possible to reach the wrong conclusions if one lacks a basic
understanding of the economic structure of the corporation
and of corporate law.4" (emphasis added).
This harsh indictment of Professor Cary's position was first
set out by Professor Fischel in a 1982 article in which he ar-
gued that Delaware was successful in attracting corporations
because its corporate law represented a "climb to the top," not
a "race to the bottom."491 He asserts that "all available theo-
48 Id. at 1495.
4'9 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1983).
" Fischel, supra note 33, at 1454 (referring to Cary, supra note 481 (empha-
sis added).
" Fischel, supra note 475, at 920.
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retical and empirical evidence" contradicts Professor Cary's
position and supports the proposition that "states such as Dela-
ware have adopted enabling corporation statutes to allow pri-
vate parties to enter into contractual arrangements that they
find mutually advantageous."'92
Also, Professor Fischel continues the argument in his 1991
book (with Judge Easterbrook), The Economic Structure Of Cor-
porate Law.493 There the authors wrote: "As a matter of theo-
ry, the 'race for the bottom' cannot exist. Empirical studies con-
firmed the force of competition." 94 Professor Roberta Romano,
in her 1993 book The Genius of American Corporate Law"95
strongly supports this position in a chapter entitled The Feder-
alism Debate."96
A close analysis of the authorities relied on by Professor
Fischel shows that he has overstated the case against Professor
Cary's position. He and Judge Easterbrook do not give appro-
priate consideration to an empirical study by Professors
Bradley and Schipani that directly supports Professor Cary's
position. Also, a close review of Professor Romano's more re-
fined analysis of this issue leads to the conclusion that there is
substantial empirical support for Professor Cary's "race to the
bottom" theory.
2. The Empirical Support for the Criticism
The sole piece of empirical evidence relied on by Professor
Fischel in his Race to the Bottom article was a 1982 study by
Professors Dodd and Leftwich 97 in which they "investigate
the case for federal chartering of corporations by examining
evidence of the effect of the choice of a state of incorporation on
the wealth of shareholders."4 98 In their 1991 book, Professor
Fischel and Judge Easterbrook also cite to this study by Dodd
and Leftwich, as well as to studies by Professor Romano and by
-' Id. at 921.
"' FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTrRE
OF CORPORATE LAw (1991).
' Id. at 214.
4" ROMANO, supra note 391, at 14-24.
49 Id. at 14-24.
4" Fischel, supra note 475, at 920-21.
"m Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Un-
healthy Competition" versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. L. 259, 260 (1980).
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Professors Baysinger and Butler, as support for the statement
that "[elmpirical studies confirmed the force of competi-
tion."4
Professors Dodd and Leftwich argue that if Professor
Cary's position were correct, firms would earn negative abnor-
mal returns when "managements initiate a change in the state
of incorporation to a state that is supposedly more pro-manage-
ment (such as Delaware)."5 °°
Rather than finding abnormal negative returns, they find
that reincorporations generally follow a period of abnormal
positive returns and that after the reincorporation shareholders
earn normal returns. They argue that these findings are incon-
sistent with Professor Cary's position, which they refer to as
the "stockholder-exploitation hypothesis" and are consistent
with the "cost-avoidance hypothesis." 50 ' They conclude that
"contrary to the allegations of the supporters of federal regula-
tion, stockholders are not made worse off when firms switch
state of incorporation, even when they switch to that much-
maligned state of Delaware."52 They continue:
[Tihe case for federal chartering is not supported by the evi-
dence. The evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that
managers of a firm take advantage of the competition among
states to locate in a state which offers an efficient set of re-
strictions on the firm, given the firm's anticipated production-
investment and financing decisions.
0 3
The empirical findings in the Dodd and Leftwich study
were refined in a 1985 empirical analysis of the "incorporation
puzzle" by Professor Roberta Romano."°4 Professor Romano
19 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 493, at 214.
600 Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 498, at 261.
.01 Id. at 275.
" Id. at 281.
"' Id. at 282.
'o' Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puz-
zle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Incorporation Puzzle].
See also ROBERTA RoMANO, FOUNDATION OF CORPORATE LAW 87 (1993); Roberta
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709
(1987) (discussing Delaware's impact on shareholder's benefits from corporate
competition) [hereinafter Romano, State Competition Debate]; Roberta Romano,
State Competition for Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 409 (1992) (commenting on relationship between courts and legislatures in
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divides reincorporations into the following three categories: (1)
reincorporations by target firms to take advantage of defensive
tactics; (2) reincorporations by acquiring firms to better effectu-
ate mergers and acquisitions; and (3) reincorporations for other
purposes, such as the achievement of tax savings. She finds
that on an aggregate basis, reincorporations produced positive
abnormal returns of 4.1% and on a disaggregated basis each
category produced the following positive abnormal returns: (1)
merger and acquisitions-8.6%; (2) defensive tactics-1.3%; and
(3) other reasons-0.6%. °5 She finds that only the positive re-
turns for mergers and acquisitions are statistically signifi-
cant.5" She concludes that her findings are essentially consis-
tent with those in the Dodd and Leftwich study: "This finding
supports the view that a domicile change is not a negative
present value event and is consonant with the cost-reducing
implication of the transaction explanation of rein-corpora-
tions." °'
It is possible that Professor Romano's finding that
reincorporations by acquiring firms produce positive abnormal
returns is consistent with Professor Cary's theory. 8 If the
shareholders of potential acquirors benefit from
reincorporations, it may be attributable to the expectation that
the reincorporation will better position the acquiror to gain an
advantage in dealing with the target's shareholders. Thus, a
finding that the shareholders of reincorporating acquirors expe-
rience positive abnormal returns may be an indication that the
shareholders of potential targets of the reincorporating
acquirors experience offsetting negative abnormal returns re-
flecting the increased possibility that the acquirors may be in a
better position to exploit the target's shareholders. If the abnor-
mal returns for reincorporations for the purposes of mergers
and acquisitions and of defensive tactics are ignored, the
reincorporations for other purposes produce a statistically in-
significant positive abnormal return of only 0.6%. If these
reincorporations could be unbundled to focus only on those that
are effectuated for the specific purpose of engaging in one of
production of corporate law).
5' Romano, Incorporation Puzzle, supra note 504, at 270.
50 Id. at 271.
- Id. at 272-73.
58 Cary, supra note 481, at 700-01.
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the transactions that Professor Cary has criticized, one might
find negative abnormal returns. I do not find Professor
Romano's study to be strongly supportive of either the
FischellEasterbrook position or the Cary position.
In the article by Professors Baysinger and Butler, cited by
Professor Fischel and Judge Easterbrook, the authors contend
that since investors can choose to invest in corporations that
are incorporated in states with strict fiduciary rules, "[a] uni-
form strict law would not benefit these shareholders. On the
other hand, shareholders who prefer liberal laws would be
denied a choice and thus injured." °9 In any event, because of
the election-out possibility, the change of control board concept
is not a "uniform strict law."
3. The Empirical Support for the Cary Position
It would appear that Professor Fischel and Judge
Easterbrook have overstated the empirical support for their
race to the top theory. Also, they do not adequately address the
1989 empirical study by Professors Bradley and Schipani,
which provides just the type of focused study of the market re-
sponse to a specific legal rule that would be encompassed by
Professor Cary's proposal for federal minimum fiduciary
standards." ' In their study, Professors Bradley and Schipani
examine, through the mechanism of event studies, the market
impact on the shares of Delaware firms as a result of the fol-
lowing two events.511 The first event was the Delaware Su-
preme Court's decision in Van Gorkom, in which directors were
held personally liable for breach of the duty of care. 12 The
second event was the subsequent legislative response by enact-
ment of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Business Corporation
Law, which permits corporations to limit or eliminate monetary
damages faced by directors for breach of the duty of care.513
'" Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the
Top: the ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 462
(1985).
.10 Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372, at 69.
..' Id. at 57-59. Professors Bradley and Schipani also examine the market
impact of these two events on insurance companies providing directors and offi-
cers insurance. This aspect is not examined here.
512 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
1. Delaware Business Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991 & Supp. 2000).
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Professors Bradley and Schipani explain that since Van
Gorkom increases legal constraints placed on directors and
section 102(b)(7) loosens these restraints, Van Gorkom and
section 102(b)(7) "provide an opportunity to test empirically the
relative importance of market constraints and legal constraints
to shareholder wealth."514 They set out the following alterna-
tive hypotheses regarding the Van Gorkom decision:
If the constraints imposed by the due care standard are im-
portant monitoring devices designed to keep management in-
terests aligned with shareholder interests, we expect to see
shareholder wealth increase in the wake of the [Van Gorkom]
decision. Stronger liability rules are predicted to favor absen-
tee stockholders. Alternatively, if market constraints are
sufficient to prevent the interests of managers from diverging
from those of shareholders, the tightening of legal constraints
would unduly restrict management's ability to perform.
Shareholder wealth would thus decrease.
5 15
And, Professors Bradley and Schipani set forth the following
alternative hypotheses regarding the enactment of section
102(b)(7):
[T]o the extent section 102(b)(7) permits greater manage-
rial discretion, the legal constraint theory predicts a decrease
in shareholder wealth. The lack of monitoring would increase
the incentives of directors to ignore shareholder interests and
act in their self-interest. Conversely, the market constraint
theory predicts that in lessening the constraints imposed on
management decisionmaking, section 102(b)(7) should favor-
ably affect shareholder wealth.516
Professors Bradley and Schipani find "no significant
change in the value of Delaware firms around the date of the
[Van Gorkom] decision."5 17 They go on to conclude:
[Contrary to either the market [Fischel] or the legal con-
straint [Cary] theories, [Van Gorkom] does not appear to have
"' Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372, at 44.
515 Id. at 44-45.
5 6 Id. at 46.
"' Id. at 58.
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had a significant effect on the stock price of Delaware corpo-
rations vis-a-vis corporations incorporated in other states....
One possible reason is the persuasive value of Delaware case
law on the corporate law of other states. 18
On the other hand, they find a "significant decrease in the
relative values of Delaware firms in the wake of section
102(b)(7) ... ."51' They explain that this decrease in value "in-
dicates that the relaxed liability exposure for violations of the
duty of care standard allowed by this act is detrimental to the
wealth of the stockholders of Delaware firms."5 20 The results
are consistent with the legal constraint view that the enact-
ment of section 102(b)(7) increased agency costs and reduced
the value of the shares of these firms. They also found negative
abnormal returns for firms adopting the limited liability pro-
vided by section 102(b)(7). 21
Finally, Professors Bradley and Schipani address the sig-
nificance of their findings on the debate between Professor
Cary's "race to the bottom" theory and Professor Fischel's
"climb to the top" theory:
The negative economic effects incurred in the wake of
Delaware's enactment of section 102(b)(7) are more consistent
with William Cary's thesis that competition among states can
be characterized as a race to the bottom. We end by noting
that since July 1, 1986, the effective date of the Delaware
statute, 37 states have enacted similar legislation."
The findings of Professors Bradley and Schipani are not
controverted and arguably are essentially confirmed by an
empirical study by Professors Janjigian and Bolster of the per-
formance of Delaware firms during the legislative period lead-
ing up to the enactment of section 102(b)(7).123 Although they
conclude that "liability elimination does not have a significant
5,8 Id. at 59.
519 Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372, at 61.
520 Id.
521 Id. at 63.
'2 Id. at 72.
'" Vahan Janjigian & Paul J. Bolster, The Elimination of Director Liability
and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Investigation, 13 J. FIN. RES. 53 (1990).
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impact upon shareholder wealth,"524 they also point out that
"[riesults indicate that Delaware firms performed worse than
non-Delaware firms during the Delaware legislature's debate
and approval of the liability-eliminating measure.'5251 Their
overall conclusion, however, is that "[nlo systematic evidence is
found indicating that. . . limitations on liability negatively
affect shareholder wealth.526
The findings of Bradley and Schipani are essentially sup-
ported by an empirical study of the effects of the enactment of
section 102(b)(7) by Professor Romano.527 She finds statistical-
ly significant abnormal negative returns on the day after the
press reports of the enactment of section 102(b)(7) and on the
day after the Senate passed the legislation.5" She says that
her "findings are broadly consistent with Bradley and
Schipani's finding of significantly negative cumulative abnor-
mal returns upon the effective date of the statute .... .529
Notwithstanding these findings she concludes: "Given the
curious pattern of the CARs as well as the odd timing of the
only significant CARs, the event study data provide no convinc-
ing support for a perceived deterrent effect from directors' lia-
bility for negligence."53° She criticizes the Bradley and
Schipani study's findings of negative abnormal returns on the
effective date of section 102(b)(7) because she argues that the
effective date, which was two weeks after enactment, is essen-
tially irrelevant for determining shareholder reaction.5"' She
points out, however, that "there is also no other obvious event
5' Id. at 60.
" Id. at 59. Also, in a study of the shareholder wealth effects of charter
amendments by Delaware corporations to expand management protection by lim-
iting directors' liability under section 102(b)(7) and increasing indemnification
rights, Professors Netter and Poulsen find that "cumulative abnormal returns are
negative for high insider ownership firms . . . ." Jeffrey Netter & Annette
Poulsen, State Corporations and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT, Autumn 1989, at 29, 38.
526 Janjigian & Bolster, supra note 523, at 59.
52 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990).
528 Id. at 1186.
529 Id. at 1187.
... Id. at 1187-88.
531 Id. at 1185.
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that could have affected Delaware firms on the later dates and
that thereby would explain the negative returns."32
In her 1993 book, The Genius of American Corporate Law,
Professor Romano summarizes the results of the three studies
of the effect of the enactment of section 102(b)(7) as follows:
533
DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY STATUTE
Bradley and Schipani (1989) Negative AR* on effective date
Janjigian and Bolster (1990) Negative AR on newspaper announce-
ment day and day of introduction to Sen-
ate
Romano (1990) Negative AR on effective date, day after
Senate action
*AR = Average Residual or Abnormal Return
She also reports that four studies of the effect of the adoption
by firms of section 102(b)(7) charter provisions produce ambigu-
ous results.534 She points out that "leivent studies of charter
amendments may not, however, accurately identify an
amendment's effect if investors anticipate that firms will adopt
conforming charter amendments when the enabling statute is
enacted."535 Although this analysis would seem to give cre-
dence to the consistent findings of negative abnormal returns
around the date of enactment of section 102(b)(7) (which force-
fully support Professor Cary's thesis), Professor Romano never-
theless concludes, "[tihe most cogent interpretation of these
data is that the limited liability statute did not adversely affect
shareholders, a conclusion more consistent with Winter's than
Cary's characterization of state competition."
5 36
I read the empirical evidence regarding section 102(b)(7) as
strongly supportive of the Cary thesis, and Professor Romano
reads the evidence as unsupportive. However, with regard to
the empirical evidence concerning the economic impact of state
" Romano, supra note 527, at 1187.
.. ROMANO, supra note 391, at 20.
534 Id.
5' Id. at 22.
3' Id. at 24.
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takeover legislation, such as control share statutes, she con-
cludes that "[elmpirical research on the effects of [state] take-
over laws on shareholder wealth is most consistent with Cary's
view of the harmful effect of state competition."
537
Given that the general thrust of both section 102(b)(7) and
state takeover statutes is to protect incumbent directors and
that the enactment of these provisions was accompanied by
significant abnormal shareholder returns, the empirical evi-
dence seems overwhelmingly supportive of Professor Cary's
thesis. This is so even though, as Professor Romano points out,
the "[elvent studies of Delaware's second-generation statute
find no significant price effect ... [,j [which] is consistent with
viewing Delaware's efforts at regulating takeovers as less re-
strictive than those of other states."538 Indeed, this is an illus-
tration that, in the context of state takeover legislation, states
such as Pennsylvania that have enacted highly restrictive pro-
visions have harmed shareholders, 39 whereas Delaware, with
its less restrictive takeover provision, section 203, and its
Unocal enhanced scrutiny of defensive tactics, has been more
protective of shareholder rights.54 ° This observation is, of
course, consistent with Cary's general thesis that the protection
of shareholder rights is beneficial.
A study by Professor Robert Daines provides additional
empirical support for the proposition that in the takeover area
Delaware law is more efficient than the law of many other
states. 1 Using a Tobin Q analysis, Professor Daines finds
that "Delaware firms are worth more than similar non-Delawre
firms."542 Professor Daines explains that Tobin's Q provides
an estimate of a company's market value divided by the
company's replacement cost and that the "ratio represents a
firm's investment or growth opportunities, including those
531 Id. at 60.
"' ROMANO, supra note 391, at 67.
"' See 15 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2544 (1995).
.40 See Delaware Business Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(1991 & Supp. 2000); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985).
""' Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, Nov. 1999, avail-
able in Social Science Research Network Electronic Library, <httpJ/
www.ssrn.com>.
542 Id. at 4.
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added by management and corporate law rules."543 In ad-
dressing why Delaware law "may add value," Professor Daines
says that the
best view of the evidence is that Delaware corporate law im-
proves firm value by facilitating the sale (acquisition) of the
firm. First, Delaware law is less likely than other states to
entrench incumbent managers due to its takeover law, politi-
cal economy and specialized corporate courts .... Delaware
firms receive significantly more takeover bids and are signifi-
cantly more likely to receive at least one bid and to be ac-
quired. Firms in states that raise significant barriers to hos-
tile bids are worth less and receive significantly fewer
bids.5"
Professor Daines goes on to conclude that Delaware "produces
legal rules and courts that appear to improve firm value." "4
I would like to make three observations about Professor
Daines' findings: First, the findings do not show that Delaware
law is optimal and cannot be improved upon; the findings
merely show that Delaware law is more economically efficient
than the laws of other states. Second, the Cary thesis would
clearly support Delaware law over the restrictive anti-takeover
provisions adopted by many states, and the growth of restric-
tive state takeover statutes is just another variant of the race
to the bottom. Third, the adoption of the change of control
provisions proposed here would certainly be an improvement
over both the restrictive state takeover laws and the less re-
strictive Delaware law.
Finally, Professor Fischel and Judge Easterbrook pose the
question: "Does the 'race for the top' survive the adoption of
antitakeover statutes?"546 They respond that the "answer de-
pends on how the thesis is characterized." 7 They say, on the
one hand, that "[ilf the claim is that the competition among
states for incorporations always produces the optimal result, it
50 Id. at 10.
5" Id. at 5.
545 Id. at 6.




stands refuted."54 On the other hand, they argue that "if the
thesis is that competition creates a powerful tendency for
states to enact laws that operate to the benefit of investors (the
opposite of the Cary view), it is alive and well." 9 They do not
explain why, in the face of this "powerful tendency," states
would rush to enact anti-takeover laws that in their view are
antithetical to shareholder interests.
In any event, it is not necessary to delve further into this
dilemma; it is sufficient to note that the proposal here would
preempt state takeover statutes because the change of control
boards would have sufficient authority to accomplish the pur-
poses of those statutes in appropriate circumstances.
4. Summary
In summary, the theoretical case made by Professor
Fischel and others against Professor Cary's position is at bot-
tom based on the false assumption that public shareholders are
on an equal bargaining footing with managers and that the
resulting bargain between shareholders and managers is in the
best interest of both parties. Their theory ignores the real life
potential for managerial exploitation of the "rational ignorance"
of public shareholders. Thus, their theory closes its eyes to the
unlevel playing field between public shareholders and manag-
ers.
Although Professor Fischel may have been correct when he
said in 1982 that "not one shred of empirical evidence has been
adduced to support [Professor Cary's] view,"55° he could not
make that statement today. The study of reincorporations by
Dodd and Leftwich may on its face support Professor Fischel's
theoretical position, 5 ' but the more focused reincorporation
study by Professor Romano called into question the unqualified
conclusions reached by Dodd and Leftwich.552 Further, the
even more focused study of the effects of the enactment of sec-
tion 102(b)(7) by Bradley and Schipani, (and arguably by
Janjigian and Bolster, and Romano) provide vigorous empirical
548 Id.
549 Id.
... Fischel, supra note 475, at 914.
551 Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 498, at 260.
552 Romano, State Competition Debate, supra note 504, at 732.
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support for Professor Cary's position.55 Thus, the state of the
empirical evidence has come full circle.
Also, the race to the top theory is under assault at the
theoretical level. In his 1992 article Professor Bebchuk asserts
that the capital market, the product market, the market for
managers and the market for corporate control, which Profes-
sor Fischel assumes will police managers, are not effective in
dealing with significant redistributive issues. 54 These are is-
sues in which the size of the potential transfer from share-
holders to managers (the distributive element) is significant
relative to the potential effect on overall value (the efficiency
element).555 Thus, these situations arise where a particular
action by a manager may give rise to a large personal windfall
but have a small effect on overall firm value.556 Professor
Bebchuk explains:
The markets for corporate control, managerial labor, addition-
al capital, and company products discipline managers' deci-
sions to some extent. The operation of these markets may
well ensure that managers will seek (and states in turn will
provide) only value increasing rules with respect to issues
that are not significant redistributive. However, . . . the vari-
ous market forces invoked by race for the top adherents do
not ensure that managers will not seek value-decreasing rules
with respect to other types of issues. In particular, market
discipline notwithstanding, managers may seek such rules
with respect to issues that are significantly redistributive."7
The "omnipresence" of conflicts of interests in mergers and
acquisitions is in large measure attributable to the significant
redistributive issues embedded in such transactions. The pro-
posal here for a change of control board would (unless the inde-
pendent shareholders elect-out) put the control of all significant
redistribution issues arising in the context of a change of con-
... Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372, at 70.
'" Bebchuk, supra note 487, at 1461.
55 Id.
... For a discussion of a manager's role in the development of corporate law
rules, see Carney, Competition for Corporate Charters, supra note 472, at 303-06.
... Bebchuk, supra note 487, at 1467.
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trol of publicly-held corporations in the hands of a truly inde-
pendent arbiter.
Finally, in a 1999 article entitled Federalism and Takeover
Law: the Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers,558 Profes-
sors Bebchuk and Ferrell make a powerful argument that the
"supporters of state competition-Ralph Winter, Frank
Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel and Roberta Romano"559 should
reconsider their position. The authors say that "[wihile the pro-
state competition view has a serious problem accounting for
existing state takeover law ... the view that Cary held, and
that we are advocating, has no problem whatsoever explaining
this."56 They draw the following conclusions on the race to
the bottom theory:
On some important issues, states might have incentives to
provide rules that are attractive to managers but not
shareholders. Takeover law is one important area in which
state competition is likely to fail. There are strong theoretical
reasons to expect that state competition will work to produce
a body of corporate law that excessively protects incumbent
managers. The development of state takeover law .. . is con-
sistent with this view. It should lead the many [including
Easterbrook, Fischel, and Romano] who offer unqualified sup-
port of state competition to reassess their position.561
VII. SURVEY OF OTHER PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING CHANGE
OF CONTROL TRANSACTIONS AND COMPARISON WITH CHANGE
OF CONTROL BOARD
A. Survey
This section surveys many of the other proposals for ad-
dressing various types of change of control transactions. This
section does not, however, provide an exhaustive review of the
proposals in this area.
On the free market side, Professor Fischel and Judge
Easterbrook have argued that a target's board should not be
" Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 3.
"' Id. at 1194.
'® Id. at 1198.
561 Id. at 1199.
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able to engage in any defensive action. 6 2 This view is known
as the managerial passivity approach and is based on the as-
sumption that this system will maximize aggregate shareholder
value because there will be a larger number of tender offers
than would otherwise occur if managers undertake defensive
actions."63
On the other hand, Martin Lipton has argued strenuously
for a standard that permits a target's directors to use defensive
tactics and that provides them protection under the business
judgment rule." This standard is similar to (but less de-
manding than) the standard that applies under current Dela-
ware law and under the ALI's proposed rules, both of which
provide an enhanced business judgment rule standard of re-
view for defensive actions. 65 Also, under certain state corpo-
rate laws, such as the Pennsylvania corporate law at issue in
Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Conrail, Inc.," a target's directors
have very broad latitude to oppose a hostile takeover, even
broader in some cases than the business judgment rule. 67
As an intermediate position, Professor Bebchuk has argued
that in the face of a hostile takeover, a target's board should
have to auction the target."s In a paper that is soon to be
published in the Virginia Law Review, Professors Bebchuk and
Ferrell propose the adoption of an elective federal takeover law
that would not be as protective of management as current state
law. 69 Their proposal is broadly consistent with the proposal
set out here.
511 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 493, at 171-74.
" Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
'" See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 THE
Bus. LAw. 101, 109-10 (1979); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28-35 (1987) [hereinafter Lipton, Fi-
nance Corporatism].
"3 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 236.
"3 No. 96-7167, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1997).
67 Norfolk So. Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 978, at *5-7.
" Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982). See also, Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REV. 819, 821 (1981) (proposing limited roles for management as means
of reducing effects of defensive tactics).
" Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law
and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111 (2001).
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Martin Lipton has also made two legislative proposals for
dealing with hostile takeovers and corporate governance in
general. In a 1987 article, Lipton laid out a comprehensive
legislative plan for addressing hostile takeovers, 570 and he
said that if this plan is adopted, defensive tactics could be pro-
hibited.571 The first part of his legislative proposal would
amend the Williams Act to eliminate partial bids by requiring
an acquiror in a tender offer to bid for all of a target's
stock.172 No more than 5% of a target's stock could be pur-
chased without making a tender offer for all of the stock.
5 73
Further, the threshold for open market purchases that must be
reported under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 would be reduced from 5% to 2%. 1 4 The period during
which a tender offer would have to remain open would be ex-
tended from the current 20 business days to 120 calendar days
to "give the board a realistic opportunity to determine whether
the target is best served by remaining independent.. . "57' To
eliminate what he describes as "an element of coercion in every
tender offer," the target's shareholders would have the right to
vote on the tender offer within the 120 day period.16 If the
bidder did not receive a majority vote, it would have to with-
draw its bid.577
In addition, Lipton proposes that junk-bond financed bust-
up takeovers be discouraged by denying the deductibility for
the interest on junk bonds issued to finance hostile takeovers
or to repurchase a company's own equity.5 78 To discourage in-
stitutions from holding investments for the short-term, he pro-
poses a graduated tax on investment gains that would go from
60% on positions held for not more than one year declining to
35% on positions held for more than five years.
5 79
Lipton states that if these proposals were adopted, "the
takeover defenses currently used to combat such abuses will no
"0 Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 564.
571 Id. at 64-65.
" Id. at 61.
673 Id.
574 Id.
" Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 564, at 62.
576 Id.
171 Id. at 63.
578 Id.
179 Id. at 64.
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longer be justified.""'0 Specifically, he proposes an exchange
rule requiring one share, one vote; annual election of directors;
and a prohibition against staggered boards and shark repellant
charter provisions."8 ' Lipton concludes, "[wlith limitations on
abusive takeovers in place, there no longer will be a justifica-
tion for structural defenses that treat common stockholders un-
equally or are triggered by a change of control, such as poison
pills, lock-up options, and fair-price provisions."
8 2
Professor Lowenstein has made a similar legislative pro-
posal.8 3 He has proposed that hostile tender offers be re-
quired to remain open for at least six months and that any
defensive tactics employed by the target's directors be required
to be approved by the shareholders."
Although Martin Lipton proposes annual election of direc-
tors in the 1987 article,585 to facilitate long term operating
success, in a 1991 article he proposes, inter alia, that directors
serve for a five-year period.586 Specifically this proposal
would:
[R]eplace annual elections of directors with quinquennial
elections; bar nonconsensual changes in control between elec-
tions; provide major stockholders with direct access to the
corporate proxy machinery in connection with the
quinquennial election; provide for a detailed five-year report,
which would be independently evaluated by an outside advi-
sor ... ; and tie significant management compensation
awards, as well as significant penalties, to the corporation's
performance against the five-year plan.587
He goes on to point out that under this proposal the
"quinquennial election would be the sole means of accomplish-
:s Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 564, at 64.
581 Id. at 65.
582 Id.
'" Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
5 Id. at 255.
5 Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 564, at 65.
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Gover-
nance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991).
... Id. at 190.
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ing nonconsensual changes of control."588 There would be a
prohibition against an acquisition of more than 10% of a
corporation's stock without the directors' approval. 89 Between
meetings, a corporation's directors could enter into a consensu-
al acquisition.5" Since hostile transactions would be prohibit-
ed except in connection with the quinquennial meetings, take-
over defenses, including the poison pill, would be eliminated
and takeover-related state legislation would be prohibited. 91
In a 1996 article, Professor McGinty proposed that a public
corporation's shareholders be given the authority to initiate
voluntary dissolution proceedings. 92 If a majority of the
shareholders approved the dissolution, the board of the corpo-
ration would be required to obtain the highest value by auc-
tioning the corporation. 93 He sees this voluntary dissolution
procedure as the antidote to sophisticated takeover defenses
that put shareholders at the "mercy of managers, who can
remove the market's most serious constraints on managerial
inefficiency [i.e., the hostile takeover] and, in effect, entrench
themselves."" Professor McGinty points out that his proposal
is compatible with a proposal made by Bratton and McCahery
which would give shareholders the authority to "initiate charter
amendments dealing with corporate process and structure."9 '
Professor McGinty would have a quinquennial opt-out elec-
tion pursuant to which the shareholders would choose to waive
or retain the right to initiate a voluntary dissolution.5" The
default rule would be the opt-out.597 He says that this opt-out
is consistent with both a proposal by Professor Coffee that
would require supermajority charter provisions to be reviewed
every three years by a similar, supermajority shareholder
vote,598 and a proposal by Professor Romano that would per-
59 Id. at 240.
59 Id. at 241.
591 id. at 244.
591 Lipton & Rosenblum , supra note 586, at 241.
s Park McGinty, Replacing Hostile Takeovers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1996).
1 Id. at 987.
5' Id. at 986-87.
" Id. at 997. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV.
1861, 1903-25 (1995) (discussing production of strategies for self-regulation
through shareholder participation).
" McGinty, supra note 592, at 1071.
597 Id.
" Id. at 1072 n.229. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corpo-
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mit shareholders to opt-out of the Williams Act if they do not
want their corporation to hold auctions, thereby increasing the
possibility of takeover, but possibly at a lower premium. 99
Professor McGinty distances his proposal from Martin
Lipton's quinquennial election proposal, which the professor
describes as "unappealing because it follows essentially a so-
cialist, or at least command economy, model for running free
market firms" and it reduces "directors' discretion to respond to
changing conditions [thereby] discard[ing] the dynamic respon-
siveness of capitalist forms of organization."
Professor Weiss has proposed that the Williams Act be
amended to incorporate certain provisions of Delaware's busi-
ness combination statute.6 0 1 This statute prohibits second-
step freezeout mergers for a three-year period after a hostile
acquiror acquires more than 15% of a target's stock, unless: (1)
the acquiror acquires 85% of the target's stock, (2) before the
acquisition the target's board approves the acquisition, or (3)
after the acquisition the target's board and two-thirds of the
disinterested shareholders approve the transaction. 2 His
proposal would preempt both state antitakeover statutes and
most takeover defenses.0 3
Finally, in a 1998 article, Professor Romano proposes a
"regulatory approach of competitive federalism, under which
firms select their securities regulator from among the fifty
states and the District of Columbia, the SEC, or other na-
tions."' Thus, she would permit a corporation to elect-out of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, including the Williams Act. Without commenting on the
general merits of this proposal, the change of control board
concept is broadly consistent with the general thrust of her
rate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Gover-
nance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1262-63 (1984) (discussing durational limits of
supermajority provisions).
" McGinty, supra note 592, at 1072 n.229. See Romano, supra note 183, at
165-66 (proposing amendments to Williams Act).
McGinty, supra note 592, at 1072 n.229.
001 Elliott J. Weiss. A Proposal for a Federal Takeover Law, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1699 (1988).
' Delaware Business Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991 &
Supp. 2000).
See Weiss, supra note 601, at 1700.
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998).
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proposal because a company could elect-out of the change of
control provision and thereby be governed by the law of the
jurisdiction of incorporation.
B. Comparison of Other Proposals With the Change of Control
Board Concept
The proposal here for a change of control board would
address many of the concerns that motivate these various pro-
posals. Indeed, the change of control board concept has the flex-
ibility in a particular context to accommodate the polar oppo-
site positions of the managerial passivity approach of Easter-
brook and Fischel or the managerial action approach of Lipton.
In certain circumstances, the change of control board may de-
cide to take no defensive action and let the shareholders decide,
as proposed by Easterbrook and Fischel. In other circumstanc-
es, it may erect a "just say no" defense, which is consistent
with Lipton's approach. Of course, if the circumstances require,
the change of control board could adopt the intermediate auc-
tion approach of Bebchuk. The point is that the optimum ap-
proach (managerial passivity, managerial action, auction, or
other) will depend on the circumstances, and the change of
control board has the authority and the expertise to fashion an
appropriate response.
The change of control board is more flexible than Lipton's
legislative proposal of a 120 day tender offer period with the
target's shareholders having the right to vote on the tender
offer. Lipton's proposal would unnecessarily delay transactions
that for good business reasons need to close quickly. Also, if the
change of control board wanted to have a shareholder vote it
could provide for one. For the same reasons, the change of
control board concept is more flexible than Professor
Lowenstein's proposal for a six month tender offer period and
for shareholder approval of defensive tactics. If in a particular
case a change of control board wanted to seek shareholder
approval of any defensive tactics it undertook, it could do so.
The change of control concept is obviously more flexible
than the quinquennial election proposal made by Lipton. It
would be unwise to insulate a corporation from the potential of
a hostile acquisition for any period, let alone for five years, as
his proposal would do. Also, Lipton's proposal would unfairly
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strengthen the hand of a corporation's board because it could,
within the five-year period, enter into consensual transactions.
Because the change of control board concept would not act
as a deterrent to takeovers, there would be no reason to give
the shareholders the right to initiate dissolution procedures, as
Professor McGinty has proposed. Also, since shark repellant
charter provisions would be prohibited, it would not be neces-
sary to get a shareholder vote on such provisions as Professor
Coffee has proposed. Professor Weiss's proposal for a federal
statute similar to Delaware's business combination statute
would not be needed with the change of control board concept.
Finally, the adoption of Professor Romano's proposal for an
elective securities law regime should not have an adverse effect
on the adoption of the change of control board concept.
In summary, the change of control board concept provides
for great flexibility in responding to the dynamic market for
corporate control. It does not provide a set of rigid rules, which,
depending on the circumstances, may or may not maximize
shareholder welfare. Finally, all of the surveyed proposals are
directed at hostile acquisitions, but the change of control board
concept applies to all forms of change of control transactions
involving public corporations: arm's-length mergers and acqui-
sitions, management buyouts, tender offers, and freezeouts.
VIII. COMPARISON OF CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD CONCEPT
WITH RULES GOVERNING A TARGET'S DIRECTORS, IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The approach to takeover regulation in the United King-
dom and Germany and the proposed takeover regulation of the
European Union are significantly different from the U.S.
approach."°5 This is obviously a complex topic, and the discus-
sion here focuses on only the rules governing the defensive
actions of the target's board.
In the United Kingdom, takeovers of publicly-held corpora-
tions are governed by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers
' See Edward F. Greene et al., Toward a Cohesive International Approach to
Cross-Border Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823, 824 (1997) (noting
that United States regulates takeovers by statute while United Kingdom and
Germany regulate through non-statutory bodies); see generally THOMPSON, supra
note 324, ch. 26, pt. IV.
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(City Code),6  which is administered by the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers. The Panel consists of market participants
and relies on non-legal sanctions for enforcement. The City
Code consists of general principles and specific rules, including
rules governing Substantial Acquisitions of Shares (SARs).
General Principles 7 of the City Code prohibits the target's
board from taking defensive actions after the commencement of
a takeover bid without the prior approval of the target's share-
holders:
At no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to
the board of the offeree company [the target], or after the
board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a
bona fide offer might be imminent, may action be taken by
the board of the offeree company in relation to the affairs of
the company, without the approval of the shareholders in
general meeting, which could effectively result in any bona
fide offer being frustrated or in the shareholders being denied
an opportunity to decide on its merits."°
General Principle 9 provides in part that when giving ad-
vice to the shareholders the directors should consider the
"shareholders' interest taken as a whole, together with those of
employees and creditors." 8
Rule 3.1 of the City Code provides that the "board of the
offeree company must obtain competent independent advice on
any offer and the substance of such advice must be made
known to its shareholders."609
Germany follows a similar approach in The German Take-
over Code.61° Article 19, under the General Principles of this
code, provides: "Following publication of a public tender offer,
and until the outcome of the tender offer is published, the exec-
PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERG-
ERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES (9th ed.
1996) [hereinafter CITY CODE]; see generally, THOMPSON, supra note 324, § 26.9.B.
CITY CODE, supra note 606, at General Principle 7.
Id. at General Principle 9.
Id. at Rule 3.1.
810 THE GERMAN TAKEOVER CODE (UBERNAHMEKODEX) OF THE EXCHANGE Ex-
PERT COMMISSION AT THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE (July 14, 1995, amended
January 1, 1998) [hereinafter GERMAN TAKEOVER CODE]. See generally, THOMPSON,
supra note 324, at § 26.10.B.
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utive or managing body of the target company... may not
take any measures that run counter to the interest of the hold-
ers of securities in taking advantage of the tender offer." 'l
The Article prohibits the following:
(1) the issuance of new securities;
(2) a substantial change to the assets or liabilities of the
target company; and
(3) the conclusion of agreements outside of the scope of
ordinary business activities.612
The European Commission currently has a Takeover Pro-
posal (EC Takeover Proposal),613 which, if adopted, would es-
tablish takeover standards that all members of the European
Union would have to adopt.614 Article 8 of the EC Takeover
Proposal provides that member states shall ensure that rules
are in force requiring that after receiving the information con-
cerning the bid, and until the result of the bid is made public
or lapses:
the board of the offeree company should abstain from com-
pleting any action other than seeking alternative bids which
may result in the frustration of the offer, and notably from
the issuing of shares which may result in a lasting impedi-
ment to the offeror to obtain control over the offeree company,
unless it has the prior authorisation of the general meeting of
the shareholders given for this purpose during the acceptance
of the bid.. 615
The December 9, 2000 issue of the Economist reports that
the European Parliament's legal affairs committee has voted to
amend the current EC Takeover Proposal to "allow national
supervisors to give company boards the right to devise defen-
sive measures [such as poison pills] to deter predators, without
:n GERMAN TAKEOVER CODE, supra note 610, at art. 19.
12 Id.
613 PROPOSAL FOR A 13TH EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON
COMPANY LAW CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS, (December 1999) [hereinafter EC
TAKEOVER PROPOSAL]. See generally, THOMPSON, supra note 324, § 26.8.C.
61 See generally Greene, Cross-Border Takeover, supra note 605, at 862;
THOMPSON, supra note 324, § 26.8.C.
6'5 EC TAKEOVER PROPOSAL, supra note 613, art. 8.
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first obtaining shareholder approval."6 16 It is not certain
whether this amendment will be finally adopted.
The approach to defense tactics taken by the United King-
dom and Germany and posited in the current draft of the EC
Takeover Proposal is similar to the management passivity
approach urged by Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel.617 This approach should not be followed for at least
two reasons. First, Professors Bradley and Schipani identified a
collective action problem whereby, a passive board could permit
an acquiror to take unfair advantage of the target's sharehold-
ers.618 Second, there may be times when the market does not
reflect the value of the target's assets, and in such cases it may
be appropriate for a board to "just say no." For these reasons,
the change of control board is superior to the approaches taken
by the United Kingdom, Germany, the EC, and Easterbrook
and Fischel. The change of control board concept does, however,
contemplate the appointment of independent advisors to the
board, which is a requirement of Rule 3.1 of the City Code.1 9
There is one final point on the merger proposals of the
European Union. In its 1978 Directive Concerning Mergers of
Public Limited Liability Companies, the European Commission
promulgated a rule which in the acquisition of a public corpora-
tion requires: "[olne or more experts, acting on behalf of each of
the merging companies but independent of them, appointed or
approved by a judicial or administrative authority, [to] examine
the draft terms of merger and draw up a written report to
shareholders."620 The proposal here extends this EC require-
ment of expert independence to the target's board.
"' Poisoned?, The Economist, Dec. 9th-15th, 2000, at 82, 82.
67 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 493, at 171-74.
018 Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372.
e" CITY CODE, supra note 606.
European Commission, Third Council Directive of 9 October 1978, Based on
Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty, Concerning Mergers of Public Limited Liability
Companies, 78/855/EEC, art. 10.1; see generally THOMPSON, supra note 324,
§ 26.8.A.
[Vol. 70
CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
IX. ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE COMMENTS OF SEVERAL MERGER
AND ACQUISITION PRACTITIONERS
Several leading merger and acquisition practitioners
strongly criticized the change of control board concept. Here, I
summarize the general thrust of these critiques and provide a
response.
The critique of Martin Lipton, one of the country's preemi-
nent merger and acquisition practitioners, is short and to the
point. After saying he does not agree with the change of control
board concept, he writes: "In practice, I think this would be the
same as the rule of passivity Easterbrook and Fischel argued
for in the 80's and which I argued against in our extensive
exchange of articles. The rule of passivity received no support
and quickly disappeared." '21
It is highly unlikely that a change of control board would
stand passive in the face of an acquisition proposal. To the
contrary, the change of control board would likely be very ac-
tive in critically evaluating the plans and prospects of the tar-
get under the current board and under the proposals of the
acquiror.
Also, the reach of the change of control board concept is
much broader than the reach of Easterbrook and Fischel's
passivity principle. The passivity rule would apply only in the
context of a hostile tender offer,622 whereas the change of con-
trol board concept would apply to any proposal, whether friend-
ly or hostile, to acquire a publicly-held target.
Mr. Lipton goes on to say that he thinks "Delaware has
evolved the best approach" and that he supports it.623 He fur-
ther says that he is "strongly opposed to any federal role in
corporate governance."624 This opposition to a federal role in
corporate governance was also echoed by Marshall L. Small,
one of the reporters for the Corporate Governance Project. Mr.
Small writes:
" Letter from Martin Lipton, Senior Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and
Katz, to Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor and Director, Center for the Study
of Mergers and Acquisitions, University of Miami School of Law.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 493, at 171-74.




I should start my response by disclosing that I am very cau-
tious about trying to solve perceived problems through gov-
ernmental intervention. My basic philosophy in the area of
corporate governance is to encourage governance procedures
in the private sector that will create a credible climate of
corporate accountability to shareholders and the other constit-
uencies served by the business community. Accordingly, when
you broached the idea of a government appointed control
board, I was initially skeptical but willing to consider objec-
tively your proposal. Having now read your draft article and
your proposed Section 14A of the Exchange Act, my views
have not changed, and I must advise you that I think the
proposal is a bad idea.6
Dennis S. Hersch, the head of the mergers and acquisitions
department at Davis Polk & Wardwell, makes a similar point
regarding governmental intervention: "I submit that the kinds
of decisions that directors must make in change of control
transactions cannot-and should not-be delegated to some
appointed bureaucrat . 626
In response to these governmental intervention points,
there is currently substantial governmental intervention in the
merger and acquisition market through the widespread adop-
tion of state takeover laws, which would be preempted by Pro-
posed Section 14A(m)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Also, the substantial litigation in the merger and acquisition
market is a form of governmental intervention. For example,
Herbert Wachtell, a leading takeover litigator, says,
[tiakeover litigation is unique [and] ... [ylou have to com-
mence litigation immediately. You have to get out your depo-
sition notices. You have to make your motions for expedited
discovery .... You have to be scheduling your applications
for temporary restraining orders, stays, preliminary in-
junctions and the like.627
Letter from Marshall L. Small, Senior of Counsel, Morrison & Foerster, to
Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Professor and Director, Center for the Study of Merg-
ers and Acquisitions, University of Miami School of Law (Feb. 25, 1998).
"2 Letter from Dennis S. Hersch, Panter, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, to Samuel
C. Thompson, Jr., Professor and Director, Center for the Study of Mergers and
Acquisitions, University of Miami School of Law (Feb. 10, 1998).
Herbert M. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 BUS. LAW.
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Adoption of the change of control board concept should dramat-
ically reduce the amount of takeover related litigation, thereby
reducing judicial interference in the market for corporate con-
trol.
Further, under the change of control concept, decisions
would not be made by an "appointed bureaucrat" but rather by
experienced and independent members of the change of control
board who are appointed on an objective basis by a Change of
Control Official, who has functions quite similar to those of a
U.S. Trustee in bankruptcy matters.
With regard to arm's-length merger and acquisition trans-
actions, Mr. Small says: "I believe that at least in arm's-length
non-hostile merger transactions, current corporate governance
mechanisms can successfully resolve any such conflicts."
Certainly, a target's board may act appropriately in an
arm's-length, non-hostile merger, but there is also great poten-
tial in such transactions for the controlling members of the
target's board to feather their own nests. For example, the
target's board may negotiate significant golden parachutes or
employment payments, at the expense of the target's share-
holders. We will never know how many friendly acquisitions
have been completed at a price less than the maximum the
target's shareholders could have received.
With regard to management buyouts and freezeouts, Mr.
Small argues:
[Elven where conflicts are sharper-as in management
buyout or cashout of minority shareholders' transac-
tions-private sector mechanisms available, through use of in-
dependent board committees, seem to me to be as effective as
any government-appointed board-which must grapple with
the same issues as incumbent directors. 29
Here, Mr. Small is at odds with former Chancellor Allen of the
Delaware Chancery Court who has said that "the jury is still
out on the question whether the special committee device
1433, 1433 (1977).




works well enough, often enough, for the law to continue to
accord it weight6 ° The change of control board is especially
needed in these transactions.
Mr. Small also says, "I believe the use of the control board
mechanism, as proposed, will.., have a chilling effect on
merger activity and instead of enhancing shareholder value
and providing economic efficiency in the merger market, such a
mechanism will in my opinion have exactly the opposite ef-
fect.""3' I believe Mr. Small is wrong on this point. By taking
all types of defensive tactics out of the hands of a target's direc-
tors, the change of control board concept should facilitate acqui-
sitions and thereby increase the frequency of unwanted trans-
actions. In this regard, it should be noted that, as pointed out
by Joe Flom, in an analysis of mergers and acquisitions in the
1990s:
In 1991 there were only two domestic hostile deals an-
nounced .... In 1998 there were three announced hostile
deals .... Such transactions substantially increased in num-
ber (fifteen transactions)... in 1999 .... In 1999, announced
hostile deals worldwide... represent[ed] over 14% of all an-
nounced worldwide deal value. This was due, in no small
measure, to a precipitous increase in European hostile
deals. 32
It seems likely that the current takeover rules in Delaware,
and in states like Pennsylvania, are depressing the amount of
hostile takeover activity. Indeed, it seems curious that in 1999,
a year of extremely heavy merger and acquisition activity,
there would be only 15 hostile transactions. It is inconceivable
that the amount of hostile activity would have been lower in
1999 if the change of control concept had applied.
Mr. Hersch, of Davis, Polk & Wardwell, also says that he
has "serious doubts ... that the types of individuals you envi-
sion [for the change of control board] could be found."33 Just
as there is a market for board members, I believe an active
30 Allen, supra note 447, at 2062-63.
' Letter from Marshall L. Small to Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., supra note 625.
62 Joseph H. Flom, Mergers and Acquisitions-The Decade in Review, 54 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 753, 761-62 (2000).
" Letter from Dennis S. Hersch to Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., supra note 626.
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market would develop for membership on change of control
boards, particularly in view of the personal liability protection
that these directors receive. 34 There should be no shortage of
competent business people, investment bankers, attorneys, and
others from around the country who would be more than will-
ing to serve on a change of control board.
Also, Mr. Hersch challenges the premise of this article
concerning the inherent conflict corporate directors face in
change of control transactions. On this point he says:
[Tihe article cites a handful of cases in which directors
were adjudged to have acted improperly. Far be it for me to
defend the directors of Trans Union or Revlon who clearly did
not act in a responsible manner.
The problem I have is that you extrapolate from a small
number of cases a proposal that ignores the very fine work
done by the overwhelming majority of corporate boards in
change of control transactions. I have little doubt that it could
be empirically demonstrated that a far greater number of
these transactions are completed without legal challenge-or
after successfully defending a challenge-than the other way
around.
If my own experience is a relevant yardstick, I think you
are generally incorrect in your premise that directors do not
deal well with conflicts.3 5
He goes on to point out several transactions in which he was
involved that demonstrate the effectiveness of the current
board structure. 6
I do not doubt that the current system works well in many
cases, and I have no doubt that a "far greater number of these
transactions are completed without legal challenge-or after
successfully defending a challenge-than the other way
around."137 This does not mean, however, that in such suc-
cessful deals the target's shareholders have received the consid-
eration to which they are entitled. Further, this says nothing
about the number of deals that do not happen under the cur-
See supra part III.F.






rent rules because of the depressing effect of defensive tactics
like the poison pill.
The bottom line is that while I have great respect for the
professionals who have given me their critiques, I still believe
that the change of control board concept would significantly
improve the governance of the merger and acquisition process.
X. CONCLUSION
Under the proposal here, a publicly-held corporation that
becomes the target of a merger or acquisition would, unless the
public shareholders elected-out, be subject to the change of
control provisions of proposed Section 14A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, a uniform federal rule would ap-
ply to all such corporations.
Under Proposed Section 14A, a change of control board for
a target corporation would be appointed at the time the target
becomes the subject of a possible change of control transaction,
whether an arm's-length merger or acquisition, a management
buyout, a hostile tender offer, or a freezeout. The change of
control board would have complete authority to make all board
decisions for the target relating to the transaction, including
the implementation of defensive tactics, such as the adoption of
poison pills and the making of golden parachute payments. The
change of control board would likely consult closely with the
current board and the senior management of the target, and
one of the members of the change of control board could be a
member of the regular board, provided he or she was otherwise
qualified.
The members of the change of control board would be ap-
pointed by the Change of Control Official, a nonpolitical ap-
pointee of the SEC. In making the appointments, the Change of
Control Official would be required to make an ex ante decision
that the members of the board are truly independent and have
the requisite experience in the merger and acquisition process.
Because of this independence and experience, the change of
control board would be subject to one governance standard, the
business judgment rule, without respect to the type of transac-
tion. There would be no need for separate governance stan-
dards for the four different types of change of control transac-
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tions as is the case under current Delaware law and as pro-
posed in the Corporate Governance Project.638
The proposal here is much more limited than proposals of
Professor Cary and others for a federalization of corporate law.
Since the shareholders can elect not to have the provision apply
or elect to have it apply in only limited circumstances such as
in hostile tender offers, this proposal offers shareholders an
additional set of governance rules, thereby increasing the com-
petition for such rules. Also, even after the appointment of a
change of control board, the shareholders could, pursuant to
SEC rules, elect to dissolve the change of control board and
return to governance by the corporation's regular board or
another board.
The justification for this proposal is simple. As recognized
in several cases involving all types of mergers and acquisitions
in the arm's length merger in Van Gorkom, the management
buyout in Hanson Trust, the tender offer defensive tactics in
Revlon and the freezeout merger in Weinberger, the conflicts
facing a target's board, including independent directors, in
mergers and acquisitions often lead to decisions that do not
maximize shareholder welfare. Also, these same cases illustrate
that directors who may be proficient at making entrepreneurial
decisions may not have the requisite skill to make decisions
that maximize shareholder value in mergers and acquisitions.
The change of control board addresses these two defects in
the current process by ensuring the appointment of board mem-
bers who are both conflict free and knowledgeable. The propos-
al is designed to ensure that the directors guiding the target
through the merger and acquisition process act in the sole in-
terest of promoting the welfare of the target's shareholders and
where appropriate, other constituencies.
The cost associated with the change of control board should
be de minimis and the benefits to shareholders great. Also,
there should be substantial collateral benefits, including: (1)
the preemption of state takeover laws, (2) the elimination of
the cumbersome appraisal process, (3) the inapplicability of the
provisions of Internal Revenue Code dealing with golden para-
chutes and greenmail payments, and (4) the elimination of the
need for applying liability rules to the change of control direc-
SCORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT, supra note 2.
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tors. Since those directors would be conflict free and knowl-
edgeable, it would indeed be the rare case when their actions
would not be protected by the business judgment rule. Thus,
there should be a substantial decrease in merger and acquisi-
tion litigation. In this connection, Professors Bebchuk and
Ferrell have recently noted that "Delaware might purposely be
maintaining a legal regime that encourages litigation.
Delaware's corporate lawyers, an important interest group in
Delaware, benefit from more, rather than less, litigation." 9
The change of control board will not deter tender offers,
and, therefore, will not protect inefficient managers. The
change of control board should facilitate the movement of cor-
porate assets to their most productive uses and, therefore,
should promote economic efficiency in the market for corporate
control.
The only effective way to adopt the change of control board
is through federal legislation, because it could not be expected
that state legislatures would uniformly adopt this provi-
sion.' ° Thus, there is a strong theoretical case for the adop-
tion of a federal law mandating a change of control board, sub-
ject to the right of a corporation's independent shareholders to
elect not to have the provision apply or to apply in limited cir-
cumstances.
Moreover, as reflected in the study by Professors Bradley
and Schipani of the impact of section 102(b)(7)" and in the
studies surveyed by Professor Lin involving poison pills and
other aspects of mergers and acquisitions, 2 the current state
of the empirical evidence supports the adoption of this propos-
al. If the relaxed liability exposure provided by section
102(b)(7) reduces shareholder welfare as found by Professors
Bradley and Schipani, then the mandating of conflict-free and
knowledgeable directors to deal with the merger and acquisi-
tion process should increase shareholder welfare.
rn Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 3, at 1191 (footnote omitted).
"o See, e.g., Carney, Competition for Corporate Charters, supra note 472.
Bradley & Schipani, supra note 372.
02 Lin, supra note 438, at 930-37. See Part V.
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Unless the public shareholders vote to elect-out Affected issuers are domestic publicly held
under Section 14A(o), or pursuant to rules promul- corporations with respect to which a trigger event,
gated under Section 14A(p) the corporate issuer is ex- as defined in Section 14A(b) below, has occurred.
empted from the application of this section, this See Part III.B.
section applies upon the happening of a trigger event,
as defined in Section 14A(b), with respect to any
domestic corporate issuer that has more than $10
million in assets and underlying common stock (as
defined in regulations) held by at least 500 persons.
Such corporate issuers are referred to herein as
"public corporations," and public corporations with
respect to which a trigger event has occurred are re-
ferred to herein as "affected issuers."
(b) Trigger Events.
A trigger event shall occur if:
(I) Arm's Length Mergers, Management Buyouts Proposed Section 14A(b)(l) encompasses all
and Freezeouts. The board of directors of a public forms of transactions proposed to the targetes board,
corporation receives a bona fide proposal (1) to including proposals for arm's length transactions,
engage in a merger, consolidation or mandatory share for management buyouts and for freezeouts. See
exchange, whether effected directly or by means of a Part III.B.
subsidiary, or (b) to purchase substantially all of such
corporation's assets, or (c) to give the board's
endorsement to a tender offer for a controlling
position in such corporation, or (d) to engage in any
other transaction having a similar effect;
CHANGE OF CONTROL BOARD
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(2) Self Initiated Mergers and Acquisitions. The
board of directors of a public corporation initiates
negotiations designed to lead to the acquisition of
the corporation in a merger or acquisition
transaction;
(3) Target of Tender Offer. A public
corporation becomes the subject of an unsolicited
bona fide tender offer under section 14(d) for a
controlling interest in such corporation;
(4) 13D Filed. A Schedule 13D is filed with
respect to a public corporation and the purpose of
the acquisition as reflected in Item 4 of Schedule
13D is or may be for the acquisition of a controlling
interest in such corporation;
(5) Reverse Acquisition, Defacto Merger. In
exchange for the equity securities or assets of an-
other corporate issuer, a public corporation issues
its underlying common stock (as defined in regu-
lations) that upon issuance will amount to in excess
of 50% of such corporation's outstanding voting
common stock.
(c) Petitionfor Appointment of Change of Control
Official.
(1) Petition by Board of Directors. Upon the
happening of a trigger event as described in Section
14A(b), the board of directors of the affected issuer
shall promptly petition the Change of Control Official
(as described in paragraph (d) below) for appointment
of a change of control board.
(2) Petition by SEC or Shareholders. If the board
of directors of an affected issuer does not promptly
file such petition after the happening of a trigger
event, then the Securities and Exchange Commission,
or any shareholder or group of shareholders of the
affected issuer owning at least 5% of the underlying
common stock of the issuer may file such a petition.
Proposed Section 14A(b)(2) encompasses
merger and acquisition transactions that are
initiated by the target's board as occurred in Smith
v. Van Gorkom. See Part III.B.
Adoption of Proposed Section 14A(b)(3)
would not prevent an acquiror from making an
unsolicited tender offer for a target, but as a result
of the tender offer, a change of control board
would be appointed for the target. See Part III.B.
Pursuant to Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act, a
Schedule 13D is required to be filed upon the ac-
quisition of more than 5% of the stock of a public
issuer. See Part III.B.
Proposed Section 14A(b)(5) codifies one
aspect of the defacto merger doctrine. Under this
provision, Time, Inc. would have been required to
appoint a change of control board for its initial
proposed acquisition of Warner, because the
Warner shareholders would have ended up
owning 62% of the resulting company. See Part
III.B.
It is the responsibility of the target's board to
seek the appointment of a change of control board
upon the happening of a trigger event.
Proposed Section 14A(c)(2) gives the SEC and
shareholders power to have a change of control
board appointed if the board of directors fails to
promptly act upon the happening ofa trigger event.
See Part III.C.
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(d) The Change of Control Official.
(I) Appointment. The Change of Control Official
shall be appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, with the concurrence of a majority of
the members of the Federal Reserve Board. The
appointment shall be made on non-political grounds,
and the appointee must not be identified with any
particular change of control theory or ideology. The
Securities and Exchange Commission may appoint
multiple Change of Control Officials who shall have
responsibility for various sections of the country.
(2) Duties. The duties and responsibilities of the
Change of Control Official shall include:
(i) Preparation of lists of qualified
persons who are willing to serve as
members of a change of control board.
(ii) Preparation of lists of qualified
attorneys, investment bankers and other
professionals who are willing to serve as
advisers to a change of control board;
(iii) Selection of members of a change of
control board as provided in Section
14A(e) below;
(iv) Consultation with change of control
boards regarding the hiring by such
boards of professional advisers, such as
lawyers and investment bankers, and the
administrative activities of such boards;
(v) Monitoring and evaluating the
performance of each change of control
board and its members; and
(vi) The performance of other functions
as specified in the rules and regulations
under this section.
The procedure under Proposed Section
14A(d)(1) for appointing the Change of Control
Official is similar to that for appointment of United
States Trustees in bankruptcy cases. However, the
requirement of concurrence from the Federal
Reserve Board is new. See Part IIIC.
The duties and responsibilities of the Change of
Control Official under Proposed Section 14A(d)(2)
are similar to the duties and responsibilities of the




(e) Selection of Change of Control Board.
Upon the receipt of a petition, the Change of
Control Official shall promptly appoint a change of
control board for the affected issuer. Such board shall
consist of three persons unless in the solejudgment of
the Change of Control Official it is appropriate under
the circumstances to have more than three board
members, but in no event shall more than five persons
be appointed to a change of control board. In making
the selection, the Change of Control Official shall
make a determination that each board member is not,
pursuant to regulations to be promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, interested in
the contemplated merger or acquisition. The Change
of Control Official shall also give consideration to the
member's experience in dealing with merger and
acquisition transactions and where appropriate to the
member's knowledge of the industry in which the
affected issuer operates. The Change of Control
Official may in appropriate circumstances appoint to
the change of control board one member of the
targetes regular board who is otherwise qualified to
serve. To insure protection under the business
judgment rule set out in Section 14A(i)(4), the
Change of Control Official should be satisfied that
each member will make a proper inquiry, will act in
good faith, and will make decisions that he or she
rationally believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation. The members of the change of control
board shall continue in office until resigning or
dissolution of the board under Section 14A(I).
The procedures in Section 14A(e) for selection
of the members of the change of control board
should minimize the risk of cronyism or political
motivation in the selection process. See Part III.C.
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(f) Responsibilities and Authority of Members of
a Change of Control Board
(I) Basic Responsibilities. The change of control
board will have responsibility, pursuant to a majority
of vote, for making all decisions normally within the
scope of the authority of the affected issueres board of
directors relating in any way to a potential or actual
merger or acquisition transaction with respect to such
issuer, including (1) deciding, pursuant to the
authority contained in paragraph (i)(1) below,
whether to consider, accept or reject a proposal to
enter into a merger or acquisition transaction; (ii)
preparation of a proxy statement, information
statement or other disclosure document for
shareholders relating to any merger or acquisition
transaction; (iii) preparation of the affected issuer's
response to a tender offer on Schedule 14D-9; (iv) the
making of severance payments conditioned on a
change of control transaction (i.e., golden parachutes),
(v) the repurchase at a premium of the stock of the
issuer from a potential acquirer (i.e., greenmail), (vi)
the implementation, pursuant to the authority
contained in paragraph (i)(1), of defensive tactics,
such as the issuance ofpoison pills, that may have the
foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender
offer, (vii) entering into lock-up agreements, such as
share option and share exchange agreements, and
asset option agreements, (viii) the payment of hello
fees or goodbye (i.e., termination) fees and (ix) any
other matters relating to a merger or acquisition
transaction.
(2) Hiring of Professionals. With the consent of
the Change of Control Official, the change of control
board may hire its own independent attorney,
investment banker and any other professionals as
required by the circumstances.
(3) Authority. The change of control board shall
have the same authority to act as the issuer's normal
board consistently with the governing state law, the
charter documents, and the by-laws of the affected
issuer. Thus, a change of control board may, provided
the applicable state law and charter documents
permit, issue a poison pill, subject only to the
business judgment rule set out in Section 14A(i).
(4) Cooperation of Regular Board. The board of
directors of the affected issuer and all officers and
other employees of the affected issuer shall cooperate
fully with the change of control board. In the event a
court, upon petition by the change of control board,
determines that the board of directors is not
cooperating fully, the court shall have the authority to
suspend the board and replace it with the change of
control board.
Proposed Section 14A(e)(I) gives the change of
control board complete control over all matters
bearing on a change of control transaction. There
would be no reason for a change of control board to
issue a deadhand pill, and any deal protection
devices adopted by the change of control board
would be subject to the business judgment rule, thus
eliminating the source of many disputes arising
under the current system. See Part III.D.
It is crucial that the change of control board
have the authority to retain its own independent
professionals. See Part III.D.
Proposed Section 14A only empowers the
change of control board to take those actions that
could otherwise be taken by the target's normal
board of directors. See Part III.D.
This type of provision is needed to force the
target's board to cooperate. See Part III.D.
20001
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(g) Compensation of Members of Change of
Control Board.
The members of the change of control board shall
be compensated by the affected issuer on a fee for
services basis pursuant to rules and a periodically
updated fee schedule promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In promulgating such
rules, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall
take into consideration such factors as the size of the
parties, the complexity of the transaction and the level
of fees that would be payable in the open market for
comparable work for comparable companies. The
members shall also be reimbursed for their reasonable
expenses, pursuant to rules promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
(h) Compensation of Professional Advisers.
(I) Fee for Services. The professional advisers to
the change of control board will be compensated by
the affected issuer on a fee for services basis pursuant
to rules and a periodically updated fee schedule
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Professional advisers shall also be
reimbursed for their reasonable expenses, pursuant to
rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
(2) Contingent Compensation. In appropriate
cases pursuant to rules promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission and with the approval of
the Change of Control Official, contingent fees may
be paid to investment bankers that are responsible for
adding significant value to the transaction for the
affected issuer's stockholders.
This type of compensation arrangement should
be both fair and acceptable to most potential
members of a change of control board. See Part
IIl.D.2.
S
This type of fee for services compensation
arrangement might be objectionable to some invest-
ment bankers, but in appropriate cases, contingent
fees could be paid under Section 14A(h)(2). See
Part III.D.
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(i) Scope of Authority, Duty of Care and the
Business Judgment Rule.
(1) Scope of Authority. The change of control
board, in the exercise of its business judgment, may
approve, reject or decline to consider a proposal to the
affected issuer to engage in a merger or acquisition
transaction and may take an action that has the fore-
seeable effect ofblocking an unsolicited tender offer.
(2) Other Constituencies. In the exercise of its
business judgment, the change of control board may
have regard for interests or groups (other than
shareholders) with respect to which the affected issu-
er has a legitimate concern if to do so would not
significantly disfavor the long-term interest of share-
holders.
(3) Duty of Care. In exercising his or her business
judgment, each member of the change of control
board has a duty to the affected issuer to perform his
or her functions in good faith, in a manner he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances. The duty set forth above includes the
obligation to make, or cause to be made, an inquiry
when, but only when, the circumstances would alert
a reasonable director or officer to the need therefor.
The extent of such inquiry shall be such as the
director reasonably believes to be necessary. In
performing his or her functions, a director is entitled
to rely on materials and persons in accordance with
the principles in Sections 4.02 and 4.03 of the ALl
Corporate Governance Project.
(4) Business Judgment Rule. A member of a
change of control board who makes a business judg-
ment in good faith fulfills his or her duty under this
section if: (a) he or she is not interested in the subject
of the business judgment; (b) he or she is informed
with respect to the subject of his or her business
judgment to the extent he or she reasonably believes
to be appropriate under the circumstances, and (c) he
or she rationally believes that his or her business
judgment was in the best interest of the corporation.
(5) Burden of Proof A person challenging the
conduct of a member of the change of control board
has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that there has been a breach of the duty of
care including the inapplicability of the business
judgment rule as set forth in paragraph (4) above, and
such person has the burden of proving that the breach
was the legal cause of damage suffered by the
corporation.
Section 14A(i)(!) adopts the standard set out in
Sections 6.01(a) and 6.02(a) of the AL Corporate
Governance Project. See Part III.E.
Section 14A(i)(2) adopts the view of Section
6.02(b)(I) of the ALI Corporate Governance Project
regarding other constituencies. See Part IlI.E.
Section 14A(i)(3) sets out the duty of care rule
contained in Section 4.0 1(a) of the ALI Corporate
Governance Project. See Part III.E.
Proposed Section 14A(i)(4) adopts the business
judgment rule as set forth in Section 4.01(c) of the
ALl Corporate Governance Project. See Part III.E.
The board's decision would be protected by the
business judgment rule as long as a majority of the
members approving the action is protected.
Section 14A(i)(5) adopts the burden of proof
provision of Section 4.01(d) of the AL Corporate
Governance Project, except a clear and convincing
standard of proof rule applies for establishing that




(0) No Personal Liability, Insurance and
Indemnification.
(1) No Personal Liability. Absent proof by
clear and convincing evidence that a member of a
change of control board acted with an intent to
defraud, no member of a change of control board
shall have any personal liability for actions taken or
not taken as a member of a change of control board.
(2) Insurance and Indemnification. Upon the
appointment of the change of control board the
affected issuer shall, pursuant to rules promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, promptly
provide indemnification and insurance for the
members of the change of control board. Such
insurance and indemnification is to cover all actions
taken in connection with the member's activities on
the change of control board, except any actions
amounting to fraud.
(k) Arbitration in Majority Control Freezeouts.
If a controlling shareholder controls sufficient
votes of the controlled corporation to unilaterally
effectuate the acquisition by merger, sale of assets or
otherwise, of all of the controlled corporation's stock
or of substantially all of its assets, and the controlling
shareholder and the change of control board for the
controlled corporation do not, within the time period
specified in rules promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, reach a decision on the price
and other terms for such transaction, then the price
and other terms shall be determined pursuant to a
binding arbitration proceeding in accordance with
rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
It is crucial that the members of the change of
control board be protected from personal liability,
except in the case of fraud. See Part III.F.
4.
Proposed Section 14A(k) is designed to
eliminate a deadlock between the change of control
board for a controlled sub and the controlling parent
in a freezeout transaction in which the controlling
parent has sufficient votes to unilaterally complete
the transaction. See Part III.G.
(I) Dissolution of Change of Control Board.
Once the affected issuer is no longer the subject of Once the change of control transaction is either
a proposed merger or acquisition, the change of abandoned or effectuated, there is no longer a need
control board shall petition the Change of Control for a change of control board. See Part III.H.
Official to have the change of control board dissolved.
If the change of control board does not, within a
reasonable period, file such a petition, then such a
petition may be filed by either the Securities and Ex-
change Commission or a shareholder or shareholders
of the affected issuer owning at least 5% of the issuers
outstanding common stock.
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(m) FederalJurisdiction and Preemption of State
Law.
(I) Federal Jurisdiction. Any suits brought under
this provision shall be brought in the appropriate
federal district court, which generally shall be the
district court for the district in which the affected
issuer has its headquarters. Such district court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
(2) Preemption of State Law. The provision shall
preempt all state statutes bearing on change of control
transactions, including all state appraisal statutes. This
preemption shall not apply to those provisions setting
out normal shareholder voting procedures for change
of control transactions. Thus, this provision preempts
such items as control share statutes, business
combination statutes, disgorgement requirements and
other constituency statutes. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall promulgate regulations
specifying those state statutes that are preempted.
(3) Preemption of Charter Documents. This
provision shall preempt all charter documents, by-
laws and other contractual arrangements of an
affected issuer bearing on merger and acquisition
transactions, other than those provisions setting out
normal shareholder voting procedures for such
transactions. Thus, this provision preempts all golden
parachute contracts, poison pills, fair price provisions
and shark repellant provisions entered into by the
corporation's regular board. The securities and
Exchange Commission shall promulgate rules speci-
fying those types of corporate provisions and
contracts that are preempted.
Proposed Section 14A(m)(I) makes it clear that
there is exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
change of control board. See Past 111.1.
Proposed Section 14A(m)(2) makes it clear that
this provision preempts all state appraisal statutes
and all non-normal state statutes bearing on change
of control transactions. See Part 111.1.
Proposed Section 14A(m)(3) clarifies that this
provision preempts all non-normal corporate and
contract provisions bearing on mergers and
acquisitions. This ensures that the change ofcontrol
board has plenary authority over such matters. See
Part 111.1
(n) Transition Rules.
(I) Delayed Effective Date. This provision shall Consideration could be given to grandfathering
be effective three months after the date of enactment, certain provisions for a limited period. See Part
III.K.
(2) Voiding Contracts. Upon the effective date of
this provision all executory contacts ofthe corporation
relating to matters within the jurisdiction of the
change of control board, such as golden parachute
contracts, poison pills, fair price provisions and shark
repellant provisions shall be null and void.
20001
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(o) Election Out. I
The public shareholders of a corporation otherwise
subject to this provision, which shareholders are in no
way related to or controlled by the management of the
corporation or a controlling shareholder, may,
pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, elect not to
have this provision or specified subsections of this
provision apply to the corporation.
This provision permits the public shareholders,
on their own initiative and without the influence of
management or a controlling shareholder, to elect to
have this provision or specified subsections of this
provision not apply to the corporation. Thus, for
example, the public shareholders could elect to have
the provision apply only to hostile tender offers.
Also, even after a change of control board is
appointed, a target's shareholders may, pursuant to
regulations promulgated by the SEC, elect to
remove the change of control board. See Par III.N.
(p) Exemption Pursuant to Rule.
The Securities and Exchange Commission may This provision permits the SEC to exempt
promulgate rules and regulations exempting certain certain domestic corporate issues from Section 14A.
corporate issuers from the application of this section Such an exemption may apply if, for example, a
where it appears that because of the structure of the controlling block of shares is held by a single
ownership of such corporation or the fact that the individual or family or the corporate issuer has only
corporation has just recently become a public recentlybecome a publicly-held corporation and the
corporation or any similar reason, it would be managers or organizers of the corporation own a
inappropriate to apply the change of control board significant percentage of the stock. Thus, the
concept to such corporation. exemption is designed to minimize the possibility
that Section 14A would discourse closely-held
corporations from doing initial public offerings.
(q) Illegality.
It shall constitute a violation of the Act for any This provision is designed to prevent parties
person or persons to make a non-bona fide tender from attempting to trigger a change of control
offer or a non-bona fide merger or acquisition board for strategic purposes.
proposal to a public corporation for the purpose of
causing a trigger event to occur and a change of
control board to be appointed.
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